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Abstract 
The optimal allocation of scarce resources for health improvement is a crucial factor to lower 
the burden of disease and to strengthen the productive capacities of people living in 
developing countries. This research project aims to devise tools in narrowing the gap between 
the actual allocation and a more efficient allocation of resources for health in the case of 
Tanzania. Firstly, the returns from alternative government spending across sectors such as 
agriculture, water etc. are analysed. Maximisation of the amount of Disability Adjusted Life 
Years (DALYs) averted per dollar invested is used as criteria. A Simultaneous Equation Model 
(SEM) is developed to estimate the required elasticities. The results of the quantitative 
analysis show that the highest returns on DALYs are obtained by investments in improved 
nutrition and access to safe water sources, followed by spending on sanitation. 
Secondly, focusing on the health sector itself, scarce resources for health improvement create 
the incentive to prioritise certain health interventions. Using the example of malaria, the 
objective of the second stage is to evaluate whether interventions are prioritized in such a 
way that the marginal dollar goes to where it has the highest effect on averting DALYs. 
PopMod, a longitudinal population model, is used to estimate the cost-effectiveness of six 
isolated and combined malaria intervention approaches. The results of the longitudinal 
population model show that preventive interventions such as insecticide–treated bed nets 
(ITNs) and intermittent presumptive treatment with Sulphadoxine-Pyrimethamine (SP) during 
pregnancy had the highest health returns (both US$ 41 per DALY averted).  
The third part of this dissertation focuses on the political economy aspect of the allocation of 
scarce resources for health improvement. The objective here is to positively assess how 
political party competition and the access to mass media directly affect the distribution of 
district resources for health improvement. Estimates of cross-sectional and panel data 
regression analysis imply that a one-percentage point smaller difference (the higher the 
competition is) between the winning party and the second-place party leads to a 0.151 
percentage point increase in public health spending, which is significant at the five percent 
level. In conclusion, we can say that cross-sectoral effects, the cost-effectiveness of health 
interventions and the political environment are important factors at play in the country’s 
resource allocation decisions. In absolute terms, current financial resources to lower the 
burden of disease in Tanzania are substantial. However, there is a huge potential in optimizing 
the allocation of these resources for a better health return. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die optimale Allokation von knappen Ressourcen zur Verbesserung der Gesundheit ist ein 
entscheidender Faktor für die Verringerung der Krankheitslast und die Stärkung der 
verfügbaren Produktionskapazitäten in Entwicklungsländern. Die vorliegende Dissertation soll 
durch die Anwendung verschiedener empirischer Methoden am Beispiel Tansanias zeigen, wie 
die Kluft zwischen der aktuellen und einer effizienteren Allokation von Gesundheitsressourcen 
verringert werden kann. In einem ersten Schritt wird analysiert, inwiefern 
sektorenübergreifende Investitionen in Landwirtschaft, Wasser etc. zur Verbesserung der 
Gesundheit beitragen können. Zur Schätzung der entsprechenden Elastizitäten wird ein 
simultanes Gleichungsmodell (SEM) mit dem Zielkriterium der sogenannten 
behinderungsbereinigten Lebensjahre (Disability Adjusted Life Years, DALYs) als Maßstab für 
Gesundheit formuliert. Die Ergebnisse der quantitativen Analyse zeigen, dass Investitionen in 
verbesserte Ernährung und Zugang zu sauberem Trinkwasser den größten positiven Effekt auf 
die Gesundheit der Bevölkerung haben. 
Knappe Ressourcen im Gesundheitssektor schaffen den Anreiz, sich auf bestimmte 
Maßnahmen zu konzentrieren. Im zweiten Schritt dieser Dissertation wird daher am Beispiel 
von Malaria analysiert, wie bei einem gegebenen Budget bestimmte Maßnahmen zu 
priorisieren sind, um den positiven Gesamteffekt auf die Gesundheit zu maximieren.  Das 
Verhältnis von Kosten und Effektivität von Malariainterventionen wird anhand eines 
Bevölkerungsmodells (PopMod) geschätzt. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse verdeutlichen, dass 
präventive Maßnahmen wie die Nutzung von mit Insektiziden behandelte Moskitonetze (ITNs) 
und die vorsorgliche Behandlung von Schwangeren mit Sulphadoxine-Pyrimethamine (SP) den 
größten Effekt auf die Verbesserung des Gesundheitszustandes der Bevölkerung haben. 
Im dritten Schritt wird im Rahmen der politischen Ökonomie analysiert, welche Auswirkungen 
der Wettbewerb zwischen politischen Parteien und der Zugang zu Massenmedien auf die 
Bereitstellung öffentlicher Gesundheitsgüter haben. Die Ergebnisse der Querschnitts- bzw. 
Paneldatenanalyse zeigen, dass ein um einen Prozentpunkt geringerer Unterschied (je größer 
der Wettbewerb) zwischen der erst- und zweitplatzierten Partei zu einem signifikanten 
Anstieg der öffentlichen Gesundheitsausgaben um 0,151 Prozentpunkte führt. Die 
vorliegende Dissertation identifiziert somit sektorenübergreifende Investitionen, die 
Kosteneffizienz von Interventionen und das politische Umfeld als ausschlaggebende Faktoren, 
die in Entscheidungen zur Allokation von knappen Gesundheitsressourcen einfließen sollten.
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1. Introduction 
The first chapter presents a brief introduction into the topic of resource allocation for health 
and derives the objectives and research questions of this dissertation. Section 1.1 gives some 
background information on the research topic and outlines the allocative decisions, which will 
be analysed in this dissertation. This is followed by a presentation of the research objectives in 
section 1.2, the main research questions and hypotheses in section 1.3 and the structure of 
the present work (section 1.4). 
1.1 Resource Allocation for Health 
Human capital investments are critical for the development and growth of nations. In addition 
to education and training, a minimum level of health care is a crucial factor to increase the 
productive capacity of people (Hayami, 2005). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
defined in the year 2000, addressed this challenge by calling for a reduction of child mortality 
rates (MDG4), an improvement of maternal health (MDG5), and the combat of HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria, and other diseases (MDG6). 
Today, developing countries are still faced with an extreme scarcity of resources for health 
improvement and an enormous burden of disease, especially among the poor and the 
marginalized, due to the vicious circle of poverty and ill health. Thus, strengthening the 
development and growth of a nation stricken by poverty will require governments to provide 
a minimum level of public health services to their citizens. However, the provision of public 
services strongly depends on the resources available at lower government levels. Since these 
resources are extremely scarce for the majority of developing countries, there is a need for 
prioritization. One example of a country facing these problems is the United Republic of 
Tanzania (Tanzania), which is said to have a highly inefficient health system (Makundi et al., 
2007 I) with a very low physician-to-population ratio compared to many other developing 
countries (Munga and Maestad, 2009). One way to deal with these challenges is to allocate 
more efficiently the given resources for health improvement. 
This dissertation aims to identify possible alternative strategies to close the gap between the 
actual allocation and the potentially more efficient allocation of scarce resources for health 
improvement in the case of Tanzania. Decisions on allocative issues are reached at various 
government levels, for example, at the central level, on general budget affairs or, at the 
district level, on the actual provision of public health services. In the following analysis, 
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allocative decisions at three government levels will be evaluated in order to identify the 
determinants of resource allocation. At the regional level, the marginal health returns to 
cross-sectoral government expenditures, measured in Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), 
will be analyzed to identify the potential for Intersectoral Health Action (IHA). The hypothesis 
that health priorities, at the central government level, are set in such a way that the marginal 
dollar goes to where it has the highest effect on averting1 DALYs will be tested, taking the case 
of malaria. From the central to the district level, we will explore how mechanisms of the 
political economy influence the distribution of resources and we will show how the resulting 
allocation may differ from an allocation in accordance with the burden of disease. 
1.2 Objectives and Purpose 
This dissertation aims to identify various ways to narrow the gap between a more efficient 
allocation and the actual allocation of resources for health improvement in Tanzania. This 
discussion is quite relevant due to the extreme scarcity of resources for health improvement 
as well as the high burden of diseases, such as HIV/AIDS or Malaria, present in Tanzania. 
One way to address this challenge is to allocate resources to government sectors with the 
highest impact on public health, since most of the common diseases in Tanzania have 
multifaceted causes, led by malnutrition and poor water supply (WHO & UN Water, 2012; NBS 
and Macro International Inc., 2011). However, should the government spend more on health 
care, education, infrastructure, or agricultural research to alleviate the intolerable burden of 
disease? Fan (2000, 2002, 2004, 2005) has used sectoral budget analysis to build a 
Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) aiming at the exploration of the relative impacts of 
cross-sectoral government expenditures, such as education and health, on poverty reduction 
in the cases of India, China, Uganda, and Tanzania.  In the case of Tanzania, Fan found that 
additional public investment in education, roads, and agricultural research has favorable 
impacts on poverty reduction. Part one of the proposed research builds on these results and 
uses a similar model to identify the marginal health returns to cross-sectoral government 
expenditures, under the normative assumption of minimizing DALYs. The analysis applies 
sectoral budget analysis as a new approach to evaluate the effects of IHA. 
                                                        
1 DALYs are negatively defined, which means that a DALY is a Disability Adjusted Life Year lost. Thus, interventions 
aim at averting DALYs. 
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According to the Government of Tanzania (URT, 2010), the “recognition of cross-sectoral 
contribution to outcomes and inter-sectoral linkages and synergies“ is one of the major 
prerequisites for the implementation of the Tanzanian poverty reduction strategy MKUKUTA. 
Each of the government's major sectors has its own prime objectives. Health is one of these 
major sectors, but improving health affects all other sectors' achievement of their objectives. 
The results of this budget analysis will be used as a basis to discuss the challenges and 
opportunities that arise during the process of cross-sectoral collaboration. As an outcome, 
policy recommendations on how to improve IHA will be provided. 
Since resources for health interventions in a developing country like Tanzania are extremely 
scarce, there is also a need for prioritizing health interventions. However, most of these 
resources remain disproportionately spent on health interventions with a low overall impact 
(James et al., 2005). To contribute to the solution of this problem, the objective of part two is 
to carry out a normative analysis on how health interventions should be prioritized in such a 
way that the marginal dollar goes to where it has the highest effect on averting DALYs. The 
analysis is carried out on the example of interventions combating malaria and builds on a 
comprehensive study led by the WHO (Morel et al., 2005). For the whole of southern and 
eastern Africa, a state-transition model was used to show that case management with ACT at 
90% target coverage is most cost-effective in lowering the malaria burden (INT$ 12 per DALY 
averted), followed by the combination of ITNs (INT$ 28), IRS (INT$ 41), and IPTP (INT$ 41). 
However, this and further studies have limited relevance in the priority setting process of a 
single country, since many factors may vary across settings, e.g. the availability, mix and 
quality of inputs, local prices, labour costs, demographic structures, and epidemiological 
characteristics (Hutubessy et al., 2003). Consequently, there is a need for country-specific 
cost-effectiveness assessments. The few analyses that exist for the case of Tanzania have 
assessed single malaria interventions with limited specifications only. This study will be the 
first to analyze several strategies to combat malaria within a standardized modelling 
framework, making results comparable. 
In order to take into account changing resistance of parasites to certain malaria drugs, the 
long-term population-level impact of selected interventions is calculated by tracking the 
Tanzanian population over a ten-year implementation period, from 2002 to 2012. In the case 
of Tanzania, malaria causes the second largest disease burden after HIV/AIDS (WHO, 2009). 
The ecological conditions of the country favor the expansion of the anopheles gambiae, which 
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is the most effective mosquito in transmitting malaria parasites. Tanzania has made great 
progress in scaling up interventions to fight the dreaded disease, including the distribution of 
insecticide–treated bed nets (ITNs), indoor residual spraying (IRS), intermittent presumptive 
treatment with Sulphadoxine-Pyrimethamine (SP) during pregnancy, and case management 
with Chloroquine (CQ), SP, and Artemisinin-based combination treatments (ACTs). The 
Tanzanian government has already acknowledged the importance of prioritization with 
respect to the health sector. “ … prioritisation within these sectors needs to receive 
maximum attention to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the spending programs” 
(URT, 2011 II, p. 14). To achieve this, timely information on health effects and costs of several 
measures to combat malaria are urgently needed to inform policy makers. The actual 
allocation of financial resources, within the health sector to fight malaria, will be compared to 
an optimal allocation, based on the results of this analysis. The identification of the relative 
impact of various measures to strengthen public health will enable policymakers to 
understand the trade-offs between different investments and enable them to set health 
priorities in such a way that a higher amount of DALYs can be averted. 
Distributing resources for health improvement to regions, proportionally to the burden of 
disease, can reduce inefficiencies in the allocation of these resources. However, political 
economy influences may hinder this process. Similarly to other countries, Tanzania allocates 
government and non-government resources for health improvement, from the national to the 
district level, according to an official allocation formula, taking into account population 
patterns, poverty, remoteness, and the burden of disease. It remains questionable whether 
these are the only determinants of local resources for health improvement since politicians 
have different incentives to provide public health services and to reduce poverty. Governments 
are responsive through the electoral process (Downs 1957). Studies of government 
responsiveness in Britain, Denmark, and the United States showed that political attention is 
indeed higher when under pressure (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2007). Consequently, the 
amount of district health spending is also based on various political factors, such as the 
competition among political parties. Beyond political factors, mass media affects the level of 
district resources for health improvement due to their role of transmitting politically relevant 
information to the electorate and monitoring politicians’ efforts to providing public services  
(Besley, Burges and Prat 2002, Strömberg 2004). 
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However, most of the previous studies focus on the political economy of developed countries, 
and, in particular, the United States. Since institutional arrangements and electoral systems are 
at an earlier stage in the developing world, mechanisms of government attention might differ. 
As a contribution to close this research gap, the following analysis aims at answering the 
question whether similar effects of political factors and mass media on government 
responsiveness also exist in a very low-income country. Consequently, recommendations to 
modify allocative decision mechanisms can be made and the importance of good governance 
for the political economy will be explained. 
1.3 Main Research Question, Hypotheses, and Sub-Questions 
To answer the main research question: “how to close the gap between actual and optimal 
resource allocation for health in Tanzania”, selected theories of health resource allocation will 
be tested. Each research question focuses on a certain level of action.  Firstly, at the regional 
level, potential synergies between the health sector and related sectors, through cross-sectoral 
collaboration, will be identified and analyzed (chapter three). Secondly, the process of health 
priority setting, in a context of extreme resource scarcity, will be analyzed taking the case of 
malaria (chapter four). From the central to the local level, we will explore whether resources 
for health improvement are allocated to the district level, in accordance with the potential of 
reducing the burden of disease.  Furthermore, the role of the political economy will also be 
explored (chapter five). 
In accordance with the theoretical framework described in section 3.3, IHA is needed to 
improve the health status of people living in developing countries. Since governments face tight 
budgets, politicians need to know the health impact of additional investment in health related 
areas and synergies across sectors. The underlying normative concept to measure these 
elasticities is to calculate the amount of DALYs that can be averted per additional dollar 
invested. Consequently, chapter three of this dissertation aims to answer the following 
research question: 
Q1: What are the marginal health returns on government expenditure across sectors? 
The study benefits from secondary data on social indicators and public spending within a 
Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM). Information on the returns on investments in various 
sectors is a pre-requisite to devise ways to explore mechanisms in order to implement cross-
sectoral collaboration. Such an interdisciplinary approach is applied, for example, when the 
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transport sector includes questions regarding the reduction of pedestrian and vehicle accidents 
into their proposal for a new freeway (Egan et al., 2003). According to coalition theory, which is 
the underlying theoretical concept of IHA, the determinants of successful cross-sectoral 
collaboration are the initial distribution of resources, the payoffs for each sector, non-utilitarian 
preferences, and the rules of the game (Gamson (1961), see section 3.3.1).  In assuming that 
these factors are determined in such a way that all sectors profit from cooperation, we can 
assume the validation of the following hypothesis:  
H1: Intersectoral Health Action (IHA) leads to synergies in allocating resources for health 
improvement and contributes to an optimized resource allocation for health. 
To better understand the mechanisms behind IHA, the following subquestions have to be 
answered: what are the major preconditions for a successful cross-sectoral collaboration? 
Which organisations and ministries are currently the main drivers for IHA? Does IHA include the 
private sector and faith based organisations? All these sub questions will be answered with the 
help of semi-structured interviews and the analysis of key documents. 
Moving from cross-sectoral thoughts to the health sector itself, one key challenge is to reduce 
major projected causes of the disease burden by increasing the allocative and technical 
efficiency of health systems. In this context, allocative efficiency means the distribution of 
resources for health improvement across interventions in such a way that the highest possible 
level of health is reached for the people living in a certain region. Since resources in a 
developing country like Tanzania are extremely scarce, priorities of health interventions have to 
be set. Priority setting is most important for interventions combating major diseases, for 
example, plasmodium falciparum malaria, causing the second highest burden of disease in the 
country. Assuming an optimal allocation of resources for health improvement and the 
minimization of DALYs as a normative measurement concept, we can state the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Interventions to combat malaria are prioritized in such a way that the marginal dollar 
goes to where it has the highest impact on averting DALYs. 
Methodically, cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) will be applied to test this hypothesis. The 
identification of the relative impact of various measures to lower the malaria burden will 
enable policymakers to understand the trade-offs between different strategies. Moreover, an 
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adequate priority setting process to ensure efficient resources allocation depends heavily on 
the availability, the quality, and the use of health information as an input into the decision-
making process. Consequently, the first problem within this process might be the responsible 
health planners' lack of awareness of the impacts of certain health investments and the missing 
capacities and incentives to carry out an appropriate priority setting process that includes 
questions of allocative efficiency. Secondly, the criteria of Donors and NGOs may be used to set 
health priorities (e.g. earmarked funding) due to their high influence on decision-making at the 
local level (Kapiri & Norheim, 2004). Moreover, political constraints such as dominant interest 
groups and multiple levels of government may hinder priority setting in line with the efficiency 
criteria (Makundi et al., 2007 II). To further evaluate the priority setting process for health in 
the case of Tanzania, the following issues have to be explored: to what extent are disease-
related, patient-related, and society-related criteria (e.g. equity of health care access) included 
in the health priority setting process? Who should be the main actors in health priority setting? 
What are the major challenges of the health priority setting process? Again, all these sub 
questions will be answered with the help of semi-structured interviews and the analysis of key 
documents in chapter four. 
Besides cross-sectoral and sectoral ways of enhancing the efficiency of resources for health 
improvement, political factors often play a major role in decisions on resource allocation. From 
a theoretical point of view, allocative efficiency is ensured when resources for health 
improvement are distributed between different regions and districts according to their relative 
needs. This would result in a larger flow of resources to districts with a higher burden of disease 
compared to healthier districts. However, whether this corresponds to reality remains 
questionable. To express political interests, people of a certain region must vote and they must 
know whether resources have been allocated to the preferred public services, in the past, by 
the elected politicians. Consequently, politicians might pay more attention to regions where 
many have access to mass media and where political competition and voter turnout is higher 
(Strömberg, 2004). This may lead to the allocation of more resources for health improvement 
to these regions and determines the level of equity reached. Furthermore, the positive analysis 
in chapter five aims to test the following hypothesis: 
 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR HEALTH IN TANZANIA – DETERMINANTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
8 
H3: Political factors and mass media directly affect the distribution of district resources for 
health improvement in Tanzania 
Indirect effects of mass media on health spending via voter turnout are explored. This 
information is needed to understand the mechanisms of government responsiveness within 
the health sector and to emphasize the importance of democratic structures for an efficient 
allocation of scarce resources. The study benefits from Tanzanian secondary data on social 
indicators, public spending, and the results of the last two parliamentary elections in 2005 and 
2010. Cross-sectional and panel data regression analysis is used to estimate the intended 
effects for the 134 districts on Tanzania mainland.  
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows: chapter 2 presents a brief overview on Tanzania’s 
economy, health policies, decentralized governance, and burden of disease. Section 2.1 
discusses the economic situation of the country and corresponding trends in public 
expenditure. This is followed by a description of current and past health reforms in section 2.2 
and a review of the progressing decentralization process in section 2.3. The disease burden of 
Tanzania is presented in section 2.4. 
The first empirical analysis is presented in chapter 3, dealing with the marginal health returns 
on cross-sectoral government spending. After a brief introduction, section 3.2 reviews the 
groundwork of various authors regarding both, the need for IHA and the relative importance of 
certain sectors. In the following section, the theoretical underpinnings of cross-sectoral 
collaboration for health are discussed with regard to the incentives and conditions to form 
coalitions aiming at the improvement of public health. The subsequent section 3.3.2 derives a 
SEM to model the outcomes of these coalitions. This is followed by the quantitative analysis 
including the description of data sources and a discussion of estimation methods and major 
results. The data and findings of the qualitative analysis are presented in section 3.5. In 
addition, examples of implemented IHA are given. Finally, conclusions, policy 
recommendations, and limitations of the study are presented at the end of this chapter. 
A second aspect of health resource allocation is presented in chapter 4, testing the hypothesis 
that interventions to combat malaria are prioritized in such a way that the marginal dollar 
goes to where it has the highest effect on averting DALYs. It is organized as follows: after a 
brief introduction in section 4.1, section 4.2 summarizes the current status of the Malaria 
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burden in Tanzania. The subsequent section reviews the existing literature on the cost-
effectiveness analysis of malaria interventions, at the international and the national level, 
including the added value of this study (section 4.3). Section 4.4 discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings of cost-effectiveness analysis and derives the population model applied in this 
chapter. The estimates of the quantitative analysis are presented in section 4.5, followed by 
the results of the structured interviews and some ethical considerations. The final section 
outlines the conclusions drawn from the analysis. 
Chapter 5 positively assesses how political party competition and the access to mass media 
directly affect the distribution of district resources for health improvement. It is organized as 
follows: section 5.2 describes the development of the political and electoral system in 
Tanzania including the role of the media. The subsequent section 5.3 reviews the existing 
literature on determinants of government responsiveness, including the added value of this 
study. Section 5.4 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of government responsiveness and 
explains the corresponding regression models that will be used to identify causal effects of 
the political economy and mass media on the provision of public health services. The 
corresponding estimates of the quantitative analysis are presented in section 5.5. Finally, 
conclusions, policy recommendations, and limitations of the study are presented at the end of 
this chapter. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the quantitative and qualitative results of the three previous empirical 
chapters and gives some insights on how these three aspects of health resource allocation are 
linked to each other. Furthermore, corresponding policy recommendations are given and 
missing aspects of resource allocation are discussed. 
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2. Background 
The following chapter presents a brief overview of Tanzania’s economy, health policies, 
decentralized governance, and burden of disease. Section 2.1 discusses the economic 
situation of the country and corresponding trends in public expenditure. This is followed, in 
section 2.2, by a description of current and past health reforms and, in section 2.3, a review of 
the progressing decentralization process. Moreover, the disease burden of Tanzania is 
presented in section 2.4. 
2.1 The Tanzanian Economy and Trends in Public Expenditure 
During the last two decades, the Tanzanian Economy has dismantled its socialist economic 
controls and moved to a liberal market economy. Measures that have been taken include the 
encouragement of both foreign and domestic private investment, the introduction of certain 
policies to reduce the budget deficit, the removal of price controls, and the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises. Liberalized trade led to an increase of exports of goods and services 
from 24.1%, in 2006, to 30.2%, in 2012 (% of GDP). Imports of goods and services rose at the 
same time from 35.8% to 44.5% (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA), 2013 II). 
However, Tanzania’s integration into the world economy is still comparatively low. This was 
one reason why the recent global recession only had a small negative impact on Tanzania 
mainland. A second reason was the strong gold price which bolstered the mining sector. In 
2012, the service sector was the largest contributor to the GDP (43.9%), followed by 
agriculture, hunting and forestry (24.7%), industry and construction (22.1%), and fishing 
(1.4%, MoFEA, 2013 II). However, about 80% of the workforce is employed in the agricultural 
sector, which also accounts for 85% of exports (CIA, 2014). 
The GDP per capita is a widely used indicator to assess the income and wealth situation of a 
certain geographical area. In turn, income and wealth influence public health through various 
channels (see section 3.3). Total GDP at market prices rose from about 14 billion Tanzanian 
shillings2 in 1999/2000 to about 32 billion Tanzanian shillings in 2010/2011 (table 1). This 
corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 7.9%, which is remarkably high compared to 
other developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (4.4%) and OECD countries (1.9%). However, 
today’s per capita GDP remains at a very low level of 824,000 current Tanzanian shillings (527 
current US Dollars) with high differences across regions (map 1). The percentage of people 
                                                        
2 1 USD = 1441 Tanzanian Shillings. 
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living with less than 1.25 PPP-dollars a day was still 68 percent in 2007 (World Bank, 2013). 
Map 1: Regional per Capita GDP at Current Prices, 2010 (in thousands of Tanzanian Shillings) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics / Ministry of Finance (2011) 
Besides direct public investments in health, the expenditures on sectors relevant to health 
such as education, water, and agriculture highly influence the health status of the Tanzanian 
people through various channels. Total government expenditures, including all sectors, 
increased from 2,373 billion Tanzanian shillings during the budget year 1999/2000 to 10,750 
billion Tanzanian shillings in 2010/2011 (Table 1)3. This corresponds to an annual growth rate 
of 14.7 percent. In relation to GDP at market prices, public expenditure steadily increased 
from 17 percent, in 1999/2000, to 33 percent in 2010/2011, which is consistent with the 
average in developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 All government expenditures have been converted into 2010 constant prices using the GDP deflator. 
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Table 1: Government Expenditure on Major Sectors, 2010 constant billion Tanzanian shillings 
 
Year Education Health Water Agriculture  Total 
Government 
Expenditure 
GDP (market 
prices) 
1999/00 443.17 165.07 29.48 43.91 2,373.39 13,927.26 
2000/01 481.72 190.30 34.58 36.10 2,405.36 16,303.48 
2001/02 618.93 255.00 58.32 57.25 2,625.04 17,536.16 
2002/03 730.88 312.83 86.96 100.87 3,333.54 18,893.68 
2003/04 661.88 334.03 94.25 181.23 3,888.64 20,145.42 
2004/05 1,021.39 455.62 207.31 177.72 4,702.89 21,608.81 
2005/06* 908.14 496.19 216.90 228.83 5,473.40 22,995.85 
2006/07* 1,148.24 550.67 244.67 251.89 6,249.61 25,053.31 
2007/08* 1,284.04 697.47 365.47 448.11 7,173.15 26,529.82 
2008/09 1,517.28 798.48 250.52 318.60 7,807.71 27,434.52 
2009/10 1,716.50 787.20 347.30 472.30 9,532.70 31,109.00 
2010/11 2,062.31 1,116.57 350.28 836.85 10,749.63 32,175.93 
* Budget data available only (not actual expenditure)   
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Within the government’s discretionary budget, more than 60 percent is allocated to six key 
sectors including education, health, water, agriculture, roads, and energy. This share increased 
by more than 10 percent during previous budget years (URT, 2011 II). On average, the 
education sector received most of the allocated funds (19 percent), followed by health (9 
percent), agriculture (4 percent), and water (3 percent, see figure 1).
 
Figure 1: Government Expenditure on Major Sectors (percentage) 
Source: Authors calculations / Ministry of Finance 
As mentioned above, the largest share of the local population in Tanzania works in the 
agricultural sector, providing food, medicines, and raw material for domestic and foreign 
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industries (URT, 2010). Since a large share of the food produced is consumed domestically, 
the developments in this sector directly influence the nutritional status of the people, which 
in turn affects productivity, susceptibility to infections, and recovery time from illness. The 
allocation of funds to agriculture, relatively to the total budget, increased from 2 percent, 
during the budget year 1999/2000, to 8 percent in 2010/2011 (figure 1). In absolute figures, 
the agricultural budget rose from 43.91 to 836.85 billion Tanzanian shillings during the same 
period of time. 
There are large regional variations in per capita agricultural spending in favor of wealthier 
regions such as Arusha, Kilimanjaro or Ruvuma (Appendix 1). In general, these resources consist 
of subsidies for agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, improved seeds and agro chemicals as well 
as agricultural research and extension. As mentioned above, weaknesses in the agricultural 
production directly influence the food security in rural areas. The Tanzanian DHS 2010 shows 
that 42 percent of children under the age of five are stunted or have low height-for-age, 5 
percent have low weight-for-height or are wasted and 16 percent have low weight-for-age. 
These results show the prevalence of chronic and acute undernourishment in Tanzania. Cross-
sectoral efforts are needed in the field of nutrition, as children, with mothers who have at least 
some secondary education, were less likely than others to have micronutrient deficiencies (e.g. 
using inadequately iodised salt) (NBS, 2011). 
Public expenditure to improve access to safe water resources is critical to prevent unhygienic 
practices and the use of polluted water for food preparation, both of which can lead to water-
borne diseases such as diarrhoea and cholera. For the period of 1999/2000 to 2010/2011, the 
budget of the water and sanitation sector increased from 29.48 to 350.28 billion Tanzanian 
shillings (table 1). This corresponds to an average increase of 25.2 percent per year. In relative 
terms, the budget share allocated to water and sanitation fluctuated between 1 and 5 percent 
with an average of 3 percent (figure 1). Landlocked and low-income areas receive comparably 
less than other regions (Appendix 2).  
MDG 7 aims at halving the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation (United Nations, 2011). In the case of Tanzania, 68.3 
percent of households have access to safe water sources, with a minimum of 45.0 percent in 
Shinyanga region and a maximum of 99.5 percent in Kagera region. This shows an increase of 
28.1 percent compared to 2004, where 53.3 percent of the population had access to safe 
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water (Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority EWURA, 2009). In general, the 
probability of being connected to the water network is significantly higher in urban areas. 
Even if Tanzania is lagging behind in reaching the global MDG drinking water target of 89 
percent coverage by 2015, the country is developing well in contrast to other countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa (60 percent coverage, United Nations, 2011). To be classified as using 
improved sanitation facilities, a household has to be connected to a public sewer or a septic 
system or has to use improved toilet facilities (UNICEF/WHO 2004). In 2010, only 13 percent 
of Tanzanian households used such improved facilities (NBS, 2011). 
Investment in education is positively correlated with the health of mothers, reproductive 
behavior, healthy lifestyle, and many other aspects of public health (Ross and Wu, 1995; 
Arole, 1999). The government of Tanzania has acknowledged the high importance of 
education and allocated an average of 19 percent of the total annual budget to this sector, 
which significantly exceeds the allocation to other priority sectors (figure 1). Total public 
expenditure on education increased from 443 billion Tanzanian shillings, in 1999/2000, to 
2,062 billion Tanzanian shillings, in 2010/2011 (table 1). This corresponds to an average 
annual growth rate of 15.0 percent. Regional per capita expenditure on education varies 
strongly across regions, with less than 10,000 Tanzanian shillings in Kigoma region and more 
than 20,000 shillings in Arusha, Kilimanjaro, and Iringa region (Appendix 3). Literacy can help 
the Tanzanian people understand the messages of health workers and use the drugs as 
prescribed. Results from the latest surveys indicate that 72 percent of women and 82 percent 
of men are literate, showing a small increase, for both sexes, since 2004/2005 (NBS, 2011). 
These figures top the average literacy rates of the whole Sub-Saharan Africa region, with 54 
percent of women and 71 percent of men being able to read and write properly (World Bank, 
2013). 
2.2 Health Policies, Reforms and Financing 
With the beginning of the new millennium, Tanzania started to implement various health 
reforms planned during the 1990s. It was one of the leading countries adopting a sector-wide 
approach (SWAP) for medium and long-term planning. This approach metamorphosed many 
different vertical programmes of numerous actors into a joint initiative in which government 
and donor institutions finance the health sector within a coherent policy. The objective of a 
SWAP was to increase the coordination within the health sector and to strengthen national 
leadership, health management, and service delivery (Hutton and Tanner, 2004). As requested 
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in the poverty-reduction strategy MKUKUTA, interventions to improve child survival such as 
Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI), insecticide-treated nets, immunization, or 
vitamin A supplementation were scaled up (Masanja et al., 2008). The difficulty remains in the 
evaluation of these reforms. After a decade of working with a health SWAP in Tanzania, its 
impact has received mixed reviews (Zinnen & Robert, 2010). Programs of sectors related to 
health such as Nutrition Improvement Projects (NIPs) have been implemented since the early 
80s. However, the success of these programs was hampered by high transaction costs caused 
by great disharmony of the institutions involved (Msuya, 1999). 
Today, funding sources used to finance the Tanzanian health sector include the government's 
budget, the Health Sector Basket Fund (HSBF), comprised of funds from development 
partners, collected user-fees, and funds from health insurances and NGOs (Boex, 2008). All 
these resources compete with the financial needs of other sectors. Although nominal health 
resource allocation increased during the last few years, the government has failed to reach an 
annual growth rate of 24% as intended in the Health Sector Strategy Plan (URT, 2009 I). Health 
spending, as a percentage of total government spending, increased from 7.0%, in the financial 
year 1999/2000, to 10.4%, in 2010/2011 (Table 1). Total per capita health spending increased 
from US$ 3.60, in 1999/2000, to US$ 17.79, in 2010/2011, but remains far below the target of 
US$ 34, recommended by the WHO to address health challenges (URT, 2009 I, authors' 
calculations). 
2.3 Decentralized Governance 
Today, mainland Tanzania is subdivided into 156 district administrations, municipalities, cities, 
and towns (NBS, 2013). Each of these so-called Local Government Authorities (LGAs) elects its 
own district council. Since the introduction of the Decentralization by Devolution (D-by-D) 
policy, LGAs have become more and more important in delivering local health services. 
Various key actors are involved in the process of allocating resources for health improvement 
from the central to the local level. The central institution responsible for monitoring all 
processes, at LGA-level, is the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government in 
the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO-RALG). LGAs have to follow all guidelines and policies 
disseminated by PMO-RALG. The MoHSW is the central line ministry responsible for providing 
sector-specific policy guidelines on planning, budgeting, and implementation of local health 
services. The task of the Regional Health Secretary and the Regional Health Management 
Team is then to spread these guidelines to LGAs and to link central-local government 
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relations. The Council directors and the Council Health Management Team are finally in 
charge of overseeing the implementation of planned health services (Haki Elimu & Policy 
Forum 2008). 
Prior to the approval of local health spending by elected district representatives in the 
parliament, the budget plan has to pass through several government levels. At the beginning 
of the budget cycle, LGAs review lower level village and ward plans and construct a 
consolidated budget for the whole district. This initial plan is divided into development and 
recurrent budgets. As a further step, the regional secretariat verifies the budget plan at the 
LGA-level, combines it to a plan for the whole region, and submits it to PMO-RALG. Here, the 
budget estimates are reviewed again, consolidated into a single budget, and finally submitted 
for approval to the district representatives in the parliament. This analysis treats these 
representatives as the most influential actors within the process of state-to-district resource 
allocation. At each of these stages, the plans might be sent back to the lower level for 
revision. The final budget can vary substantially from the initial budget, since national 
development priorities often differ from the preferences of the local population. The 
disbursement of funds begins after the budget has passed the parliament. Since all 
disbursements are published in newspapers, the amount of funds available to implement 
health services can be monitored by the local population (Haki Elimu & Policy Forum 2008).  
The sources of health funding at the central level include government funds and financial 
resources from the donors’ Health Sector Basket Fund (HSBF), both disbursed through the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA, figure 2). These funds are allocated from the 
central to the local government level according to an official allocation formula. This regulation 
takes into account the population size (70%), poverty level (10%), the district medical vehicle 
route4 (10%), and mortality of children under the age of five (10%) (MoHSW, 2007) However, it 
remains questionable whether these factors are the only determinants of local resources for 
health improvement. As this analysis suggests, political factors and mass media might play a 
role in resource allocation. A total budget of 1,289 billion Tanzanian shillings5 was allocated to 
the health sector during the financial year 2012/2013, compared to 1,209 billion Tanzanian 
shillings in the previous financial year. Out of the total budget in 2011/2012, a share of 471 
billion Tanzanian shillings (38 percent) was directly distributed to LGAs and regions. This 
                                                        
4 Distance regularly travelled by vehicles of the health sector to account for higher operational costs in rural areas. 
5 All government expenditures have been converted into 2010 constant prices using the GDP deflator. 1 USD = 1.562,73 Tanzanian Shillings 
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amount was further divided at the local level into a recurrent expenditure of 327 billion 
Tanzanian shillings and a development expenditure of 144 billion Tanzanian shillings. However, 
the proportion of the total government budget allocated to health has declined from 10.8 
percent, in 2011/2012, to 10.3 percent, in 2012/2013 (MoFEA, 2013). There is a large variation 
in per capita health spending at the district level, ranging from 1,069 Tanzanian shillings, in the 
Njombe district (Iringa region), to 20,490 Tanzanian shillings, in the Pangani district (Tanga 
region, 2010). Similar differences occur at the regional level, as shown in map 2. The reasons 
for these variations at sub-national levels, beyond differing poverty and 'under-five' mortality 
rates, are the subject of this analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Financial Flows in the Health Sector of Tanzania 
Source: Boex 2008. DPs = Development Partners, VPs = Vertical Projects, MSD = Medial Stores Department, RH = Regional Hospital, DH =  
District Hospital, HC = Health Centre, D = Dispensary 
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Map 2: Regional per Capita Health Investment at Current Prices, 2010 (in Tanzanian Shillings) 
 
Source: Login Tanzania Database 2011 (mapped by the author) 
2.4 Burden of Disease 
The current burden of disease in Tanzania has been evaluated by the latest Tanzania 
Demographic Health Survey (DHS / NBS, 2011), a nationally representative survey of 10,300 
households selected from 475 sample points throughout Tanzania. According to the survey, the 
country was successful in reducing its under-five child mortality rate from 147 deaths per 1000 
live births, in 1999, to 81 deaths per 1000 live births, in 2010. Similarly, the infant mortality rate 
declined from 68, in 2005, to 51, in 2010 (deaths per 1000 live births, respectively). This is well 
on track to achieve MDG 4 (TGPSH, 2010). 
HIV/AIDS still causes the highest amount of annual DALYs lost, compared to other diseases, 
with 3,276,000 of 18,189,000 total annual DALYs (WHO, 2009). However, HIV prevalence 
slightly decreased from 7% in 2003/2004 to 6% in 2007/2008 according to HIV/AIDS and 
Malaria Indicator Surveys (NBS, 2005/2008). The level of HIV infection is higher for urban 
residents compared to rural residents (9 and 5 percent, respectively).  However, prevalence 
rates for HIV/AIDS have to be considered with caution, since errors in testing and political 
pressure are high. Increased use of contraceptive methods also contributed to these 
achievements. The use of contraceptives relies heavily upon cross-sectoral investments in 
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education, as evidenced by the increased usage: from 22 percent of married women, with no 
education, to 52 percent of married women, with at least secondary education (NBS, 2011). 
The prevalence of Malaria is the second largest cause of annual DALYs lost in Tanzania 
(1,644,000 DALYs). Efforts to reduce this burden of disease include the distribution of 
insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) and antimalaria drugs.  In 2010, three out of four Tanzanian 
households owned at least one mosquito net, but the percentage of households who owned an 
ITN was only 64. There is also an increasing distribution of intermittent preventive treatment 
(IPT) to protect pregnant women from malaria. The percentage of women who received the 
needed amount of IPTs (IPT-2) increased from 22%, in 2004/2005, to 30%, in 2007/2008. 
Furthermore, acute respiratory infection (ARI) is one of the leading causes of morbidity and 
mortality in Tanzania (1,478,000 annual DALYs). Pneumonia is the most serious type of ARI for 
young children. Fortunately, the prevalence of ARI symptoms among children, under the age of 
five, declined from 8 percent, in 2004/2005, to 4 percent, in 2010 (NBS, 2011). An additional, 
tremendous amount of 1,150,000 DALYs lost is caused by diarrhoeal diseases. Dehydration is a 
major health risk especially among young children. Cross-sectoral investments, in water and 
sanitation, are needed to prevent unhygienic practices and the use of polluted water, the two 
main causes of diarrhoeal diseases. According to the DHS, the prevalence of diarrhoea 
increased slightly from 12.6 percent, in 2004/2005, to 14.6 %, in 2010. 
Table 2: Prevalence Rates of Major Diseases in Tanzania 
Year Malaria ARI Diarrhoea Year HIV/AIDS 
2004/2005 24.2% 8% 12.6% 2003/2004 7% 
2010 23.0% 4% 14.6% 2007/2008 6% 
Source: NBS, 2005; 2008; 2011. 
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3. Intersectoral Health Action: Exploring the Health-Agriculture-Education Nexus 
Chapter 3 analyzes the health returns from alternative government spending across sectors. 
After a brief introduction on IHA, the groundwork of various authors regarding the need for 
IHA and the relative importance of certain sectors, is presented in section 3.2. In the following 
section, the theoretical underpinnings of cross-sectoral collaboration for health are discussed 
and a SEM is derived to model the outcomes of these coalitions (section 3.3). This is followed 
by a quantitative analysis, including the description of data sources, and a discussion of 
estimation methods and major results in section 3.4. The data and findings of the qualitative 
analysis are presented in section 3.5. In addition, examples of implemented IHA are given. 
Finally, conclusions, policy recommendations, and limitations of the study are presented at 
the end of this chapter. 
3.1 Introduction 
In the literature, a clear consensus exists regarding the necessity of IHA to fight against the 
high burden of disease prevalent in many developing countries (O’Neill et al., 1997, Benson, 
2007 etc.), since most of the common diseases have multifaceted causes led by malnutrition 
and poor water supply (WHO & UN Water, 2012). Thus, cross-sectoral action is needed to 
strengthen the health status of the population. Each of the governments' major sectors has its 
own prime objectives. Health is one of these major sectors, but improving health affects all 
other sectors in achieving their objectives. However, should the government spend more on 
health care, education, infrastructure, or agricultural research to fight against the intolerable 
burden of disease? For example, Tanzania faces a tight government budget that is already 
supported, to a large extent, by the donor community. Consequently, politicians need to 
know the health impact of additional investment in health related areas in order to apply the 
given resources most efficiently and to use synergies in allocating preventive resources for 
health improvement. Moreover, to increase such cooperation efforts in the future, they have 
to be aware of the preconditions and skills required for successful IHA. 
So far, evidence regarding the relative size of the impact of cross-sectoral spending on health 
has been limited (Fan 2000; 2002; 2004; 2005). This chapter aims to provide the information 
needed for future policy making. First, the marginal health returns on cross-sectoral 
government expenditures are identified with the help of a quantitative budget analysis. The 
underlying normative concept to measure these elasticities is to calculate the amount of DALYs 
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that can be averted per additional dollar invested. The study benefits from secondary data on 
social indicators and public spending within a Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM). Upon 
establishing the returns on investments in certain sectors, the political mechanisms to 
implement cross-sectoral collaboration have been explored. This has been done with the help 
of semi-structured interviews and the analysis of key documents. 
3.2 Literature Review 
The need for a comprehensive health care strategy, including IHA, was mentioned first at the 
Alma-Ata conference on Primary Health Care in 1978. Further initiatives such as the Ottawa 
Charter for Health Promotion (1986), the WHO conference on IHA (1997), and the Bangkok 
Charter for Health Promotion (2005) supported the idea of working across sectoral boundaries 
(Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), 2007). Various concepts and efforts, such as the Social 
Determinants of Health (SDOH) project, initiated by the WHO, have been developed to 
implement IHA in practice. In line with the final report of the SDOH project, the existing health 
gap could be closed by investing in education, housing, employment, transport, and health, at 
the same time and at all government levels. They further emphasized the importance of 
sufficient nourishment of mothers, since adequate nutrition begins before birth (Marmot et. al, 
2008). The European Union and South Australia have started to implement a Health in All 
Policies  (HiAP) approach. In contrast to health impact assessment, the HiAP approach informs 
policy makers at the conceptual stage of an initiative. This led to increased understanding of 
IHA by politicians, increased partnerships between health and non-health sectors, and the 
development of corresponding research (Lock and McKee, 2004; Kickbusch and Buckett, 2010; 
Lawless et al., 2012). 
Concrete ideas regarding the organization of IHA were pointed out by Armstrong et. al (2006). 
The authors suggested that the formation of cross-sectoral advisory committees and 
partnerships between academics and practitioners of health- and non-health sectors is a tool 
for successful, evidence-based intersectoral work. Such collaborative efforts need to include 
the major sectors related to health, namely the agriculture, education, water, and housing 
sectors (World Health Assembly, 1986). The correlation of interventions in these sectors with 
the health status of the population will be discussed when we develop the conceptual 
framework in section 3.3.1. Essential key pre-conditions for IHA, such as a balanced number of 
stakeholders, mutual respect and trust between partners, a clear definition of the issue, and 
community support, have been widely discussed in the literature (Nutbeam, 1994; PHAC & 
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WHO, 2008; von Braun et al., 2011). According to these authors, practical steps to implement 
IHA also include the provision of leadership, delineated roles and responsibilities, and the 
formulation of a corresponding exit point. 
Various methodological approaches have been utilized to evaluate IHA. Case studies from 
Uganda (Mutambi et al., 2007), Ecuador (Vega C., 2007), El Salvador (MSPAS, 2007), a selection 
of sub-Saharan countries (Benson, 2007), the Netherlands (Leurs et al., 2008), and Australia 
(Kickbusch and Buckett, 2010) have used qualitative methods, such as the analysis of key 
documents or semi-structured interviews with government officials and local health workers, to 
assess IHA in practice. In the case of the Netherlands, these methods have been combined with 
cross-sectional surveys in the so-called Diagnosis of Sustainable Collaboration (DISC) model. 
This model aims at exploring the opportunities and obstacles of collaborative change on the 
basis of evidence from intersectoral collaboration, organizational behaviour, and planned 
organizational change (Leurs et al., 2008). It distinguishes between ‘perceptions’, ‘intentions’, 
and ‘actions’. 
However, in most of these studies, it was too early to draw conclusions about the effectiveness 
of IHA and the adequacy of the applied evaluation method because the initiatives just had 
started or the period of time considered was too short. However, one major outcome of these 
studies was that cross-sectoral coordination fails if there is no broader political commitment to 
improve health in general, as shown in case studies on multisectoral agencies in Mozambique, 
Nigeria, and Uganda (Benson, 2007). 
A further method to assess cross-sectoral collaborative efforts in a quantitative manner is 
sectoral budget analysis. Fan (2000, 2002, 2004, 2005) has used this method to build a SEM 
aiming at the exploration of the relative impacts of cross-sectoral government expenditures, 
such as education and health, on poverty reduction, in the case of India (2000), China (2002), 
Uganda (2004), and Tanzania (2005). In the case of Tanzania, Fan found that additional public 
investment in education, roads, and agricultural research has favorable impact on poverty 
reduction. Besides budget analysis, numerous authors have explored the socioeconomic 
underpinnings of Health. For example, the results of Lee and Paxmann (1997) indicate that 
premature mortality in the United States is attributed to genetic factors (20%), environmental 
factors (20%), inadequacies in the health system (10%), and life-style (50%). For the 
Netherlands, Mooy and Gunning-Schepers (2001) used a dynamic population model with a 
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cohort specific approach to quantify the impact of several intersectoral health policies. In terms 
of the number of actual years of life gained, the highest health gains were found from 
increased cigarette pack prices, followed by stimulating commuter cycling, and nutritional 
interventions. Similarly, a meta-analysis regarding the impact of various domains on the health 
of the population has been carried out by Mc Ginnis et al. (2002). The authors concluded that 
genetic predisposition (30 percent), social circumstances (15 percent), environmental exposure 
(5 percent), behavioral patterns (40 percent), and expenditures in medical care (10 percent) are 
responsible for early death in the United States. 
However, the impact of cross-sectoral interventions also depends on how the health status of a 
population is measured. For example, Lee, Rosenzweig and Pitt (1997) used structural-equation 
models to estimate the effects of improved sanitation, nutrition, and water quality on the 
mortality of children in low-income countries. Based on data on Bangladesh and the 
Philippines, the authors found that neither improved sanitation facilities nor variation in water 
sources increase the weight of surviving children, but parental schooling levels and wealth 
does. Similar studies point out that cross-sectoral determinants of health strongly depend on 
the degree of urbanization. Using data from Nicaragua, men’s education turned out to have a 
significant effect on health only in urban areas, and, in contrast, income, only in rural areas 
(Wolfe and Behrman, 1982). Moreover, possible synergies of interventions in health and non-
health sectors were analyzed (Behrman, 2000). 
Consequently, most of the previous studies show that IHA plays a large role in promoting public 
health. However, economic arguments, such as measuring the cost-effectiveness of preventive 
health measures, are not enough to persuade political decision makers to implement IHA. To 
push public policies into this direction, more empirical evidence is needed (Potvin, 2012; 
Martinez, 2013). The relative size of the impact of cross-sectoral interventions on health differs 
among health related sectors. Thus, there is a need to measure these effects, as requested by 
various authors (e.g. Kindig et al., 2003). Due to the lack of quantitative monitoring 
instruments, this analysis applies sectoral budget analysis as a new approach to evaluate the 
effect of IHA.  In order to overcome the challenge of short periods of investigation, as 
mentioned by previous studies, time-series data of almost 15 years is used in the analysis. 
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3.3 Theoretical Framework 
3.3.1 Economic Theory of IHA 
Most of the common diseases have multifaceted causes led by malnutrition, poor water 
supply, and inadequate sanitation (WHO & UN Water, 2012). Thus, public health is 
determined by a variety of factors within and outside the health sector. Figure 3 shows how 
all these factors are linked to health and other determinants of health. Firstly, there is an 
assumed correlation between governmental and non-governmental health spending and the 
health status of the population. This includes expenditure on curative and preventive 
measures in the short and long run. However, the actual impact might be small, since more 
public spending on health doesn’t necessarily mean that more public health services are 
created. (Filmer & Pritchett, 1999, see section 3.4.2). 
As mentioned in section 3.3.2, public spending on agriculture mainly consists of subsidies for 
agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, improved seeds and agro chemicals as well as agricultural 
research and extension. This in turn influences agricultural production, which is predominantly 
used for own-consumption. Both, the nutritional value of the agricultural products and health 
hazards of agricultural technology determine the health status of the population (von Braun 
2007; Arole, 1999). Farm income and the income from agricultural labor influences health in an 
indirect manner. Investments to improve access to drinking water, sanitation facilities, and 
hygiene practices reduce the risk of diarrhoeal disease, which is still a leading cause of 
morbidity and mortality in developing countries. Moreover, access to safe water sources 
strengthens public health by reducing the risk of contamination during storage and transport of 
water (Fewtrell et al., 2005).  
The links between infrastructure and health have been exhaustively reviewed by Brenneman 
and Kerf (2002). They found evidence, reported in various studies, that improved transport 
saves cost and time to reach health providers and strengthens the timely access to health care, 
especially for the poor. Moreover, it facilitates the staffing and operation of health institutions. 
The number of hospitals, health centres, and dispensaries, available in a certain region, further 
determines access to health providers.  
The positive relationship between education and health has been widely verified in the 
literature. Educated people are more likely to afford health measures, their jobs are less 
stressful and dangerous, their social-psychological resources are larger, and they have a more 
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positive health related lifestyle (Ross and Wu, 1995). Furthermore, education promotes the 
improvement of personal hygiene, environmental sanitation, and the understanding of 
preventive and curative care (Arole, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Determinants of the Health Status of the Population 
Source: author 
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determinants (e.g. social gradient or social exclusion, see Marmot, 2005) have not been 
included in the model due to poor data. The impact of cross-sectoral efforts on health is 
strongly influenced by the political and socioeconomic context of the country. 
The allocation problem of public resources to health- and non-health sectors is addressed by 
various economic theories, among them the “Maximum Welfare Principle of Budget 
Determination”, developed by Musgrave (1959), Pigou (1928) and Dalton (1936). According to 
the authors, public resources should be allocated among different sectors based on the 
following two principles: firstly, resources should be allocated in such a way that the marginal 
returns of each of the sectors are equalized. Secondly, public expenses of a certain sector 
should be increased up to a level where the marginal returns of certain interventions equal the 
marginal costs in terms of taxes. Adhesion to these two principals results in maximization of 
societal welfare. Figure 4 shows the optimal budget determination as illustrated by Musgrave 
(1959). Here, public expenditure on, for example, health measures and the corresponding 
amount of taxation is shown on the X-axis. On the Y-axis, the 'Marginal Social Benefit' (MSB) is 
shown above the X-axis, and the 'Marginal Social Sacrifice' (MSS) below the X-axis. Curve EE 
shows a decreasing marginal utility of social benefit with increasing funds allocated to the 
budget. Curve TT, in contrast, indicates how marginal social sacrifice increases with additional 
spending. The optimal size of the budget is reached at the intersection of the net benefit curve 
NN and the X-axis (MSB = MSS, point M). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Maximum Welfare Principle of Budget Determination 
Source: Musgrave 1959 
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Moreover, coalition theory has widely been used as a framework for understanding and 
implementing cross-sectoral health interventions that lead to synergies in the allocation of 
scarce resources for health improvement (O’Neill et al., 1997). Gamson (1961) defined 
coalitions which, in the context of this analysis, are collaborations between the health sector 
and related sectors, as “ … temporary, means oriented, alliances among individuals or groups 
which differ in goals.“(p. 374). According to the author, the collaboration of different sectors 
depends on four parameters. Firstly, the initial distribution of given resources among the 
participants have to be known. Secondly, the payoffs for each coalition have to be calculated, 
similarly to game theoretical approaches. Thirdly, the so-called “Non-utilitarian strategy 
preferences” have to be identified. These strategy preferences can be described as inclinations 
to join with other groups determined by interpersonal attraction and independently from other 
players’ resources. Fourthly, the “effective decision point” reveals the specified amount of 
resources that will enable the player to control the decision. 
In general, the implementation of cross-sectoral coordination will contribute to an efficient 
use of scarce resources for health improvement. This coordination includes the health 
services provided by the private sector. According to Samuelson (1954), pareto-optimal 
provision of the public good “health services” is given when the sum of individuals’ marginal 
rates of substitution equals the marginal rate of transformation between the health services 
offered by the public sector and health services provided by the private sector (  MRSi = MRT 
). In reality, the governmental share of a developing country’s total health budget is 
determined by the priorities of that country (e.g. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers), the 
power relations between different government sectors, corruption, and lobbyism.  
Further preconditions for the successful use of intersectoral synergies are to ensure an 
adequate balance regarding the number of relevant stakeholders in each sector and their 
relative skills, the recognition of different cultures and incentives, and the consensus on the 
benefits that could result from cross-sectoral cooperation.  Furthermore, functional ways of 
communication between the stakeholders have to be ensured, tools for analyzing common 
problems have to be developed, and sufficient capacities and incentives have to be in place 
(von Braun et al., 2011). 
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3.3.2 Modelling the Impact of Nutrition, Water, and Education on Health 
Marginal health returns on cross-sectoral government expenditures have been determined 
using quantitative budget analysis. This information is needed by politicians as an incentive to 
form coalitions for health. Building on previous IFPRI studies in Asia and Africa (see Fan, 2000-
2005), a SEM has been developed to estimate these effects. The formal structure of the system 
is represented by equation (1) to (5): 
(1) DISPREV =  f (THINV, NUTR, SWATER, SANI, INFRA, GDP, EDU, URB) 
 
(2) NUTR =  f (TAINV, GDP, BREASTF, IODINE, MEDU, VACC, URB, DISPREV) 
(3) SWATER =  f (TWINV, GDP, URB) 
(4) EDU =   f (TEINV, GDP, DISPREV, URB) 
(5) GDP =  f (LABOUR, LAND, EDU, RAIN, URB) 
 
The model can be grouped into two blocks of equations: The first block (equation 1) models the 
hypothesized major determinants of the dependent variable disease prevalence (DISPREV). 
Block two (equation 2-5) models the determinants of each endogenous variable used in block 
one. Each of these equations has a clear ceteris paribus interpretation, which makes it an 
appropriate SEM (Wooldrigde, 2009). The advantage of this method is that it allows measuring 
direct and indirect effects on health. To optimize the trade off between accuracy and 
complexity of the model, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) has been used. The linearity of 
the model has been tested using two-way plots and additional non-linear regressors. According 
to the results of these tests, the non-linearity hypothesis can be rejected. Moreover, all 
expenditure variables have been transformed into logs in order to better fit into a linear model. 
Equation (1) models the influence of various factors on the endogenous variable DISPREV, 
which is an index reflecting the most prevalent diseases among children 'under-five' in 
Tanzania. Disease prevalence has widely been used as a measure of need in the literature (e.g. 
Munga & Maestad, 2009). Children under the age of five have been chosen to reflect the age 
group most vulnerable to diseases influenced by cross-sectoral factors such as malnutrition or 
waterborne diseases. In addition, it accounts for the cohort-specific differences in the strength 
of health determinants. The index includes the percentage of children with fever (used as an 
indicator for malaria), diarrhoea, and symptoms of acute respiratory infections (ARIs) in the two 
weeks preceding the DHS survey. These three diseases are weighted by annual DALYs lost, 
according to the latest WHO-data, resulting in an index allocation of 38.2 percent to Malaria, 
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35.2 percent to Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI), and 26.7 percent to Diarrhoea (WHO, 2009). 
On the right hand side of the equation, the exogenous variable THINV measures the logarithm 
of deflated public per capita spending on health, in the short- and long-term6. This includes the 
total expenditure of the current and the last five budget years7. Thus, short-term spending for 
curative measures, such as the provision of drugs or salaries for health personnel, as well as 
long-term spending, like preventive interventions or health research, are considered. To 
account for the assumed correlation of nutrition and health, the endogenous variable NUTR has 
been included as an additional covariate. It captures the percentage of children under the age 
of five classified as malnourished according to weight-for-age8, which is considered a general 
indicator for the nutritional status of children (Haddad et al., 2003). 
The endogenous variable SWATER reflects the percentage of households with access to safe 
water sources, which is defined as living within reach of an official water point. As an indicator 
for sanitation, the variable SANI captures the number of latrines per 100 pupils in Tanzanian 
schools. INFRA is a stock variable considering infrastructure, such as the number health 
facilities and the condition of roads needed to access them. Specifically, it is measured here as 
the percentage of women and men aged 15-49 who reported serious problems in accessing 
health care due to the distance to the next health facility. Yearly, regional per capita GDP serves 
as a proxy for income. The nexus of health and education is reflected by the endogenous 
variable EDU, which captures the number of primary school pupils divided by the number of 
primary school teachers (Pupils-Teacher-Ratio, PTR). In each of the five equations, URB serves 
as a control variable for the degree of urbanization. The effect of urbanization on health 
remains unclear, since negative aspects of larger cities such as air pollution and industrial waste 
might outweigh the advantage of better health care and health infrastructure in urban areas 
(Moore et al., 2003).  
Equation (2) models the factors influencing the endogenous nutritional status (NUTR) included 
in the first equation. As stated by von Braun et al. (2005), an increase of domestic budgetary 
allocations to agriculture strengthens agricultural growth, and, in turn, reduces malnutrition 
and hunger. The first covariate on the right hand side of equation 2 (TAINV) takes this 
correlation into account reflecting the logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on 
                                                        
6 For comparison, all figures on sectoral government spending and GDP have been converted into 2010 constant 
prices using the GDP deflator. Moreover, the model uses logs of the per capita values. 
7 Due to problems of Multicollinearity, short- and long-term spending has not been included as separate variables. 
8 below -2 standard deviation units (SD) from the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards adopted in 2006.  
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agriculture at the regional level (total of current and previous year). Moreover, sustained 
income growth can lead to a reduction of malnutrition in the long run, as shown in a cross-
country and household level study by Haddad et al. (2003). The log of regional per capita GDP 
has been included in the model as a proxy for household income.  
In principle, malnutrition consists of protein-energy malnutrition and micronutrient 
deficiencies. One measure to prevent protein-energy malnutrition is to promote initial breast-
feeding, reflected by the exogenous variable BREASTF. This variable indicates the percentage of 
mothers who started breastfeeding within one hour of birth among the last children born in the 
five years preceding the survey. Although not exclusively, micronutrient deficiencies are mainly 
due to deficiencies in iodine, iron, vitamin A, and zinc, although not exclusively (see Müller and 
Krawinkel, 2005). To cover at least one of these deficiencies, the percentage of households with 
adequate iodine content of salt (15+ ppm) is included by the variable IDODINE. Increasing the 
education of mothers augments their skills at providing care and, in turn, improves the 
nutritional status of their children (Sahn & Alderman, 1997). To account for this correlation, the 
variable MEDU captures the percentage of women aged 15-49 who completed at least grade 6 
at the secondary level. Two further variables reflect the impact of health on nutrition. Besides 
the endogenous variable DISPREV, the covariate VACC represents the percentage of children 
aged 12-23 months with a vaccination card. Ideally, regional differences in food prices, climate 
conditions, and the existence of nutrition programmes should be included in the model. 
However, sufficient information about these variables was not available for the selected period 
of time.  
Determinants of access to safe water sources are modelled in equation (3). In the short term, 
public investments into the water sector extend the reach of water networks and improve the 
management of regional water sources. Long-term spending aims at capacity building of water 
personnel and structural changes, such as the privatization of water suppliers. Both effects are 
captured in the right hand side variable TWINV, taking into account the logarithm of average, 
deflated public per capita spending on water, in the current and the last five budget years. 
Whether consumers can afford to use safe water sources is also determined by income. 
Consequently, the log of the regional per capita GDP is included as a proxy for income. 
Information regarding the volatility of water prices, the gap between water demand and 
supply, and the existence of certain interventions such as the installation of water kiosks has 
not been included in the model due to incomplete time series.  
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Equation (4) describes the relationship between education and its determinants. Since most of 
the Tanzanian schools are public, government spending on teachers’ salaries and school 
supplies influences pupils’ performance in the short run. Long-term investments include the 
construction and maintenance of classrooms or educational research. Both effects are reflected 
by the independent variable TEINV (same measurement procedure as for water spending). 
Health (DISPREV) affects children's cognitive functions and students' as well as teachers' school 
attendance, which in turn influences the level of education achieved (Jukes, 2005). Moreover, 
equation (4) includes per capita GDP as a proxy for income, necessary to cover education costs. 
Tuition for primary schools was eliminated in 2002, but families still have to pay for testing 
fees, uniforms, and school supplies for primary education, as well as tuition for pupils in 
secondary schools. Information about additional variables, such as the educational status of the 
parents, cultural aspects, political factors, and family background has been excluded from the 
model due to data constraints.  
Widely used production functions such as Cobb-Douglas represent the relationship of an output 
(Y) to the inputs labour (L), capital (K) and total factor productivity (A) (Cobb & Douglas, 1928). 
In equation (5), a similar but more simplistic approach is used to model the determinants of 
regional per capita GDP. The variable LABOUR measures the percentage of women and men 
employed in the 12 months preceding the survey. Due to the high share of agricultural 
production and its major share in the family income, ‘hectares of farmland (LAND)’ are taken as 
a proxy for capital. This covariate includes the area under temporary mono or mixed crops, 
permanent mono or mixed crops, and the area under pasture. Since agricultural output 
strongly correlates with rainfall variability, the variable RAIN, which measures yearly rainfall in 
millimetres, has been included in equation (5). Due to increased skills and knowledge (EDU), 
the contribution of educated people to the GDP might be higher compared to others. 
Technological change and innovation are captured by the total factor productivity in the Cobb-
Douglas model. Reasons for omitting these variables in equation (5) are the short period of 
time considered in this analysis and the fact that technology might not be a local phenomenon. 
Public spending on health, agriculture, water, and education might have long lead times in 
affecting the prevalence of diseases. Consequently, current and past values of government 
expenditure have been included as lags in the model. Various econometric methods exist to 
determine the adequate length of lag for each of the investment variables. Authors of similar 
works (e.g. Fan, 2000) used the adjusted R2 criterion suggested by Greene (2008). This method 
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was also applied in this study, resulting in a lag length that maximizes adjusted R2 as defined by 
McElroy (1977). As mentioned above, the outcome was to include total spending of the current 
and the last five budget years. Furthermore, the choice of the appropriate length of lags was 
constrained by the length of the time series data available.  
To measure the direct and indirect effects of cross-sectoral government spending and other 
variables on the prevalence of diseases, we have to totally differentiate equations (1) to (5). To 
this effect, we take the derivative of equation (1) with respect to the desired variable. Since 
most of the model variables are given as a percentage or included as logs, the result is the 
elasticity of the selected variables. As an example, the direct impact of agricultural investments 
(TAINV) on the prevalence of diseases through nutritional status (NUTR) can be derived as:  
(6) ∂DISPREV/∂TAINV  = (∂DISPREV/∂NUTR) (∂NUTR/∂TAINV) 
Similar, the effect of LAND on health is derived as: 
(7) ∂DISPREV/∂LAND  = (∂DISPREV/∂GDP) (∂GDP/∂LAND) 
     + (∂DISPREV/∂SWATER) (∂SWATER/∂GDP) (∂GDP/∂LAND) 
     + (∂DISPREV/∂EDU) (∂EDU/∂GDP) (∂GDP/∂LAND) 
 + (∂DISPREV/∂NUTR) (∂NUTR/∂GDP) (∂GDP/∂LAND) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation 7 shows the direct effect of LAND on the 
variance of regional per capita GDP, which in turn is a determinant of public health. Secondly, 
the change of GDP also leads to indirect effects on health through its influence on access to 
safe water, education, and nutrition, as shown in the following terms. Direct and indirect 
effects of other variables on health can be derived in a similar way. 
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3.4 Quantitative Analysis: Model Estimation and Results 
3.4.1 Data 
This study uses data at the regional level of Tanzania, excluding the five regions on the semi-
autonomous state Zanzibar. Almost all of the 21 regions of Tanzania mainland include one 
regional capital classified as an urban district and several further districts all classified as rural. 
Since no systematic secondary data is available at the regional level, a panel dataset was 
generated by aggregating survey data for the years 2004, 2005, 2009 and 2010. Thus, this study 
is based on a total of 84 observations.  Data on public spending on health, education, 
agriculture, and water was retrieved from various budget books, for the years 1999/2000-
2004/2005, and from the Local Government Information database (LOGIN Tanzania, see URT, 
2012 II), for the years after 2005. This database is jointly provided by MoFEA and the Prime 
Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMORALG).  The figures 
include recurrent and development spending of the government and, partly, donor funds 
allocated to the regions. For comparison, all data on government expenditures was deflated to 
the common base year 2010, using the GDP deflator retrieved from the World Bank’s 
development indicators (World Bank, 2013).  Population data, used for computing per capita 
amounts, was generated from the last population and housing census 2002 (NBS, 2006 I). 
According to LOGIN Tanzania, population variables are inflated uniformly across all regions by 
2.9% per annum. 
Information about per capita GDP was obtained from national accounts and deflated like public 
spending (URT, 2011). For the variable measuring the percentage of people with access to safe 
water sources, aggregated data from the Water Utilities Performance Report (EWURA, 2009) 
and Annual Health Statistical Abstracts (URT, 2006) was used. Data about agricultural farmland 
was retrieved from Country STAT, a database for food and agriculture statistics provided by the 
NBS (URT, 2012 I). For all other variables included in the model, data comes from the 
HIV/AIDS/STI surveillance report (URT, 2009 II), Basic Education Statistics Tanzania (BEST, URT, 
various years), and selected DHS and HMIS household surveys (NBS, 2005-2011). Presently, the 
included data sources are the most comprehensive and reliable ones in Tanzania. Numerous 
studies, notably a paper published by Fan, Nyange & Rao (2005), have also used these data 
sources. Table 3 shows an overview of all variables. The behavior of selected dependent and 
independent variables over time is reflected in figure 5. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Description Unit of Measurement 
DISPREV 0.150 0.061 Health-Index disease prevalence Fractions 
THINV 17811 7733 Total per capita health investment  Tanzanian Shillings 
NUTR 0.199 0.068 Malnourished under age 5 Fractions 
SWATER 0.608 0.168 Access to safe water sources Fractions 
SANI 1.706 0.601 Access to sanitation No. of Latrines per 100 pupils 
INFRA 0.305 0.137 Problems to health facility access Fractions 
GDP 0.667 0.246 Gross domestic product Million Tanzanian Shillings 
EDU 53.214 9.188 Access to education Pupils-Teacher-Ratio (PTR) 
URB 0.232 0.170 People living in urban areas Fractions 
TAINV 2881 2227 Total per capita agriculture invest.  Tanzanian Shillings 
BREASTF 0.554 0.202 Breastfeeding within 1h after birth Fractions 
IODINE 0.495 0.261 Adequate iodine content of salt Fractions 
MEDU 0.102 0.073 Mothers education Fractions 
VACC 0.823 0.080 Children with vaccination card Fractions 
TWINV 3682 2191 Total per capita water investment  Tanzanian Shillings 
TEINV 66382 23886 Total per capita education invest.  Tanzanian Shillings 
LABOUR 0.813 0.090 Employed in the previous year Fractions 
LAND 4.266 2.322 Per capita farmland ha 
RAIN 834.706 353.750 Yearly rainfall Millimetres 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
Figure 5: Behaviour of Selected Dependent and Independent Variables Over Time 
Source: author’s calculations (PTR: divided by factor 100 / AINV, TWINV: divided by factor 10.000) 
3.4.2 Model Estimation, Results, and Marginal Returns on Public Investment 
According to the model specification described in section 3.3.2, the four endogenous covariates 
are jointly determined with the dependent variable disease prevalence. Consequently, the 
problem of endogeneity of explanatory variables arises in the form of simultaneity. All 
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endogenous, explanatory variables, which are determined simultaneously with disease 
prevalence, are generally correlated with the error term. Thus, the use of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) to estimate the SEM would lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. Instead, as 
with the solution of omitted variables and measurement error problems, the leading method to 
estimate SEMs is the method of instrumental variables. Exogenous variables appearing 
anywhere in the system serve  as instruments for a particular equation. Three instrumental 
variable approaches are appropriate to estimate a SEM, namely Two-Stage-Least-Squares 
(2SLS), Three-Stage-Least-Squares (3SLS), and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Under 
the assumption that all equations are correctly specified, 3SLS produces asymptotically more 
efficient estimates compared to 2SLS and GMM (Wooldridge, 2010). Thus, 3SLS has been used 
to solve the model9. 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimated SEM. With some limitations, cross-sectoral 
investments seem to have enormous effect on the reduction of disease prevalence. The results 
of the estimated health equation (equation 1) show a significantly positive impact of nutrition, 
access to safe water sources, and sanitation on health. For every one percent decrease in the 
number of malnourished children under the age of five, the disease index declines by 0.332 
percentage points. This result complements previous research showing a highly significant 
correlation between nutrition and health in Tanzania (Alderman et al., 2005; Keding, 2010).  
Slightly less effective are investments in water quality. The index declines by 0.167 percentage 
points for every one percent increase of people who have access to safe water sources. This 
confirms the results of a regional study on waterborne diseases on the Tanzanian side of Lake 
Victoria (Semili et al., 2005). Improved sanitation has a smaller, but still significant potential to 
improve public health with a coefficient of 0.027. Unlike the theoretical assumption discussed 
in section 3.3.1, income seems to have no significant effect on the prevalence of 'under-five' 
diseases. The abolition of user fees for maternal and child health services in Tanzania might 
explain this result. However, out-of-pocket payments are still substantial in practice, especially 
for facility based deliveries (Kruk et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, short- and long-term public spending on health are insignificant determinants of 
health. The weak effect of pure public health expenditure on the prevalence of diseases has 
widely been shown in the literature. The reason for this weak relationship could be, amongst 
                                                        
9 See appendix 5 for 2SLS estimates. 
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others, the fact that more public spending on health doesn’t necessarily mean that more public 
health services are created. Some of these additional health services might have been 
consumed anyway. Consequently, in order to see a measureable effect of public health 
spending on disease prevalence, the additional services have to change the total amount of 
health services consumed. Ultimately, services financed by the government have to be cost-
effective in improving public health and consequently reduce the burden of disease (see Filmer 
& Pritchett, 1999). This can be questioned in the case of Tanzania, ranked 156 among 191 
countries in overall health system performance (WHO, 2000). 
Table 4: Relationship between Burden of Disease and Intersectoral Health Action, 2004-2010 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1) DISPREV (2) NUTR (3) SWATER (4) EDU (5) GDP 
THINV 0.102 (0.06)     
NUTR 0.332 (0.16)**     
SWATER -0.167 (0.06)**     
SANI -0.027 (0.01)**     
INFRA 0.053 (0.05)     
GDP -0.127 (0.10) -0.009 (0.064) 0.007 (0.19) -34.927 (7.57)**  
EDU -0.007 (0.00)**    -0.018 (0.00)** 
URB 0.226 (0.46) -0.137 (0.31) 1.974 (1.07)* 75.571 (41.3)* 2.633 (0.54)** 
      
TAINV  -0.020 (0.01)    
BREASTF  0.075 (0.03)**    
IODINE  -0.040 (0.04)    
MEDU  -0.421 (0.13)**    
VACC  0.028 (0.07)    
DISPREV  0.507 (0.14)**  -35.250 (9.19)**  
      
TWINV   0.258 (0.09)**   
      
LTEINV    -3.774 (5.38)  
      
LABOUR     0.115 (0.13) 
LAND     0.120 (0.02)** 
RAIN     0.000 (0.00) 
      
R-Squared 0.6512 0.8865 0.6965 0.8338 0.9069 
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 
      
Note: The table reports standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted with the conventional ***p 
< 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. The coefficients of regional dummies are not reported. 
 
For the evaluation of the “causes of the causes”, estimates for equation (2) show that reaching 
grade 6 at the secondary level, as a proxy for mothers’ education, significantly contributes to 
fight malnutrition with a coefficient of 0.421. Furthermore, the results suggest that decreasing 
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prevalence of 'under-five' diseases reduces malnutrition, with a coefficient of 0.507 (significant 
at the 5 percent level). Estimates for equation (3) show that the sum of public spending on 
water in the current and preceding five budget years and an increasing degree of urbanization 
are significant factors in determining access to safe water. Growing income is highly correlated 
with improvements in education (equation 4).  However, the relationship between education 
and urbanization shows an unexpected sign. An increasing degree of urbanization leads to a 
lower level of education. Reasons for that might be the fact that fast and unplanned urban 
growth often leads to increased poverty levels and population growth exceeding manageable 
education infrastructure (Moore et al., 2003).  As expected, higher levels of education, 
urbanization, and land are positive determinants of the regional GDP, with significant 
coefficients of 0.018, 2.633, and 0.120, respectively.   
Bearing in mind the assumed policy objective of maximizing the amount of DALYs averted, table 
5 shows the returns in DALYs for every one percent improvement of the corresponding 
variable. For example, for every one percent decrease in the number of malnourished children 
under the age of five, 4870 DALYs can be averted10. The highest returns on DALYs are obtained 
by improved nutrition and access to safe water sources, followed by sanitation. Looking at the 
impact of indirect factors, the health effect of investments in mother education exceeds the 
effect of additional short- and long-term public spending on water. 
Table 5: Returns of Cross-sectoral Health Interventions (DALYs averted for every 
 one percent improvement of the corresponding variable) 
Sector-Variable Total DALYs 
NUTR 4870 
SWATER 2450 
SANI 396 
MEDU 2050 
DISPREV 2469 
TWINV 632 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
10 The nutrition coefficient multiplied by the total number of DALYs in the health index (0.332/100*1466805) 
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3.5 Qualitative Analysis 
3.5.1 Methods 
In addition to the quantitative model, the qualitative “Diagnosis of Sustainable Collaboration 
(DISC)” model was modified to analyze cross-sectoral collaboration for health. This model aims 
at exploring the opportunities and obstacles of collaborative change on the basis of evidence 
from intersectoral collaboration, organizational behaviour, and planned organizational change 
(Leurs et al., 2008). It distinguishes between ‘perceptions’, ‘intentions’, and ‘actions’. Each of 
these constructs was evaluated by a set of indicators. An analysis according to the DISC model 
combines semi-structured interviews and the analysis of key documents. In contrast to 
narrative interviews, the semi-structured form aims at obtaining concrete statements about the 
object of investigation. Moreover, it allows for the comparison of results due to its clear 
structure (Mayer, 2009). Key stakeholders working in health related sectors were chosen as 
interviewees, representing the government, multilateral and bilateral organisations. The 
triangulation of quantitative analysis, qualitative semi-structured interviews, and document 
analysis is used to strengthen the reliability and the validity of the conclusions. 
3.5.2 Data and Major Findings 
According to the DISC-Model, the structured interviews were divided into four categories, 
namely external factors, change management, collaborative support, and budget allocation. A 
total of 13 stakeholders were consulted to discuss their experience on IHA11. Among these, six 
interviewees represented different governments institutions acting as, for example, a regional 
medical officer (Tanga, Pwani and Mtwara) or a headmaster of a secondary school (Mtwara). 
Furthermore, seven stakeholders from non-governmental institutions (e.g. WHO, Faith-based-
organizations, development partners) were interviewed. The selection of stakeholders was 
made according to their understanding and involvement in IHA. To test for a significant 
difference between the statements of government and non-government interviewees, a 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test was applied (Mann & Whitney, 1947).  
In category one, stakeholders were asked to specify how hard they work with related sectors 
and to evaluate the yields of particular collaborations. People working for the health sector 
tend to cooperate with the education, water, and infrastructure sector rather than the 
agriculture and employment sector. Both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders 
                                                        
11 See appendix 6 for the structure of the interview and appendix 7 for a list of all interviewees. 
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reported to collaborate with the local governance sector. Examples of concrete cross-sectoral 
programs in place are given in section 3.5.3. As the main drivers of IHA, the MoHSW, Tanzania 
Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS), the IFAKARA Health Institute (IHI), and PMO-RALG were 
mentioned. Most of the cross-sectoral collaborations include the private sector and Faith-
Based-Organizations (FBOs).  
Stakeholders have to be equipped with certain skills for effective health promotion alliances. 
The second subject of the structured interview, “Change Management”, dealt with this issue 
(see table 6, question I). According to the interviewees, networking-skills, knowledge-sharing-
skills, and partnership-creation-skills are all very important for IHA (median: 4). However, 
partnership-support-skills seem to be less important (median: 3). There are no significant 
differences between governmental and non-governmental interviewees on this issue. Besides 
further soft-skills such as joint planning-, negotiation-, consultancy- and organizational skills, 
hard-skills, such as a technical professional background, are required. Within the third phase of 
the interview, stakeholders were asked to evaluate certain parameters regarding their 
influence on collaborative efforts (question II)12. The most influencing factor for IHA is the initial 
distribution of resources among the participants, equal to the relative budget allocated to a 
certain sector (median: 4). Only slightly less important, referring to efforts in collaboration,  are 
the payoffs of each stakeholder of the coalition and the inclinations to work jointly with the 
other sectors in terms of interpersonal attraction (median: 3). Again, there are no significant 
differences between governmental and non-governmental interviewees on this issue. 
Certain preconditions have to be fulfilled to make cross-sectoral collaboration successful (see 
von Braun, 2011). Category three evaluated the importance of these preconditions by 
questioning their relevance (question III). There is a wide consensus regarding the relevance of 
having a well-balanced number of stakeholders who respect the different, sector-dependent 
incentives within the group (median: 4). Moreover, a consensus on common problems and on 
mutual benefits is required for IHA. To enable people to make efforts to think and act cross-
sectorally, capacity building has to be put into place and functional ways of communication 
have to be in place (both median: 4). In contrast, the recognition of different cultures, tools for 
analyzing common problems, the dissemination of intersectoral research findings, and 
individual incentives seem to be slightly less relevant (median: 3.0-3.5). There was a significant 
difference, between the statements of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, 
                                                        
12 Selection of categories according to Gamson, 1961 
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concerning the two questions on incentives and on the recognition of different cultures. Both 
the recognition of others incentives and the sufficient own incentives are more important for 
government actors (p=0.0821/0.0912), whereas the recognition of different cultures matters 
less for government officials (p=0.0855). Mutual trust was suggested as a further, relevant 
precondition for IHA.  
The last question of construct three evaluated the major and minor challenges for cross-
sectoral collaboration13. The only major challenge seems to be the predominant sectoral 
orientation of funding, budget, planning, monitoring, and accountability (median: 4), even if 
this is a significant greater challenge for government stakeholders (p=0.0139). A lesser problem 
is that somebody has to assume responsibility for cross-sectoral results, the large differences in 
paradigms, and the lack of education in multi-sectoral work (median: 3). Furthermore, staff 
turnover doesn’t seem to have a very large effect on IHA. The competition of sectoral results 
plays no role for cross-sectoral cooperation. As an additional challenge, it was mentioned that 
there are no proposals for IHA promoted at higher political levels. Stakeholders suggested that 
improved IHA needs to be driven by the leadership at the different ministries and by the donors 
who support such initiatives. Moreover, the functionality of existing cross-sectoral forums 
should be strengthened. Regarding the current allocation of public expenditure to major 
sectors, the stakeholders requested to allocate at least 15% of the annual budget to the health 
sector, as committed in the Abuja Declaration in 2000. Furthermore, an increase of the 
agricultural budget share was seen as a necessary action to improve public health through 
improved nutrition. The efficiency of spending within a sector was a further issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 Selection of categories according to von Braun, 2011 
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Table 6: Qualitative Analysis 
Question Median Significant difference between 
governmental and non-
governmental interviewees? 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test) 
I. Please assess the following skills required for effective health promotion alliances 
   (1 = not important / 4 = very important) 
a) Networking-skills 4 No 
b) Knowledge-sharing-skills 4 No 
c) Partnership-creation-skills 4 No 
d) Partnership-support-skills 3 No 
II. Which of the following parameters influence collaboration efforts with health related sectors? (1 = not 
influencing / 4 = very influencing) 
a) Initial distribution of resources among the participants 4 No 
b) Payoffs of the coalition 3 No 
c) Inclinations to join with other sectors (interpersonal 
attraction) 
3 No 
III. Please indicate major preconditions for successful cross-sectoral collaboration (1 = not relevant / 4 = very 
relevant) 
a) A balanced number of stakeholders in each sector 
(including relative skills) 
4 No 
b) Recognition of different incentives 4 Yes (p=0.0821) 
c) Recognition of different cultures 3.5 Yes (p=0.0855) 
d) Consensus on common problems 4 No 
e) Consensus on mutual benefits 4 No 
f) Functional ways of communication 4 No 
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g) Tools for analyzing common problems 3 No 
h) Sufficient capacities 4 No 
i) Sufficient incentives 3 Yes (p=0.0912) 
j) Dissemination of intersectoral research findings 3.5 No 
IV: What are the major challenges of IHA? (1 = minor challenge / 4 = major challenge) 
a) Predominant sectoral orientation of funding, budget, 
planning, monitoring and accountability 
4 Yes (p=0.0139) 
b) None of the sectors makes efforts to assume responsibility 
for cross-sectoral results 
3 No 
c) Large differences in paradigms, worldviews and mindsets 
across sectors 
3 No 
d) Competition of sectoral results 2 No 
e) Lack of education in multi-sectoral work 3 No 
f) High level of staff turnover 3 No 
 
3.5.3 Examples of IHA in Tanzania 
Based on the semi-structured interviews and further analysis of key documents, existing 
programmes of cross-sectoral collaboration for health have been identified. A remarkable 
initiative is the “Prevention and Awareness in Schools of HIV/AIDS (PASHA)” program, a 
collaboration between the health and the education sector. Initiated by the Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) in 2003, PASHA is part of the reproductive health 
component of TGPSH. The initiative aims at the provision of information on Sexual and 
Reproductive Health (SRH) to young people in primary and secondary schools. For the 
implementation of PASHA, school counselors are elected by the pupils. These counselors 
receive peer-to-peer training on reproductive health and HIV/AIDS, adolescence, counselling 
skills, action planning, and record keeping before they start to teach and advise pupils on SRH. 
It is a “whole school” development approach, where activities focus on students, teachers, 
heads of schools and non-teaching staff at the same time. To date, the program has been 
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implemented in three of the 21 regions in Tanzania, namely Tanga, Mtwara and Lindi (see Swiss 
Centre for International Health, 2012). However, high fluctuation of trained staff and poor 
communication between the District Education Officer and the Council HIV/AIDS coordinator 
weakens the effectiveness of the program. Moreover, it remains a challenge to secure funding 
for the school based HIV/AIDS activities via the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (TGPSH, 
2008). 
A second example of implemented IHA in Tanzania is the “Public-Private Partnership for 
Handwashing with Soap (PPPHW)”, a cooperation of the health, water, and sanitation sector. 
Founded in 2005, the objective of the program is to promote handwashing with soap at critical 
times among women of reproductive age, care takers of children under the age of five, and 
children between the ages of 6-14. The initiative aims to strengthen the health impact of the 
WSDP and the Healthy Village Initiative in 10 selected districts on Tanzania mainland. Activities 
include focused multi-phased behavior change communication campaigns to entice the target 
group to wash their hands with soap. Today, 500 community workers have been trained to 
conduct interpersonal communication. Partners of the program are the MoHSW, MoEVT, the 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoWI), and others. Furthermore, the work of the PPPHW is 
complemented by similar initiatives of NGOs and international organizations (PPPHW, 2012). 
3.6 Conclusions 
3.6.1 Major Findings and Priorities of Future Government Investment 
Understanding how IHA contributes to the reduction of the burden of disease in Tanzania is 
crucial for future decisions on budget allocation. The results of the estimated SEM show a 
significantly positive impact of nutrition, access to safe water sources, sanitation and education 
on the reduction of disease prevalence. By comparing these variables, the highest returns on 
DALYs are obtained by improving nutrition and water, followed by sanitation and education. 
However, short- and long-term public spending on health turned out not to have a significant 
positive impact on health. Further evaluation of the “causes of the causes” showed that 
mothers’ education and a decreasing prevalence of 'under-five' diseases significantly reduce 
the prevalence of malnutrition among children under the age of five. In the case of access to 
safe water sources, which is a further determinant of the disease burden, public spending on 
water and an increasing degree of urbanization are significant determinants. Moreover, 
growing income is highly correlated with improvements in education. 
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With respect to the qualitative structured interviews conducted with 13 stakeholders, 
networking-skills, knowledge-sharing-skills and partnership-creation-skills are all very important 
to begin and maintain cross-sectoral cooperation. Additional skills required are further soft-
skills such as joint-planning-, negotiation-, consultancy- and organizational skills and hard-skills 
such as a technical professional background. The most important factor influencing 
collaborative efforts is the relative budget allocated to a certain sector. Slightly less important 
in terms of starting collaborations are the payoffs of each stakeholder and interpersonal 
attraction. Preconditions to work intersectorally include a well-balanced number of 
stakeholders, mutual trust, a consensus on common problems and, especially for government 
actors, sufficient incentives for IHA. A major challenge of working cross-sectorally for public 
health is the predominant sectoral orientation of funding, budget, planning, monitoring, and 
accountability, especially for government stakeholders.  
Most of the expected and theoretically assumed correlations between investments of health 
related sectors and the health status of the population are supported by the results of the 
quantitative model. This encourages the use of budget analysis as a method for analyzing IHA. 
However, some of the findings need to be further discussed. For example, the insignificant 
impact of public health spending, predominantly on curative measures, could be understood as 
a call for more preventive measures, including improvements in nutritional status and drinking 
water quality. This brings us back to the need for cross-sectoral investments. However, the 
qualitative analysis shows, for example, that there is not much collaboration in place between 
the health sector and the agricultural sector14, even if this is most effective according to the 
estimated coefficients in the quantitative model15. A reason for this might be the lack of 
proposals for IHA at the higher political level, which is, in turn, a consequence of poor 
incentives to think and act cross-sectorally among government institutions (see section 3.5.2). 
This behavior contradicts the consensus for the need of IHA, as stated in the poverty reduction 
strategy paper of Tanzania, MKUKUTA. Efforts for cross-sectoral collaboration might be more 
prevalent among non-government institutions and international organizations, due to financial 
incentives and higher salaries paid in contrast to the government sector. 
According to the literature, IHA fails more often than it succeeds. One of the challenges might 
                                                        
14 People working for the health sector tend to cooperate with the education, water and infrastructure sector 
rather than the agriculture and employment sector (see section 3.5.2). 
15 The results of the estimated health equation (equation 1) show a significantly positive impact of nutrition on 
health. 
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be the fact that the prestigious health sector often expects other sectors to consider health-
related issues, within their policies, without regard to the question of how the health sector 
could support the agendas of related sectors (O’Neill et al., 1997). Appointing particular 
government employees in each ministry to be in charge of intersectoral work could solve some 
of the challenges, such as the lack of taking over responsibility for cross-sectoral results. Careful 
consideration, increased education in multi-sectoral work would be prerequisites for such an 
approach. 
If Tanzania seriously wants to reduce its burden of disease, this study suggests to put more 
weight on the allocation funds to the agriculture, water, sanitation and education sectors. As 
the example of the handwashing initiative shows, some first steps in this direction have been 
made.  
3.6.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Measuring IHA with the applied methods has some limitations. Firstly, the data might be biased 
due to incomplete data collection. However, this bias shouldn’t influence the results presented, 
since there is no reason to believe that the degree of incompleteness varies systematically 
between the regions. Nevertheless, there is much room for improvement regarding the quality 
and quantity of available data in Tanzania. This should be a priority for the relevant government 
institutions. Otherwise, impact evaluations of various measures to further develop the country 
remain difficult. Secondly, the considered investment variables do not include all kinds of donor 
funds spent in the regions. It is almost impossible to sum up total donor spending in a certain 
region due to the high number of vertical programs. Only some of the released funds are 
captured in the government budget. Thirdly, the use of DALYs as an indicator for health status 
has widely been criticized in the literature. In particular, the assumptions and value judgements 
such as age-weighting and discounting are seriously questioned (Anand and Hanson, 1997).  
Fourthly, the policy relevance of budget allocation decisions can be questioned. Donors 
contribute to more than 40% of the annual budget in Tanzania (Wohlgemuth, 2006). Taking 
into account that most of these donor funds are earmarked, the scope for flexible budget 
allocation is limited. More research is needed to identify cross-sectoral determinants of health. 
A similar analysis could be done to measure the impact of public spending on one specific 
disease such as HIV/AIDS, Malaria or Diarrhoea. If data allows, other sectors such as roads and 
housing should be included in future studies. 
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4. Cost-Effectiveness of Health Interventions – the Case of Malaria 
Chapter 4 evaluates whether interventions to combat malaria are prioritized in such a way 
that the marginal dollar goes to where it has the highest effect on averting DALYs. It is 
organized as follows: after a brief introduction in section 4.1, section 4.2 summarizes the 
current status of the Malaria burden in Tanzania. The subsequent section reviews the existing 
literature on cost-effectiveness analysis of malaria interventions at both the international and 
the national level including the added value of this study (section 4.3). Section 4.4 discusses 
the theoretical underpinnings of cost-effectiveness analysis and derives the population model 
applied in this chapter. The estimates of the quantitative analysis are presented in section 4.5, 
followed by the results of the structured interviews and some ethical considerations. The final 
section outlines the conclusions drawn from the analysis. 
4.1 Introduction 
Malaria is a treatable and preventable disease. Despite huge political and financial efforts, 
during the last decades, to lower the malaria burden , 655 000 people still died from malaria 
in the year 2010 worldwide, 91% of them living in Africa and 86% being children under the age 
of five (World Health Organization (WHO), 2011). Malaria heavily affects the economic 
productivity of people and slows down the development of a country. To address this 
challenge, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) considered the burden of malaria in 
two of its objectives: calling to halt and reverse the incidence of malaria by 2015 (MDG 6) and 
achieving a reduction in child mortality by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015 (MDG 4). 
In the case of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT), malaria causes the second largest 
disease burden after HIV/AIDS (WHO, 2009). The ecological conditions of the country favor 
the expansion of the anopheles gambiae, which is the most effective mosquito in transmitting 
malaria parasites. Tanzania has made great progress in scaling up interventions to fight the 
dreaded disease, including the distribution of insecticide–treated bed nets (ITNs), indoor 
residual spraying (IRS), intermittent presumptive treatment with Sulphadoxine-
Pyrimethamine (SP) during pregnancy, and case management with Chloroquine (CQ), SP and 
Artemisinin-based combination treatments (ACTs). Since resources for malaria interventions 
in a developing country like Tanzania are extremely scarce, there is a need for prioritization. 
The Tanzanian government has already acknowledged the importance of prioritization with 
respect to the health sector. “ … prioritisation within these sectors needs to receive 
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maximum attention to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the spending programs” 
(URT, 2011 II, p. 14). To do so, timely information on health effects and costs of several 
measures to combat malaria are urgently needed to inform policy makers. 
The objective of this analysis is to contribute to the elimination of this deficiency. Assuming 
the minimization of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) as a normative measurement 
concept, this analysis assesses whether interventions to combat malaria are prioritized in such 
a way that the marginal dollar goes to where it has the highest effect on averting DALYs. The 
identification of the relative impact of various measures to lower the malaria burden will 
enable policymakers to understand the trade-offs between different strategies. The 
prioritization of health interventions depends on the underlying rating criteria. Among others, 
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is indispensable to optimize the allocation of available funds. 
Without such an analysis, priorities would be set to improve the health of a small number of 
people by a minor amount at the expense of a larger number of people  whose health status 
could have been improved by a larger amount (Evans et. al., 2005). Moreover, one must 
consider that health interventions are not implemented in isolation from each other. 
Interactions between costs and impacts of health measures, which are implemented 
simultaneously, should be included in CEA for priority setting. The results from the existing 
body of literature regarding cost-effectiveness of malaria interventions lack transferability 
across countries. Thus, a context-specific analysis is unavoidable. 
Six individual control interventions designed to reduce the incidence and case fatality rates of 
plasmodium falciparum malaria have been selected for the present analysis. Moreover, the 
cost-effectiveness of combined interventions is assessed. The longitudinal population model 
PopMod serves to estimate the effectiveness of interventions in terms of DALYs. PopMod is a 
multi-state dynamic life table, which is frequently used in similar studies to simulate the 
evolution of populations exposed to changing disease states. The costs reflected in the 
calculation of cost-effectiveness ratios represent the perspective of the society, including 
indirect and direct treatment costs of the patient in addition to provider costs. Estimates are 
based on survey data from the NBS, price catalogues, WHO-CHOICE database, existing 
literature and expert opinion. As a result, cost-effectiveness ratios of each of the interventions 
are calculated and compared to the current allocation of resources. Moreover, additional 
qualitative criteria for health priority setting are retrieved from structured interviews with 
governmental and non-governmental representatives of the health sector. 
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4.2 The Malaria Burden in Tanzania 
4.2.1 Prevalence 
According to the World Malaria Report 2011, the impact of malaria control lowered the 
number of annual malaria cases worldwide from 237 million in 2005 to 216 million in 2010. 
Almost all cases were due to Plasmodium falciparum (91 percent) and occurred in the African 
Region (81 percent). Looking at East Africa, most of the countries show a similar trend of 
decreasing malaria admissions between 2000 and 2010. However, Tanzania mainland is among 
the few countries reporting constant malaria transmission since 2005. After HIV/AIDS, it is the 
second largest cause of morbidity and mortality in the country. 
 
Figure 6: Mortality Rates for Tanzania 1991 - 2012 
a) The probability of dying before the first birthday expressed per 1000 live births b) The probability of dying between birth and the fifth 
birthday expressed per 1000 live births c) Expressed per 10,000 live births; calculated as maternal mortality rate divided by the general fertility 
rate  
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and HIV/AIDS and Malaria Indicator Surveys (HMIS), various years 
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Figure 7: Malaria Indicators for Tanzania 1991 – 2012 
d) Percentage of children under age 5 with fever in the two weeks preceding the survey e) Percentage of households with at least one ITN f) 
Percentage of women who took any antimalarial drugs for prevention during the pregnancy for their last birth in the two years preceding the 
survey g) Among children under age 5 with fever, the percentage who took antimalarial drugs 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and HIV/AIDS and Malaria Indicator Surveys (HMIS), various years 
 
Most vulnerable to the Malaria are children, due to their insufficient immunity through 
previous exposure, and pregnant women due to their reduced natural immunity (NBS, 2008). 
The economic consequences of the disease burden range from low productivity in the 
workplace to school absenteeism. Tanzania mainland registered a strong decline in infant- and 
child mortality during the past two decades (figure 6). A potential reason might be the scaling 
up of preventive and curative measures to combat malaria such as the use of ITNs and 
antimalarial drugs during that period of time (figure 7). The reduction of deaths was stronger in 
rural areas compared to urban areas. This possibly indicates that the interventions reach the 
poor people most vulnerable to malaria. From the year 1999 onwards, the use of antimalarial 
drugs during pregnancy increased rapidly and could account for the falling maternal mortality 
rate in the subsequent years. More than 92 percent of the Tanzanian people live in areas where 
Malaria is transmitted, resulting in approximately 10 million clinical malaria cases annually 
(MoHSW, 2008 I). As shown on map 3, the prevalence of malaria varies across the regions, 
depending on seasonal rainfall patterns and further climatic conditions. Prevalence rates vary 
from more than 20 percent in the regions bordering Lake Victoria (Mwanza, Mara, Kigoma) to 
less than 10 percent in Arusha and Dodoma. 
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Map 3: Regional Malaria Prevalence for Children Under the Age of Five 2011/20121 
 
1 Percentage of children under age 5 with fever in the two weeks preceding the survey  
Data source: NBS, 2012 (mapped by the author) 
4.2.2 Policies 
Various policies are in place to fight the persisting malaria burden shown in section 4.2.2. 
However, if Tanzania would succeed in eliminating malaria without similar success in the 
neighbouring countries, malaria would return because of the movements of people across 
borders. To account for this fact, a regional policy forum was founded, called the African 
Leaders Malaria Alliance (ALMA). It is an alliance of African Heads of State aiming to keep 
malaria high on the political agenda and to provide a high-level forum that discusses the most 
efficient ways to finance, manufacture, and distribute malaria interventions beyond national 
borders (ALMA, 2013). In addition to these regional efforts, various national policies regulate 
malaria control and eradication. The strategic objective in the Health Sector Strategic Plan 
(HSSP) III, for the years 2009 to 2015, is to implement universal access to malaria 
interventions through effective and collaborative efforts. Achievements will be measured by 
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the proportion of pregnant women and children under the age of five sleeping under ITNs, the 
proportion of structures sprayed by IRS, and the proportion of 'under-5s' with parasitaemia 
(MoHSW, 2009).  
More specific objectives and measures to combat malaria are set in the Malaria Medium-
Term Strategic Plan (MMTSP) 2008-2013 (MoHSW, 2008 II) that aims to reduce the malaria 
burden by 80% by the end of 2013. The baseline for this objective is the year 2008, showing 
18 million malaria cases and 80,000 malaria deaths per year. To achieve this objective, the 
two core strategies are malaria diagnosis and treatment, on the one hand, and malaria 
prevention, on the other. The National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP) leads the 
implementation of these strategies and coordinates all national, bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives. As part of the health sector reform in 1999, malaria was included in the National 
Package of Essential Health Interventions (MoHSW, 2000). Thus, measures to fight malaria are 
part of the activities in the Comprehensive Council Health Plans (CCHPs), including planning, 
budgeting and capacity building for implementation. 
4.2.3 Interventions 
Four major interventions to combat malaria are currently implemented in Tanzania, including 
mosquito nets, IRS, case management with antimalarial drugs, and IPTP. Additional measures 
include environmental management, intermittent preventive treatment in infants (IPTi), 
communication campaigns, and initial experiments with malaria vaccines. The German 
colonialists were first in using mosquito nets woven out of cotton to reduce biting intensities 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. With the help of social marketing campaigns in the 
nineties, the usage of ITNs had reached 10.4 percent of the households in 1999 (figure 6). To 
increase the coverage of ITNs, Tanzania started to distribute the nets through the Tanzania 
National Voucher Scheme (TNVS) whereby vouchers were given to pregnant women and 
children enabling them to receive an ITN for a small top-up fee. In 2008, ITNs were replaced 
by long-lasting insecticide-treated nets (LLINs) and given for free to all children under the age 
of five (Roll Back Malaria Partnership (RBM), 2012). The result of these measures was a 
substantial increase in coverage, reaching 69.2 percent of households in 2012. Coverage 
varies substantially among the regions, and those with medium prevalence rates such as 
Rukwa or Mbeya still lack sufficient ITN coverage (map 4). 
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Map 4: Use of ITNs 2011/20122 
 
2 Percentage of the household population who slept under an ITN in the night before the survey 
Data source: NBS, 2012 (mapped by the author) 
In 1985, IRS was introduced as a second preventive intervention to combat malaria. However, 
the donor funded program ended after a few years due to insufficient funds to sustain it. 
After the reintroduction of IRS in 2007, the target of the MMTSP is now to protect 50% of the 
population with IRS and to scale it up to 60 districts by the end of the year 2013 (MoHSW, 
2008 / RBM, 2012).  However, this goal will be difficult to achieve. According to the latest 
HMIS, 11.6 percent of the households on Tanzania mainland had been covered with IRS in 
2012 (NBS, 2012). IRS is free to homeowners and is largely carried out by the government.  
As with mosquito nets, curative case management with antimalarial drugs had its beginning 
during the German colonial time, when Quinine was given to the staff and family of colonial 
officials. Due to growing resistance, Tanzania changed its first line drug to treat malaria 
several times in history, from CQ to SP in 2001 and again from SP to ACT at the end of the year 
2006. With every change of the drug policy, health workers had to be trained on new 
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guidelines and treatment procedures. To improve the accessibility of antimalarial drugs to the 
population, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) launched the strategy of 
accredited drug-dispensing outlets (ADDO). With this program, private drug outlets receive 
subsidized antimalarial drugs under certain conditions regarding storage, sale, and patient 
consultation (RBM, 2012). Nowadays, former first- and second-line antimalarial drugs are still 
widespread. In 2008, children under the age of five with fever had been treated with SP (4.9 
percent), CQ (0.5 percent), Amodiaquine (18.2 percent), Quinine (11.7 percent), ACTs (21.5 
percent) or other antimalarial drugs (1.6 percent). Remarkably, the percentage of children 
with fever who took ACTs increased to 33.7 percent in 2012 (NBS, 2008/2012). The problems 
of proper case management include frequent stock-outs of drugs at health facilities and a high 
number of people who, when infected, do not seek treatment from a formal health provider.  
As mentioned in section 4.2.1, women are most vulnerable to malaria infection during 
pregnancy. According to Steketee et al. (2001), malaria during pregnancy is associated with 
anemia, low birth weight, intrauterine growth retardation, and infant mortality. IPTP is a 
preventive measure to avert malaria during pregnancy and includes two doses of SP. The first 
dose is given to the women during their antenatal care visit in the second trimester of 
pregnancy and the second one follows in the third trimester (NBS, 2008). In 2012, 32.9 
percent of women with a live birth in the two years preceding the survey took at least two 
doses of SP. This is a small increase compared to 26.7 percent in 2010, but remains well below 
the coverage target of 80% stated in the MMTSP (NBS 2011, 2012). Problems relating to the 
scaling up of the intervention include the lack of competence concerning the safe timing of SP 
provision, inconsistent record keeping, and troubles with data analysis (President’s Malaria 
Initiative (PMI), 2012). 
4.2.4 Budget 
Most of the malaria control interventions implemented in Tanzania are funded by bilateral and 
multilateral development partners. These funds increased substantially during the last decade, 
from 4.9 million US$, in 2003, to 137.9 million US$, in 2010 (figure 7). In relation to the total 
malaria budget, the government’s share remained low at US$ 5.2 million, in the budget year 
2006/2007, and US$ 2.0 million, in 2008/2009 (PMI, 2012). The lion’s share of the total malaria 
budget comes from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, followed by PMI, 
the World Bank’s Malaria Booster Program, and other donors. Expenditure per person at risk of 
malaria increased from US$ 0.14 in 2003 to US$ 3.31 in 2010 (RBM, 2012). This level of malaria 
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expenditures is quite high compared to other African countries such as Ghana (US$ 3.00 per 
person at risk) or Nigeria (US$ 0.85, WHO, 2011). Looking at the major health programs in the 
latest Public Expenditure Review for the Health Sector, only 3% of the funds are allocated to 
the malaria program, compared to 14% for HIV/AIDS and 30% for reproductive and child health 
(MoHSW, 2012). 
 
Figure 8: External Funding Sources for Malaria Control and Average Allocation to Interventions 2000-2010  
Source: RBM, 2012 
Figure 8 shows major interventions' share of the malaria budget. More than half of the funds 
are allocated to preventive measures, led by ITNs (47%), IRS (8%), Behaviour Change 
Communication (6%), IPTP (2%), and Larviciding (1%). A smaller share of almost one third of the 
funds is allocated to malaria case management (RBM, 2012). This analysis serves to prove 
whether this allocation is also justified on cost-effectiveness grounds. 
4.3 Literature Review 
The impact of the malaria burden on economic growth, fertility, population growth, saving 
and investment, worker productivity, absenteeism, and premature mortality has been widely 
discussed in the literature (Sachs and Malaney, 2002 / Chima et al., 2003). Moreover, various 
authors examined the cost-effectiveness of strategies to combat malaria for the whole of Sub-
Saharan Africa. One of the first studies carried out by Goodman et al. (1999) modelled the 
effectiveness of the provision of ITNs (US$19-85 per DALY averted), IRS (US$32-58), 
chemoprophylaxis for children (US$3-12), and IPTP (US$4-29). The authors concluded that 
cost-effective interventions are available but not affordable in very-low-income countries 
without substantial donor support. At the same time, Coleman et al. (1999) found that the 
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long-term use of ITNs, in areas with high infection rates, might lead to a mortality rebound in 
later childhood, which could lower the cost-effectiveness of the intervention. This is justified 
by the fact that an infection in the first years of life might allow for the development of 
immunity.  At the beginning of the new millennium, many countries changed the first line 
drug for malaria treatment from CQ to SP, due to the growing resistance of parasites to the 
former. A modelling approach was used by Goodman et al. (2001 I) in order to find the 
optimal year for the switch over.  
Furthermore, Utzinger et al. (2001) indicated that environmental management, such as the 
modification of river boundaries or draining of swamps, has a huge potential to reduce the 
malaria burden. The short-term costs of this strategy are US$ 524-591 per DALY averted 
compared to long-term costs of US$ 22-92. Thus, this strategy is cost-effective in the long-
term only. Several authors have assessed the impact of antimalarial chemoprophylaxis during 
pregnancy on the birth weight of newborn babies (Wolfe et al., 2001 / Goodman et al., 2001 
II). They agreed that the SP regime is cost-effective in reducing the proportion of newborns 
weighing less than 2,500 g.  
In 1998, the WHO launched a project called “Choosing Interventions that are Cost-Effective” 
(CHOICE) in order to analyze regional costs and impacts of key health interventions. For 
southern and eastern Africa, the WHO used a state-transition model to show that case 
management with ACT, at 90% target coverage, is most cost-effective in lowering the malaria 
burden (INT$ 12 per DALY averted), followed by the combination with ITNs (INT$ 28), IRS 
(INT$ 41), and IPTP (INT$ 41, Morel et al., 2005). Further regional estimates for the Kenyan 
highlands suggest that in various scenarios, IRS would appear to be more cost-efficient than 
ITNs, with economic costs of $0.88 and $2.34 per person protected, respectively (Guyatt et 
al., 2002). A similar analysis for Mozambique shows that the economic costs of IRS differ 
between rural (US$3.48 per person covered) and semi-urban areas (US$2.16, Conteh et al. 
2004).  
For Tanzania, the following studies explored the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of single 
malaria interventions. Policy makers were particularly interested in studies on the cost and 
health implications of changing first line drugs for the treatment of malaria due to growing 
resistance. By the end of the nineties, the growth rate of CQ resistance accelerated rapidly in 
many African countries and Tanzania was no exception. Thus, Abdulla et al. (2000) used a 
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decision tree model to assess the impact of changing the first line drug from CQ to SP for the 
case of Tanzania. Even under the assumption of a substantial increase in SP resistance, the 
switch appeared to be highly cost-effective with a cost of US$ 14 per death averted. However, 
extensive awareness and sensitization campaigns were necessary to implement the policy 
change, since only 50% of the Tanzanian people were aware the CQ could fail to treat malaria, 
57.1% knew of alternative treatment options, and 63.2% knew the reasons for non-response 
to antimalarial treatment (Tarimo et al., 2001). With rising levels of drug resistance to SP, 
researchers focused on the cost-effectiveness of new developments for malaria case 
management, such as ACT. Wiseman et al. (2006) carried out an economic evaluation of drug 
combinations used to treat Tanzanian children with non-severe malaria. Using a randomised 
effectiveness trial, the authors found that both artemether-lumefantrine and amodiaquine 
with artesunate were most cost-effective with gross savings of approximately US$ 1.70 per 
case averted, compared to monotherapy. The latest results on the cost-effectiveness of 
preventive measures to combat malaria are presented by Yukich et al. (2007). The authors 
estimated US$ 21-60 per DALY averted for ITNs and US$ 21 for IRS, based on data from the 
Tanzanian National ITN program and regional data from southern Mozambique, respectively.  
However, all these studies have limited relevance for the priority setting process of a single 
country, since many factors may alter across settings, e.g. the availability, mix and quality of 
inputs, local prices, labour costs, demographic structures, and epidemiological characteristics 
(Hutubessy et al., 2003). Consequently, there is a need for country-specific cost-effectiveness 
assessments. The few analyses that exist for the case of Tanzania have assessed single malaria 
interventions with limited specifications only. This study will be the first to analyze several 
strategies to combat malaria within a standardized modelling framework, making results 
comparable. 
4.4 Theoretical Framework 
4.4.1 Theoretical Basis for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
Due to scarce financial resources to lower the malaria burden in Tanzania, policy makers are 
forced to prioritize corresponding curative and preventive health interventions. From an 
economic point of view, improved efficiency should be the major criterion within the health 
priority setting process. 
Health planners have applied two major tools for priority setting during the past decades, 
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namely CEA and cost-benefit analysis (CBA). With the help of CEA, the relative costs and 
outcomes of two or more health interventions can be compared. Priority should be set to 
interventions with the lowest costs per health unit. In contrast to CBA, the gains of the 
interventions on health do not have to be monetized. Typically, CEA uses the following 
formula to compare different health interventions (Russell et al., 1996): 
 
 
Various methods exist for measuring the health outcomes (denominator). One possibility is to 
use natural units (e.g. number of cataracts removed). In this case however, only interventions 
with the same objective can be compared. Furthermore, DALYs, quality adjusted life years 
(QALYs) or healthy-years equivalents (HYEs) could be applied as a denominator. Each method 
has its strengths and weaknesses. In this analysis, DALYs are used to ensure the comparability 
of results to similar studies (see section 4.3). 
Two standard CEA concepts are applied to health, in current practice. Firstly, intervention 
mixed constrained cost-effectiveness analysis (IMC-CEA) evaluates the cost-effectiveness of 
additional activities to the current mix of interventions. It does not question the effectiveness 
of the interventions at the starting point of the analysis. Consequently, there might be 
considerable allocative inefficiency in the on-going allocation of resources and major 
opportunities to strengthen the cost-effectiveness of the system are not identified. A second 
approach for CEA is generalized cost-effectiveness analysis (GCEA). In contrast to IMC-CEA, 
GCEA assesses the costs and effects of health interventions in comparison to the null set of 
interventions (as explained below). Following the analysis, the interventions are categorized 
as ‘very cost-effective’, ‘cost-effective’, and ‘cost-ineffective’, and, thus, the optimal 
combination of interventions can be applied to any given budget. The advantage of this 
concept and the reason for its use in the ensuing analysis is the increased transferability of the 
results to different regions in Tanzania, for example, where currently, different mixes of 
interventions exist (Tan-Torres Edejer et al., 2003). 
The null set of interventions is defined as a situation, where a certain group of interrelated 
interventions (in this case interventions to fight malaria) are eliminated at the beginning of 
the simulation period. This situation is rather a transition of the epidemiological profile, 
spread over the time of simulation, than a stable epidemiological state. A prerequisite for this 
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situation is the possibility of reallocation of all funds within the health sector. Furthermore, 
the cluster of interventions includes only interventions that affect each other, e.g. the 
implementation of IRS and the distribution of ITNs to the same household. The cost-
effectiveness of all selected interventions is proven in relation to its non-implementation, or 
the null set of interventions. This includes individual interventions and combinations of the 
same. In the case of a large number of interrelated interventions, it is a pragmatic decision to 
increase the number of interventions included in the cluster, given the additional workload 
(Tan-Torres Edejer et al., 2003). 
As mentioned above, CBA would be an alternative approach to analyze the costs and benefits 
of different health care interventions. In this case, the individual utilities of patients are 
central. To rank the outcomes of possible health interventions for the priority setting process, 
the net benefits of each intervention must be calculated in monetary units according to the 
following formula (Hauck et al., 2004): 
Net benefit = sum of individual utilities  in monetary units – costs of intervention 
 To assess the sum of individual utilities, the scope of the benefits has to be identified first. 
This includes not only the improved health status of a person, but also benefits to third 
parties (e.g. decreased care time), benefits to all members of the community (e.g. decreased 
risk of infections due to vaccination campaigns), and economic values such as the availability 
of work force. A method to convert these impacts into monetary benefits is the willingness to 
pay (WTP) approach. It measures, for example, the WTP for an increased number of life years 
in full health. Thus, an intervention is worth implementing if aggregate WTP exceeds costs. 
However, we opted to not use this approach for two reasons. Firstly, the results obtained 
through the application of this method are strongly influenced by the design of the 
questionnaire and the WTP depends on the ability to pay. Secondly, insufficient information is 
available to value the benefit of a certain health intervention (Hauck et al., 2004; Tan-Torres 
Edejer et al., 2003). 
Within the economic theory of health care evaluation, two general approaches to determine 
the costs of interventions are discussed. The ‘decision maker’s approach’ is a more pragmatic 
way of calculation and focuses on the costs incurred by the health provider. In other words, it is 
the view of the Ministry of Health, without incorporating direct or indirect costs that have to be 
borne by the patient or family, such as transportation to the hospital or the time forgone while 
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caring at home for people exposed to malaria. In contrast, all of these non-medical costs are 
included in the 'welfarist' approach  which determines the costs of interventions from a societal 
perspective. In this case, it does not matter who bears the costs of the health measure. Health 
provider costs are combined with the costs of the family or patient. The value of the costs of 
non-health consumption is determined by the benefits forgone because the patient or family 
could not use these resources for different purposes (opportunity costs). As far as the data for 
the realization of this study allowed, the ‘welfarist’ approach has been used in the following 
analysis (Brouwer and Koopmanschap, 2000; Wiseman, 2006). 
4.4.2 Population Model 
The longitudinal population model PopMod developed by Lauer et al. (2003) is employed to 
compute the effectiveness of selected malaria interventions. In comparison to other 
population models of the life-table family, PopMod is unique in using separate age and time 
axis. It is implemented with the help of the Windows based C++ software application 
4SPopMod. The model results serve as input in the denominator of the cost-effectiveness 
formula (see section 4.4.1). PopMod is a multi-state dynamic life table used for the simulation 
of health and mortality of a given population. In doing this, up to two interacting disease 
states and other background causes of ill-health and death can be simulated. The population-
level impact of selected interventions is calculated by tracking a certain population over a 
period of 10 years. PopMod is able to compare the evolution of disease prevalence, incidence, 
remission, and case-fatality in the case of no interventions (the null set) and in the cases of 
single or combined interventions (at different coverage levels). In the case of malaria, 
interventions reduce its incidence and case-fatality. As a result, the population health gain 
due to the interventions in terms of DALYs can be calculated.  
Several sub-populations must be built for the analysis. Firstly, the entire population is divided 
into male and female sub-populations. Secondly, age groups of one-year span are constituted 
up to the age of 100 years. Figure 9 shows the basic structure of the four-state population 
model considering births (B), deaths (D), and up to two disease conditions. States are mapped 
as boxes and flows are shown as arrows. 
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Figure 9: The Four-state Population Model 
Source: Lauer et al., 2003 
 
 
 
The total population (T) of each age group is divided into four disease states, two with the 
individual disease condition (X or C), a group with the combined condition (XC), and a group 
with “healthy people” (S). Similarly to the study on the cost-effectiveness of malaria 
interventions done by Morel et al. (2005, see section 4.3), only a partial model of PopMod, 
focusing on one disease condition, has been used in this analysis. The prevalence rates of the 
groups X (those with malaria) and S (healthy people) are defined as proportions relative to the 
total population: 
(1) pX = X/T  pS = S/T 
Population movements between the disease states shown in figure 8 are called transition 
hazards. In the terminology of PopMod, the population movements from X to D are divided 
into two parts. Firstly, fX stands for the cause-specific fatality hazard or in other words, the 
case-fatality rate (CFR) of the people suffering from malaria. Secondly, deaths from causes 
other than malaria are denoted as m (background mortality).  
(2) hXD= fX + m  hSD= m 
Transition hazards change over time due to, for example, changes in the effectiveness of 
interventions (e.g. resistance of drugs). Equation 3 expresses the time dependent transition 
hazard h(t) of the at-risk population dP/P.  
(3) h(t) = - (1/P)  dP/dt 
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The population evolution, over time, for the three groups used in the analysis is shown in the 
differential equation system below. For instance, the group of healthy people S is decreased 
by malaria incidence or background mortality and increased by people who are cured of 
malaria. Analogously, the changes within the other two groups are explained as follows: 
(4) dS/dt = -(hSX + hSD )  S + hXS   X  
 
(5) dX/dt = -(hXS + hXD )  X + hSX   S 
 
(6) dD/dt = hSD   S + hXD   X  
 
The differential equation system is approximated by a 4th-order Runge-Kutta method (see 
Lauer et al. (2003) for further details). Moreover, PopMod analyzes all age- and sex classes of 
the population as separate systems. Interventions to reduce, for example, the malaria burden, 
are modelled as a change of hazards during a certain time. The evolution of hazards can be 
described by the following linear function: 
(7) h  hint = a h + b 
Using this equation, the initial hazard level b and the hazards change rate a are required for 
the analysis. Alternatively, the changes of hazards due to interventions can be supplied 
manually for all age- and sex groups, as done in the following analysis.  
The output of PopMod includes the total amount of population healthy years under the 
baseline scenario and in the case of selected malaria interventions. The difference of both can 
be interpreted as the effect of the health measure and will be expressed as DALYs averted. 
Thus, a DALY can be interpreted as a lost year of “healthy life”. It combines the years of life 
lost (YLL) due to premature mortality and the years lost due to disability (YLD): 
(8) DALY = YLL + YLD 
For the calculation of YLLs in the total population, the remaining life expectancy at the age of 
death is multiplied by the number of deaths. In the event of a deadly malaria infection, the 
basic formula for YLL is given by 
(9)  YLL = N L   N = number of deaths due to malaria 
     L = life expectancy at the age of death in years 
For a certain period of time, YLD can be computed by multiplying the number of incident 
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cases by the average duration of the disease and a weight factor. The following formula shows 
the calculation of YLD in the case of a malaria infection: 
(10) YLD = I  DW L  I = number of malaria cases 
     DW = health state valuation for malaria 
L = average duration of the malaria infection until 
remission or death (years) 
 
The weight factor specifies the severity of the disease and lies between 0 and 1, where 0 is 
defined as perfect health and 1 as death (WHO, 2013). The deterioration of the health status 
in the case of malaria infection varies according to age and gender. Thus, PopMod allows for 
different health-state valuation factors for all age- and gender groups. The inclusion of age 
weighting into the analysis is controversial. In the literature, there is a distinction between 
efficiency-based age weighting and equity-based age weighting. The former argues that the 
relative social value of a person’s health differs by age. The age-weight function of this 
concept increases through childhood, peaks at the beginning of a person's twenties and 
decreases slowly afterwards. In contrast, equity-based age weighting gives the largest weight 
to young people and declines continuously with age (but remains below zero). The logic 
behind this approach is that everybody has the right to a certain span of health, depending on 
his or her life expectancy. These theories could not be finally confirmed in empirical studies 
(Tsuchiya, 1999). In particular, very little is known about equity-based age weights. Thus, the 
following analysis presents both results with and without age weighting.   
Recipients of health interventions prefer to obtain the outcome of the measure sooner rather 
than later. In contrast, the costs of the interventions are paid later rather than sooner. 
Consequently, there is a broad consensus in the literature to discount costs and a 
controversial discussion on discounting health effects. The justification of discounting future 
health consumption is based on three approaches. Firstly, there is a risk that there will be no 
need for the consumption of a certain health intervention in the future due to, for example, 
death, climate change, or new technologies. The so-called “pure rate of time preference” is a 
second reason why people value today’s consumption over future consumption. Thirdly, the 
marginal welfare of consumption is higher today when future increases in income are 
expected. The basic formula to discount costs is the following: 
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(11)   
 
Here, t specifies the time period of the costs and r the corresponding discount rate (Tan-
Torres Edejer et al., 2003). As mentioned above, there is no agreement in the literature on 
how to discount health effects. In accordance with the time paradox by Keeler and Cretin 
(1983), costs and benefits have to be discounted with the same rate. Otherwise, if the rate 
used for health effects were lower than the one used for costs, the cost-effectiveness ratio 
would increase due to the shift of interventions to the future.  Other authors, however, stated 
that the time paradox is irrelevant, because early and later health effects are not mutually 
exclusive (Parsonage and Neuburger, 1992). In the basic case of this analysis, a discount rate 
of 3% is applied to both intervention costs and effects. Sensitivity analysis in section 4.5.5 
tests the impact of using different discount rates. Various types of uncertainty occur during 
the calculation of cost-effectiveness ratios, including parameter uncertainty, model 
uncertainty, and generalization uncertainty (Tan-Torres Edejer et al., 2003). As for age-
weighting and discounting, sensitivity analysis will also be applied in this study to explore the 
impact of varying input factors (e.g. unit costs, efficacy of interventions etc.) on the cost-
effectiveness ratios. 
Using the longitudinal population model PopMod for CEA of selected malaria interventions 
has several limitations. In particular, there are three types of errors in PopMod. Firstly, the 
results of this analysis are distorted due to a model or projection error. PopMod analyzes a 
simplified system of interacting disease states instead of a more complex full system closer to 
reality. For instance, the variable X representing the population group suffering from malaria 
does not distinguish between severe and non-severe malaria cases. Secondly, PopMod 
simulates population health with the help of approximate solution values using numerical 
techniques. This might further distort the estimated results due to numerical errors. Thirdly, 
there is much uncertainty in observed and derived variable values due to the weak quality and 
availability of data in Tanzania (see Lauer et al., 2003). Moreover, the model is very simple 
regarding human behaviour and learning and there is no explicit link to water management. 
 
  
  
Costpresentvalue =
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(1+ r )tt=0
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å
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4.5 Quantitative Analysis: Model Estimation and Results 
4.5.1 Data 
This study is based on historical data on the effectiveness and costs of selected malaria 
interventions, covering a ten-year implementation period from 2002 to 2012. Data sources 
comprise the NBS, price catalogues, WHO-CHOICE database, relevant literature, and expert 
opinion. The analysis focuses on the national level of Tanzania mainland (i.e. excluding 
Zanzibar). Table 7 shows the initial or mean values of all variables included in the study. Data 
on total population levels, population growth, mortality rates, and initial birth cohorts are 
retrieved from the 2002 Population and Housing Census (NBS, 2006 I) and its future 
projections (NBS, 2006 II). Mortality rates and population levels are divided into one-year age 
groups covering age 0 to age 100+, resulting in 101 age bins for both females and males. 
PopMod takes into account that the data from the census is given as mid-year populations. 
Since population levels are collected in five-year intervals only, PoPMod smoothens the data 
accordingly.  
For all hazard rates, a certain value is given to each of the age- and gender-specific groups. 
The incidence rate reflects the occurrence of new malaria cases or, in other words, the 
transition of people from state S to X. Its value varies between a minimum of 0.196 and a 
maximum of 0.409 (Schellenberg et al., 2003; WHO, 2012 II). Stated differently, the remission 
rate measures the number of people who have been cured of malaria and move back to state 
S. Depending on age and gender, the value of the remission rate varies between 0.072 and 
0.183 (WHO, 2012 II). Moreover, the percentage of people who died from malaria in a certain 
period of time is measured by the CFR. Reyburn et al. (2004) and WHO (2012 II) estimated a 
rate between 0.020 and 0.107 for Tanzania mainland. Data on malaria prevalence was 
obtained from the latest HMIS (NBS and Macro International Inc., 2012) and Khatib et al., 
(2012). Furthermore, age- and gender-dependent disability weights for malaria required for 
calculating the DALYs were retrieved from the burden of disease database (WHO, 2012 II). In 
general, the net-effectiveness of selected malaria interventions on malaria incidence (ix1) and 
the case-fatality hazard (fx) depends on adherence, compliance, the initial level of drug 
resistance, and the growth rate of drug resistance. Adherence reflects the estimated 
proportion of patients who take malaria drugs as prescribed. On the other hand, compliance 
indicates the probability of successful treatment when the physician’s prescription deviates 
from the official dosing schedule.  
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Various studies have shown that there is a similar effect of ITNs and IRS in reducing malaria 
incidence and case-fatality (Curtis and Mnzava, 2000; Lengeler, 2001). Consequently, the data 
from Lauer et al. (2003) indicates that both ITNs and IRS reduce malaria incidence by 33.0 to 
75.0 percent and the CFR, by 13.0 to 30.0 percent (table 7). Incorporating a basic level of CQ 
drug resistance of 0.71 and, due to the replacement of CQ with SP, a negative resistance 
growth for CQ of -3.0 percent, case management with CQ is estimated to reduce the CFR by 
11.0 to 24.0 percent (Mwai et al., 2009). Based on both a lower level of drug resistance (0.23) 
and a positive resistance growth rate (0.4), the CFR can be reduced by 19.0 to 43.0 percent 
through case-management with SP (Alifrangis et al., 2009). However, the CFR might fall the 
most through active case management with ACT (62.0 percent), due to resistance levels and 
growth rates close to zero (Mugittu et al., 2006). IPTP is applied to a very small part of the 
total population and, consequently, reduces the overall CFR by 0.9 to 1.9 percent only. 
The cost analysis is done from a societal perspective, including provider costs as well as 
indirect and direct costs to the patient and family. For comparison, all data on intervention 
costs were deflated to the common base year 2007 using the GDP deflator (World Bank, 
2013). Moreover, economic costs are used instead of financial costs to express the 
opportunity costs of the intervention. A comprehensive cost review showed that the per 
capita costs for an ITN in Tanzania lies between US$ 2.32 and US$ 2.77 annually, including 
costs for the identification of need, training on how to use the net, monitoring, and 
administration (Guyatt et al., 2002; Yukich, 2007). In accordance with Morel et al. (2005), it 
was assumed that the average ITN is used by 1.5 persons. The annual per capita costs for IPTP 
are much lower, ranging between US$ 0.34 and US$ 1.49 and covering expenditure for drugs, 
staff, and health education (Goodman et al., 2001 II; Wolfe et al., 2001).  Since IPTP is done 
during regular antenatal care (ANC) visits, costs for transportation and the opportunity costs 
for travel time to the hospital have been excluded at this point. 
The costs for IRS comprise insecticides, project management, surveillance and training, and 
range from US$ 1.04 to US$ 4.97 per person covered per year (Guyatt et al., 2002; Conteh et 
al., 2004; Yukich, 2007). For malaria case management, the figure for the annual outpatient 
and inpatient attendance has been obtained from the latest Health Statistical Abstract 
(MoHSW, 2008 I). Costs include non-drug expenditures on the side of the provider, drug costs, 
direct costs for the patient’s family such as hospital fees, transportation, and miscellaneous, 
and indirect costs such as the opportunity costs of time spent at the hospital, time for 
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travelling to the hospital, and time spent caring for sick people at home (see table 7). In an 
optimal case, further costs as those of the MoHSW, costs for the education of health 
professionals or even health costs in extended years of life, would have been included in the 
analysis. However, this was impossible due to data limitation. To our knowledge, we have 
utilized the most reliable and comprehensive data sources currently available for Tanzania. 
Various studies have also used some of these data sources, as for example a Lancet article 
published by Masanja et al. (2008). 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
a) Population Data 
Variable 
(age) 
Description (Initial) Value Unit Sources 
T Total population (m) 16.35 Million NBS, 2006 I 
T Total population (f) 17.11 Million NBS, 2006 I 
g Population growth 3.29 Percentage NBS, 2006 II 
B Initial birth cohort 1.44 Million NBS, 2006 I 
M 0 Age-specific death rate 101 Per 1000 p. NBS, 2006 I 
M 1-4 Age-specific death rate 22 Per 1000 p. NBS, 2006 I 
M 20-24 Age-specific death rate 6 Per 1000 p. NBS, 2006 I 
b) Hazard Data 
Variable Description Trans. -Value Unit Sources* 
ix1 Incidence of malaria S  X 378.673 Per 1000 p. Schellenberg et al., 2003 
rx1 Remission from malaria X  S 177.011 Per 1000 p. WHO, 2012 II 
fx Case fatality hazard X  D 42.230 Per 1000 p. Reyburn et al., 2004 
m Background mortality M–mx 34.848 Per 1000 p. NBS, 2006 I 
mx Case mortality (die of X in T)  0.489 Per 1000 p. WHO 2012 II 
X Malaria prevalence  128.391 Per 1000 p. NBS; Khatib et al., 2012 
HSV.X Health-State Valuation X  0.82  WHO, 2012 II 
c) Net effectiveness of the interventions 
Variable Adher-
ence 
Com-
pliance 
Initial 
resis-
tance 
Resis-
tance 
growth 
Baseline reduction Unit Sources* 
Inci-
dence 
Case 
fatality 
ITNs 65.0 0.0   33.0-75.0 13.0-30.0 Percentage Lauer et al., (2003) 
IPTP 80.0 10.0 23.0 0.4 - 0.9-1.9 Percentage Alifrangis et al., (2009) 
IRS 100.0 0.0   33.0-75.0 13.0-30.0 Percentage Lauer et al., (2003) 
CQ 40.0 20.0 71.0 -0.03 - 11.0-24.0 Percentage Mwai et al., (2009) 
SP 90.0 0.0 23.0 0.4 - 19.0-43.0 Percentage Alifrangis et al., (2009) 
ACT 35.0 45.0 0.9 0.05 - 41.0-93.0 Percentage Mugittu et al., (2006) 
d) Patient Cost Ranges (per capita, in 2007 US-dollars) 
Variable Drug costs Direct costs Indirect costs Sources 
ITNs 2.32-2.77 Yukich, 2007; Guyatt et al., 2002 
IPTP 0.34-1.49 Wolfe et al., 2001; Goodman et al., 2001 II 
IRS 1.04-4.97 Guyatt et al., 2002; Yukich, 2007; Conteh et al., 
2004 
CQ 0.077-0.396 1.87 14.73 Drug Price Indi., 2013; Wisemann et al., 2006 
SP 0.011-0.226 1.87 14.73 Drug Price Indi., 2013; Wisemann et al., 2006 
ACT 1.651-2.616 1.87 2.20 Drug Price Indi., 2013; Wisemann et al., 2006 
* WHO (2012) was used as a complementary data source for all hazard and intervention variables 
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4.5.2 Model Estimation and Results 
Table 8 shows the cost-effectiveness estimates for 6 individual and 11 combined interventions 
to combat malaria in Tanzania. Three different coverage levels are presented to account for 
potential economies of scale, which could occur, for example, if the additional amount of 
DALYs averted, by scaling up certain interventions, exceeds the additional amount of costs. 
Moreover, coverage levels are calculated relatively to the population at risk (92% in the case 
of Tanzania). The baseline scenario has been estimated without age-weighting and 
discounting of health effects and costs.  Median drug prices and costs have been used. The 
sensitivity of the results to these factors is shown in section 4.5.5. 
Having a limited malaria budget, the first and second priority should be given to the 
implementation of preventive interventions such as the distribution of ITNs and IPTP, with 
costs of US$ 41 per DALY averted, for both of the interventions, at a coverage level of 95%. 
With growing resource availability, ACT for malaria case management should be added as a 
third priority at the same coverage level (US$ 53 per DALY averted). The incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio was estimated to be 85.3. Finally, IRS at 95% of coverage would be 
included as a fourth measure with costs of US$ 73 per DALY averted and an incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio of 191.1. Due to the growing resistance of parasites to CQ and SP, the 
health effects of these treatments are comparably low. Consequently, both are not included 
in the health maximizing combination of interventions. Lower coverage levels lead to less 
cost-effective interventions in most of the cases.  
The WHO has derived certain threshold values for cost-effectiveness analysis in low-income 
countries. An intervention that costs less than US$ 30 per DALY averted can be referred to as 
highly attractive. Interventions that cost less than US$ 150 per DALY averted are still 
attractive. Consequently, all interventions of the aforementioned health maximizing 
combinations could be referred to as attractive (WHO, 1996). 
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Table 8: Average and Incremental Cost-effectiveness of Selected Malaria Interventions (in 2007 US-Dollars) 
Intervention Cover-
age 
Average 
yearly costs 
(in Millions) 
Average yearly  
DALYs averted 
(in Millions) 
Average costs per 
DALY averted 
Incremental  
cost-effectiveness 
ITN 95% 58.350 1.421 41 41.0 
IPTP 95% 1.355 0.033 41 41.0 
IRS 95% 103.300 1.421 73 Dominated 
CQ 95% 199.940 0.372 537 Dominated 
SP 95% 198.653 0.659 301 Dominated 
ACT 95% 79.418 1.504 53 Dominated 
ITN&CQ 95% 258.290 1.657 156 Dominated 
ITN&SP 95% 257.004 1.836 140 Dominated 
ITN&ACT 95% 137.768 2.360 58 Dominated 
IRS&CQ 95% 303.239 1.657 183 Dominated 
IRS&SP 95% 301.952 1.836 164 Dominated 
IRS&ACT 95% 182.717 2.360 77 Dominated 
IRS&ACT&IPTP 95% 184.072 2.368 78 Dominated 
ITN&ACT&IPTP 95% 139.123 2.368 59 85.3 
IRS&ITN 95% 161.650 2.304 70 Dominated 
IRS&ITN&ACT 95% 241.068 2.904 83 Dominated 
IRS&ITN&ACT&IPTP 95% 242.423 2.908 83 191.1 
ITN 80% 491.373 1.183 42 Dominated 
IPTP 80% 1.140 0.024 47 Dominated 
IRS 80% 86.989 1.183 74 Dominated 
CQ 80% 168.370 0.313 538 Dominated 
SP 80% 167.287 0.552 303 Dominated 
ACT 80% 66.878 1.252 53 Dominated 
ITN&CQ 80% 217.508 1.391 156 Dominated 
ITN&SP 80% 216.424 1.549 140 Dominated 
ITN&ACT 80% 116.016 2.007 58 Dominated 
IRS&CQ 80% 255.359 1.391 184 Dominated 
IRS&SP 80% 254.276 1.549 164 Dominated 
IRS&ACT 80% 153.867 2.007 77 Dominated 
IRS&ACT&IPTP 80% 155.008 2.014 77 Dominated 
ITN&ACT&IPTP 80% 117.156 2.014 58 Dominated 
IRS&ITN 80% 136.126 1.914 71 Dominated 
IRS&ITN&ACT 80% 203.005 2.479 82 Dominated 
IRS&ITN&ACT&IPTP 80% 204.145 2.483 82 Dominated 
ITN 50% 30.711 0.723 43 Dominated 
IPTP 50% 0.713 0.015 47 Dominated 
IRS 50% 54.368 0.723 75 Dominated 
CQ 50% 105.231 0.194 541 Dominated 
SP 50% 104.554 0.341 306 Dominated 
ACT 50% 41.799 0.764 55 Dominated 
ITN&CQ 50% 135.942 0.863 157 Dominated 
ITN&SP 50% 135.265 0.969 140 Dominated 
ITN&ACT 50% 72.510 1.272 57 Dominated 
IRS&CQ 50% 159.600 0.863 185 Dominated 
IRS&SP 50% 158.922 0.969 164 Dominated 
IRS&ACT 50% 96.167 1.272 76 Dominated 
IRS&ACT&IPTP 50% 96.880 1.276 76 Dominated 
ITN&ACT&IPTP 50% 73.223 1.276 57 Dominated 
IRS&ITN 50% 85.079 1.165 73 Dominated 
IRS&ITN&ACT 50% 126.878 1.576 81 Dominated 
IRS&ITN&ACT&IPTP 50% 127.591 1.579 81 Dominated 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
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4.5.3 Graphical Analysis 
In the following section, a graphical solution to determine the most cost-effective strategy to 
combat malaria in Tanzania is presented. Figure 10 shows the costs and effects of the 51 
individual and combined strategies (black squares). The dotted cost-effectiveness threshold 
line is derived from the categories defined in the previous section. All strategies at the left of 
the dotted line are not considered as attractive interventions, since costs exceed US$ 150 per 
DALY averted. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios are calculated between the strategies 
that are not dominated by others (dashed lines). Altogether, these dashed lines form an 
efficiency frontier. Decision makers move along the efficiency frontier and implement 
attractive strategies with increasing budgets. The most cost-effective strategy is reached at 
the tangency of the efficiency frontier and the cost-effectiveness threshold (dotted line), in 
this case, the implementation of ITN & ACT & IPTP. Moreover, diminishing marginal returns on 
investments in malaria interventions can be derived from the graph. 
 
 
Figure 10: Expansion Path of 51 Strategies to Combat Malaria (Baseline Scenario) 
Source: author’s calculations 
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4.5.4 Optimal Budget Allocation 
Based on the results of section 4.5.2 and 4.5.3, simple linear programming is used to determine 
the optimal allocation of funds to the most cost-effective strategies. This method has widely 
been used by various authors to solve similar optimization problems (see, for example, Fleßa, 
2000 or Earnshaw et al., 2002) and ensures that the marginal dollar goes to where it has the 
highest effect on averting DALYs. In section 4.8, the optimal malaria budget allocation will be 
compared to the one that is currently implemented in Tanzania. 
The following objective function V maximizes the amount of DALYs averted subject to several 
constraints:  
(12)    
                          
Here, i is defined as one type of the four cost-effective interventions on the efficiency frontier, 
yi the absolute number of DALYs averted per additional dollar spent and xi the absolute amount 
of funds spent on a certain strategy. The values for yi can be derived from table 8: 
(13)  yITN = 0.024 yIPTP = 0.025 yIRS = 0.014 yACT = 0.019 
The first constraint reflects the limited budget available for malaria interventions, 
(14)   
where X denotes the total share of the health sector budget allocated to malaria interventions. 
The multiplier M allows for the calculation of scenarios with increased health sector budgets. 
Since the maximum amount of DALYs averted due to a certain intervention cannot exceed the 
potential reduction in the case of full coverage, a second constraint has to be included in the 
linear program:  
(15)   
Here, Zi is defined as the total number of DALYs that could be averted based on the maximum 
of 95% coverage. Moreover, spending a certain budget share p on preventive strategies is 
assumed: 
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(16)   
Finally, equation 17 constrains the values for xi and yi to non-negative values. 
(17)    
The simplex algorithm has been used to solve the linear program. Various malaria budget 
scenarios ranging from US$ 100 million to US$ 240 million are presented in figure 11. As shown 
in figure 9, US$ 140 million are needed to implement the most cost-effective strategy including 
ITNs, case management with ACTs and IPTP. To cover all interventions along the efficiency 
frontier, the budget must be increased to approximately US$ 240 million. Decision makers 
might decide to spend a certain budget share on preventive strategies, as recommended by the 
Global Malaria Action Plan (RBM, 2012). To show this effect, all scenarios starting from a 
budget of US$ 150 million allocate 65 percent of funds to preventive interventions. The budget 
shares for Larviciding, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), Behaviour Change Communication 
(BCC), and other budget shares were kept constant. 
 
Figure 11: Optimal Budget Allocation Along the Efficiency Frontier 
Source: author’s calculations 
In line with the results of section 4.5.2, the decision maker would start to allocate large budget 
shares to ITNs, IPTP, and case management with ACTs. The ACT’s budget share increases up to 
the point were the budget share of preventive interventions is set to 65% and the proportion of 
funds allocated to IRS starts to rise. 
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4.5.5 Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analysis 
All cost-effectiveness ratios presented are subject to parameter uncertainty, owing to two 
potential reasons. Firstly, there might be huge variability around observed or derived 
parameter values. Secondly, the inclusion of specific input parameters depends on value 
judgements, such as, for example, the use of age-weighting. However, it is important for a 
decision-maker to identify at which point a certain parameter would make a strategy 
unattractive, even if it lies on the efficiency frontier in the baseline scenario. To account for 
that, sensitivity analysis is applied in this study to measure the impact of varying costs, 
efficacies, discount rates, and the use of age-weighting on cost-effectiveness ratios. 
Probabilistic uncertainty analysis has been carried out for factors with an underlying probability 
distribution (e.g. hazards and mortality rates). 
In this study, “one-way” sensitivity analysis is implemented by exploring the effect of an 
individual parameter change while holding other parameters constant. This approach provides 
more detailed information to the decision-maker compared to “multi-way” sensitivity analysis, 
where multiple components are varied at the same time (Tan-Torres Edejer et al., 2003). In 
order to evaluate the sensitivity of cost-effectiveness ratios to varying costs, the attractiveness 
of strategies has been recalculated using upper and lower extremes from table 7. The results 
are shown in figure 12. Even with the assumption of maximum costs, all four interventions can 
still be considered as attractive interventions. In the case of minimum costs, IPTP and IRS reach 
a very cost-effective point (less than US$ 30 per DALY averted). Looking at the total range of 
potential cost-effectiveness ratios, the ranking of strategies becomes unclear. However, the 
implementation of ITNs will always be preferred to case management with ACT. Figure 13 
shows the sensitivity of results to upper and lower limits of efficacy. Again, all strategies can 
still be considered as attractive in the case of minimum efficiency. ITNs can be categorized as 
very attractive interventions when efficacy reaches its maximum limit. The inclusion of age-
weighting and discounting of costs and health effects is presented in figure 14.  A discount rate 
of 3% and equity-based age-weights (giving more weight to the life of young people) do not 
change the ranking of interventions on cost-effectiveness grounds. Furthermore, the 
implementation of all interventions is still attractive according to WHO criteria. 
To implement the probabilistic uncertainty analysis, a statistical Monte-Carlo method is used. It 
is integrated in the software package PopMod and varies input parameters randomly around 
their original values during the execution of N runs. Here, parameters are assumed to be 
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normally distributed with a coefficient of 0.5 variation for all hazards including incidence-, 
remission-, case-fatality-, and mortality- rates. As an output, PopMod provides estimates for 
standard deviation and mean. Figure 15 shows that if the variation of parameters is taken into 
account, overlapping cost-effectiveness ranges make the prioritization of strategies difficult. In 
any case, ITNs and IPTP would be preferred to IRS. 
 Figure 12: Sensitivity to Costs (Lower/Upper Limits)          Figure 13: Sensitivity to Efficacy 
 
 Source: author’s calculations                                                                               Source: author’s calculations  
 Figure 14: Sensitivity to Age-Weighting/Discounting          Figure 15: Uncertainty of Hazards        
 
 Source: author’s calculations                                                                                Source: author’s calculations                                                                                
In conclusion, three of the four scenarios presented show that, at the extreme parameter 
values, the effectiveness ranking of the four interventions remains unchanged. The overall cost-
effectiveness ranges are US$ 26-64 per DALY averted for ITNs, US$ 15-67 for IPTP, US$ 25-120 
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for IRS, and US$ 34-87 for case management with ACTs. These interventions are highly cost-
effective compared to interventions tackling other major diseases in that region, for example, 
HIV/AIDS prevention (US$ 6 – 377 per DALY averted), maternal and neonatal care (US$ 82 – 
409), or Tuberculosis treatment (US$ 4129 – 5506, Laxminarayan et al., 2006). Currently, 
prevention and treatment of malaria is the second most cost-effective health intervention in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The only intervention with higher cost-effectiveness is childhood 
immunization at a cost of US$ 2 – 24 per DALY averted. These results may encourage decision-
makers to put more weight on interventions to combat malaria when allocating the overall 
health budget. Furthermore, the estimated cost effectiveness ranges are comparable to 
interventions of related sectors. One example for this are nutrition programs, with US$ 20-105 
per DALY averted for the African region (Baltussen et al., 2004). 
4.6 Qualitative Analysis 
This is a CEA of selected malaria interventions with the objective to optimize the prioritisation 
of competing measures within the overall malaria budget. However, priority setting in health 
care has many other dimensions that go beyond CEA: additional criteria are used in priority 
setting, non-health sectors compete with the funds allocated to health and malaria, various 
challenges hinder an optimal allocation, and numerous actors are involved in the malaria 
priority setting process. To account for all these issues, structured expert interviews with 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders have been conducted in addition to the 
quantitative analysis. A total of 11 stakeholders were consulted to discuss their opinion of and 
experience in health priority setting. Six interviewees, including District Medical Officers 
(Bukoba and Muleba District) and District Health Secretaries, represented the views of 
government institutions. Moreover, the opinion of five stakeholders working for non-
governmental institutions (e.g. Faith-based-hospitals, research institutions, development 
partners) was assessed. Stakeholders were selected based on their experience and involvement 
in the health priority setting process16. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test was applied to test for the 
significance of differences between the opinions of non-governmental and governmental 
respondents (Mann & Whitney, 1947).  
Firstly, the interviewees were asked to elaborate on the health priority setting process in their 
department or institution. Those who are actually involved in the ranking of health measures 
                                                        
16 See appendix II for a full list of participants. 
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stated that the allocation of government funds is based on disease burden assessment and the 
National Package of Essential Health Interventions. In contrast, it is common to use user-fees to 
cover the priorities of the corresponding facility, as for example, paying salaries to staff 
members. Several stakeholders emphasized the involvement of the community through 
representatives in health facility committees. Question two of the structured interview 
evaluated the relative importance of certain criteria for health priority setting. In the first 
section, disease-related criteria were assessed followed by patient-related criteria in section 
two and society-related criteria in the third section. The quality of evidence on effectiveness 
and the cost-effectiveness of interventions were ranked as most important within the group of 
disease-related criteria (median = 4), followed by the severity of a condition (median = 3.5). 
Among patient-related criteria, the largest weight was applied to age and the urgency of the 
need for care (median = 4), favoring the treatment of young people. Less important criteria 
include the responsibility for causing own illness, social status, and place of residence (median = 
2.5-3). However, in cases were social status and place of residence matter, priority should be 
given to interventions for poor people living in rural areas. The results in the category of 
society-related criteria show that the health budget should be allocated to health interventions 
with the objective to achieve equity of health care access (median = 4). The view of the 
community and political attitude are considered as less important criteria (median = 2.5-3). 
Several policies on how to allocate health funds to certain priorities are currently in place. In 
the context of malaria, examples of these include the regional policy ALMA or the national 
MMTSP (see section 4.2.2). The stakeholders contributing to the development of these policies 
vary according to the government level. Question four of the structured interview deals with 
this issue and asked the respondents to rank the actors who should be involved in developing 
these policies for health priority setting. There was a wide consensus that the inclusion of 
representatives from the central and local government level and health professionals is most 
important (median = 4). Less important is the participation of donors, representatives from the 
international level (e.g. WHO), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), health insurance 
companies, and the general public (median = 3). The involvement of patients in the priority 
setting process has little relevance (median = 2). In contrast, the representation of community 
members and researchers was highly requested by the interviewees. 
Even if policies and regulations to structure health priority setting are in place, several 
problems hinder the allocations of resources to interventions with the highest impact on 
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health. Consequently, in question five, stakeholders were requested to name the major 
challenges of the health priority setting process. According to the interviewees, the weak 
quality of health data and indicators is the major challenge when trying to compare the costs 
and effects of several interventions (median = 4). Besides the results of the irregularly 
implemented DHS/HMIS and the Health Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS), carried out 
by the Ifakara Health Institute (IHI), little high-quality health data is available. The respondents 
further criticized the availability of health data and indicators in general (also low-quality data), 
the lack of awareness of the impact of certain health interventions, the weak personal capacity 
for priority setting, the lack of incentives to carry out an appropriate priority setting process, 
and earmarked funding from both the donor and the government side (median = 3). In 
contrast, political constraints including dominant interest groups and multiple government 
levels as well as discrepancies in people's values are only minor challenges in the process of 
optimal resource allocation (median = 2). Furthermore, the interviewees mentioned that 
insufficiencies in the medical supply system are a further constraint. For all questions, there 
was no significant difference between the answers from governmental interviewees compared 
to non-governmental interviewees. 
The final section of the structured interview dealt with the question of how health priority 
setting could be improved in future. Firstly, respondents requested a better harmonization of 
representatives and institutions involved in the process with regards to the health SWAP. 
Secondly, when setting priorities for health, much more emphasis was advised to be put on the 
participation at the community level. As mentioned as a response to the previous question, the 
incentives to carry out an appropriate allocation of resources play a large role and should be 
strengthened, in particular, for medical practitioners. It was further requested that health 
professionals' and politicians' ideas should be given equal weight. Within the same context, 
interviewees suggested to delegate more power to health professionals, in the decision making 
process, compared to their political counterparts. 
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Table 9: Qualitative Analysis 
Question Median Significant difference between 
governmental and non-
governmental interviewees? 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test) 
2. Please rate the importance of the following criteria for health priority setting 
   (1 = not important criteria / 4 = very important criteria) 
2.1 Disease-related criteria 
a) Severity of a condition 3.5 No 
b) Cost-effectiveness of intervention 4 No 
c) Quality of evidence on effectiveness 4 No 
2.2 Patient-related criteria 
a) Urgency of need for care 4 No 
b) Responsible for causing own illness 2.5 No 
c) Age 4 No 
d) Social Status 3 No 
e) Gender 3 No 
f) Place of residence 3 No 
2.3 Society-related criteria 
a) Equity of health care access 4 No 
b) Community’s views 3 No 
c) Political views 2.5 No 
4. Who should be the main actors in health priority setting? (1 = not important actor / 4 = very important actor) 
a) Health professionals 4 No 
b) Donors 3 No 
c) International level (e.g. WHO) 3 No 
d) Central government level 4 No 
e) Local government level 4 No 
f) General public 3 No 
g) Patients 2 No 
h) NGOs 3 No 
I) Health insurance companies 3 No 
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4. What are the major challenges of the health priority setting process?  
    (1 = minor challenge / 4 = major challenge) 
a) Availability of health data/indicators 3 No 
b) Quality of health data/indicators 4 No 
c) Not aware of the impact of certain health investments 3 No 
d) No personnel capacity for priority setting 3 No 
e) No incentives to carry out an appropriate priority setting 
    process 
3 No 
f) Earmarked funding (Government) 3 No 
g) Earmarked funding (Donors) 3 No 
h) Political constraints (dominant interest groups, multiple  
     government levels) 
2 No 
i) Discrepancy in values 2 No 
Sources: author / Kapiriri et al., 2004 / Kapiriri and Norheim, 2004 
4.7 Ethical Considerations 
In times of scarce resources for health improvement, prioritization of malaria interventions is 
unavoidable and will consequently lead to the situation where some people do not receive the 
required health care. Allocating malaria funds on the basis of CEA, however, entails some 
justice and equity considerations that are criticized here. Using the words of Brock (2003), this 
criticism can be grouped into two categories, the construction of CEA, on the one hand, and the 
use of CEA, on the other. 
The first issue concerning the construction of CEA is the use of DALYs. As explained in section 
4.4.2, DALYs are calculated with the help of certain disability weights (DWs). Ethical criticism 
addresses the source of these DWs. Whose perspectives should be taken into account when 
estimating the health state valuation for malaria?  The patient's who is suffering from malaria, 
the medical doctors' perspective, or the view of other health professionals? Moreover, malaria 
health state valuation depends on adaptation, coping, and adjustment strategies of the patient 
and differs between certain economic, ethnic, and cultural groups. A second variable that is 
frequently criticized within the calculation of DALYs is the life expectancy (L). In principle, 
higher life expectancy produces a higher amount of DALYs. There are huge differences in life 
expectancy between different regions, genders, ethnic and racial groups, and socio-economic 
groups in Tanzania. Consequently, preference is given to interventions that predominantly 
serve, for example, rich people since their life expectancy might be higher comparatively to the 
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poor.  A third issue relates to the inclusion of indirect non-health benefits into the analysis. 
Malaria infection prevents people from pursuing their daily work, which is associated with a 
substantial economic loss. However, including the non-health benefit due to the prioritized 
treatment of these persons would discriminate against very young and old people who are 
outside the working age. 
Using CEA as an instrument for malaria resource prioritization maximizes benefits without 
taking into account the distribution of health. There is a large discussion whether resources 
should be allocated to give small benefits to many people (e.g. distribution of ITNs) or to 
distribute the funds in such a way that only a few people receive high benefits (e.g. case-
management with ACT in the case of severe malaria). The results of this analysis show that, 
optimally, a mixture of both should be implemented. This was only a selection of ethical 
criticism with regards to the construction and use of CEA. However, all these issues show that 
CEA should be seen as only one input into the policy debate on priorities. 
4.8 Major Findings, Recommendations, and Future Research Directions 
CEA is an essential instrument to assess whether scarce resources are allocated to 
interventions with the highest possible health benefits to the population. Estimates based on 
a population model for Tanzania mainland show that preventive interventions such as ITNs 
and IPTP would be the first choice when setting priorities, with costs of US$ 41 per DALY 
averted for both of the interventions (coverage level: 95%). The estimates for ITNs are 
identical to those for the whole Southeast African Region (US$ 41 per DALY averted, see 
Morel et al., 2005). However, huge differences exist in the case of IPTP, which was estimated 
to cost, on average, US$ 352 per DALY averted in Southeast Africa. Potential reasons for these 
discrepancies include the time lag between the two studies, differences in the availability, 
access and quality of inputs, varying local drug prices and labour costs, demographic 
structures, and epidemiological characteristics. With growing budgets, the additional amount 
of funds available should be invested in case management with ACTs. The costs per DALY 
averted are US$ 53 in Tanzania compared to US$ 12 for the whole Southeast African region at 
a coverage level of 95%. The shift from the two preventive measures (ITNs and IPTP) to the 
inclusion of ACTs results in an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of 85.3. As a fourth priority, 
IRS at 95% coverage should be included with costs of US$ 73 per DALY averted and an 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of 191.1. This estimate is roughly comparable to the 
result of the whole Southeast African region (US$ 41 per DALY averted). The ranking of 
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interventions is robust to variations in key input parameters, as shown in the sensitivity and 
uncertainty analysis.  
All these individual measures and combinations can be considered as attractive interventions 
according to WHO thresholds. The graphical analysis shows diminishing marginal returns on 
malaria investments with increasing budgets. The most cost-effective strategy is implemented 
when covering ITNs, IPTP, and case management with ACT at a level of 95%. The budget 
needed to finance this combination of interventions is almost identical to the funds available 
in the year 2010 (US$ 140 million, see section 4.2.4). However, the current budget does not 
prioritize certain interventions in such a way that the marginal dollar goes to where it has the 
highest effect on averting DALYs. The results of the budget analysis show that a budget share 
of 41.7% would be sufficient to provide ITNs to all Tanzanian people exposed to the risk of 
malaria (current allocation: 47%). To reach a more optimal budget allocation, funds from the 
overfunded ITN program and the less cost-effective IRS should be shifted to make ACTs 
available and affordable to the poor population. The current allocation of funds to ACTs is 
29% compared to 43.3% optimally. In line with the proposed budget allocation, IPTP is fully 
funded in the current budget.  
As a result of the qualitative analysis, CEA was rated as one of the most important criteria for 
health priority setting. A second criterion that has received much approval is the age of the 
patient. This could be understood as a preference for the inclusion of age-weighting when 
calculating cost-effectiveness ratios. However, CEA should only be seen as the second stage of a 
“medical-social triage”. During the first stage, priorities in health are set according to medical, 
ethical, and socio-legal issues (which are not covered by pure CEA) and divided in groups of 
“must treats” and “desirable treats”. In the course of the second stage, all possible 
interventions are ranked again according to CEA. Measures of the “must-treat”-group will be 
implemented, even if they are less cost-effective than others (e.g. case-management with 
ACTs). Regardless of the implementation of such a two-stage approach, social, and ethical 
dimensions have to be considered. Moreover, the standardization of the methods used within 
CEA is a precondition to increase the comparability of health interventions analyzed in different 
studies (Terry, 2004). 
Beyond the interventions assessed in this analysis, broader opportunities for malaria control 
should be taken into account. This includes increasing the availability and appropriate use of 
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rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs). With the help of these tests, a large amount of money could be 
saved by giving appropriate treatments to non-malarial fevers instead of expensive ACTs. 
Moreover, spatial targeting of malaria interventions might help to save malaria funds in low-
risk settings (Wilson and Aizenman, 2012). 
Increasing the malaria budget to approximately US$ 240 million would allow scaling up of all 
interventions on the efficiency frontier to their maximum level.  However, this could only be 
done at the expense of the budgets of other sectors, where some of these might be more 
effective in improving population health. Thus, the total amount currently spent on malaria 
interventions in Tanzania might be close to the optimum, but there is a huge potential to 
allocate these funds in a more cost-effective way. 
Future research should take into account some broader aspects of malaria control, as for 
example, the question of how to replace worn-out ITNs in an efficient manner. On the one 
hand, replacing ITNs  that are still functional, and thus, can still protect people, would be a 
waste of resources. On the other hand, not replacing worn-out nets would decrease their 
effectiveness (Wilson and Aizenman, 2012). As a second issue, more research is needed on 
implementation barriers such as procurement processes for malaria drugs, especially for 
remote regions in Tanzania. 
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5. Political Economy of Health Care Provision 
Chapter 5 positively assesses how political party competition and the access to mass media 
directly affect the distribution of district resources for health improvement. It is organized as 
follows: section 5.2 describes the development of the political and electoral system in 
Tanzania, including the role of the media. The subsequent section 5.3 reviews the existing 
literature on determinants of government responsiveness including the added value of this 
study. Section 5.4 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of government responsiveness and 
explains the corresponding regression models, which will be used to identify causal effects of 
the political economy and mass media on the provision of public health services. The 
corresponding estimates of the quantitative analysis are presented in section 5.5. Finally, 
conclusions, policy recommendations, and limitations of the study are presented at the end of 
this chapter. 
5.1 Introduction 
In addition to education and training, health care is the most crucial factor to increase the 
productive capacity of people. Thus, having the objective of strengthening the development 
and growth of a nation in poverty, governments should at least provide a minimum level of 
public health services to its citizens.  However, the provision of public services, strongly 
depends on the resources available at lower government levels. Since these resources are 
extremely scarce in the majority of developing countries, there is a need for prioritization. 
Distributing resources for health improvement to regions in a manner reflecting the relative 
burden of disease can reduce inefficiencies in the allocation of these resources. 
Similarly to other countries, the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) allocates government and 
non-government resources for health improvement from the national to the district level 
according to an official allocation formula, taking into account population patterns, poverty, 
remoteness, and the burden of disease. However, it remains questionable whether these are 
the only determinants of local resources for health improvement, since politicians have 
different incentives to provide public health services and to reduce poverty. Democratic theory 
suggests that governments are responsive through the electoral process (Downs 1957). 
Consequently, the amount of district health spending is also based on various political factors, 
such as the competition among political parties. Beyond political factors, mass media affects   
the level of district resources for health improvement, owing to their role of transmitting 
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politically relevant information to the electorate and monitoring of politicians’ efforts to 
provide public services  (Besley, Burges and Prat 2002, Strömberg 2004). However, measuring 
to what extent political factors and mass media influence local level health spending has been a 
widely neglected field in the literature, especially in the developing world. 
The objective of this study is to contribute to the elimination of this shortcoming. How the 
access and use of mass media and political party competition directly affects the distribution 
of district resources, for health improvement, in the case of Tanzania, will be positively 
assessed. Moreover, indirect effects of mass media on health spending via voter turnout are 
explored. This information is needed to understand the mechanisms of government 
responsiveness within the health sector and to emphasize the importance of democratic 
structures for an efficient allocation of scarce resources. The study benefits from Tanzanian 
secondary data on social indicators, public spending, and the results of the last two 
parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2010. Cross-sectional and panel data regression analysis 
is used to estimate the intended effects for the 134 districts on Tanzania mainland.  
5.2 Politics and the Media in Tanzania 
5.2.1 Political and Electoral System 
Following its independence in 1961, Tanzania became a one-party state under the lead of 
Julius Nyerere. As a member of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, Nyerere installed a 
socialist model of economic development and focused on the education of the countries’ 
citizens. Following his retirement and various political and economic reforms during the late 
eighties, the country adopted a multi-party system in 1992 and had its first multi-party 
parliamentary elections in 1994. Today, Tanzania is a presidential democratic republic with 
Jakaya Kikwete serving as president since 2005. Kikwete is a member of CCM and acts as both, 
head of state and head of government, simultaneously. The Government of Tanzania has the 
executive power in the country and shares legislative power with the parliament. In turn, the 
parliament consists of the president and the national assembly. It is responsible for 
monitoring the programs and plans of the government and approves the funds for 
administration. In particular, the parliament is in charge of making laws and discussing 
proposals on public expenditure for major government sectors (URT, 2013). Persisting 
corruption has weakened the political system of Tanzania for decades. Although various 
mechanisms, such as the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) or the 
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Presidential Commission Against Corruption (PCAC) have been installed to fight corruption in 
the country, the so-called ‘old guard’ has managed to stay in power due to high personal and 
financial influence (Kelsall, 2002).  
Despite the introduction of a multi-party system in the nineties, CCM has continued to 
dominate the political landscape. The party managed to transform the economy from 
socialism to a more neoliberal approach without losing much of its political power. One 
reason for this was the slow emergence of opposition parties due to weak leadership and little 
public demand for political competition. Other constraints include legal and illegal methods 
used by the governing party to suppress its opponents, such as a bureaucratic registration 
process for new parties (Hoffman and Robinson, 2009). Nevertheless, a few opposition parties 
consistently won a considerable amount of votes in parliamentary elections. Amongst others, 
the Civic United Front (CUF) is a major competitor of CCM and is particularly strong on the 
semi-autonomous island Zanzibar. An increasing share of votes is also won by Chama cha 
Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), the party for democracy and progress. Since some 
districts are already governed by opposition parties which may lead to a different allocation of 
resources for social sectors, the model in section 5.4.2 includes a control variable that 
considers the type of party in power. 
The electoral process in Tanzania includes the presidential elections, the parliamentary 
elections, and the local government elections. Since the parliament is the institution in charge 
of decisions on health budget allocation (see chapter 2.3.1), the following analysis is based on 
the results of the two previous parliamentary elections. Tanzania has introduced a first-past-
the-post electoral system, meaning that the candidate with the majority number of votes wins 
the election. The National Electoral Commission of Tanzania (NEC) carries out all three 
elections. Among other tasks, the independent NEC is responsible for the coordination and the 
supervision of the registration of voters, the establishment and review of constituencies’ 
boundaries, and the provision of education to the voters. To be eligible to vote in Tanzania, 
people have to be aged 18 and registered in the Permanent National Voters Register (PNVR). All 
voters registered in the PNVR are notified about the location of their polling station via the 
short message system (SMS). Local radio stations and newspapers inform the population about 
the electoral process and election results. However, the electoral process is facing several 
challenges. Firstly, poor road construction makes it difficult to allocate election materials and 
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hinders a timely submission of ballot boxes to higher government levels. Secondly, there is a 
lack of funds for the training of polling staff (NEC, 2011). 
A special feature of the Tanzanian system is the representation of women in parliament 
through quotas. The objective of this system was to strengthen the voices of a particular part of 
the population rather than compensating a historical imbalance (Meena, 2003). Political parties 
that have won at least five percent of the total votes in parliamentary elections are eligible to 
nominate members of parliament for special seats allocated only to women. The number of 
appointed women is proportional to the number of votes won by the corresponding party 
(NEC, 2011). To elect women for special seats, each of the political parties has its own 
individual mechanisms. Since the introduction of quotas, women have pushed for several laws 
concerning women issues. First, a draft bill regarding maternity leave for both married and 
unmarried mothers was brought into parliament and accepted by its members. Furthermore, 
women representatives achieved the revision of a law concerning the access of women to 
tertiary level education. Prior to the implementation of this revision, female high school leavers 
were requested to stay home for a period of two years before they could be allowed into 
university. The consequence was a significant increase of women enrolment at universities. 
However, the introduction of female gender quotas also has some negative impacts. The 
election of women for special seats is a way to exclude strong female leaders from competitive 
politics and to diminish the pressure to nominate them for parliamentary elections (Meena, 
2003). To take into account the effect of women participation, a control variable measuring the 
gender of the political head has been included in the empirical model. After dominating the 
political sphere for decades, CCM had to give up a significant amount of seats to its only serious 
competitor CHADEMA after the parliamentary elections in 2010. The number of directly elected 
seats won by CCM decreased from 206 in 2005 to 187 in 2010, while CHADEMA managed to 
increase its share from 5 seats, in 2005, to 22 seats, in 2010 (Reith, 2011). However, large 
differences of political competition exist among the regions in Tanzania. Map 5 measures 
political competition as the percentage of votes for the winning party less the percentage won 
by the second-place party (see Cleary, 2007). Thus, regions with the lowest difference are the 
ones with the highest amount of political competition, such as Dar es Salaam, Shinyanga and 
Kigoma. 
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Map 5: Regional Political Party Competition, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NEC 2013 (mapped by the author) 
5.2.2 Mass Media 
Mass media improves the monitoring of politicians’ efforts to provide public health services and 
supplies most of the information used by the population in electoral processes. In addition, 
media channels are used to spread health information to specific target groups. However, it is 
important to note that mass media is not able to transmit information uniformly to the 
population. The type and scope of media that a certain population group uses in a developing 
country like Tanzania largely depends on the costs of the product and the income of its 
consumers. In principle, major types of mass media in Tanzania include radio, newspapers, 
television and internet, but in most parts of the country, radio and newspapers are the only 
affordable and used forms of media. The latest Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 
confirmed the limited relevance of the media by collecting data on the exposure of men and 
women to various types of mass media. According to the results, 36.4 percent of women and 
Dodoma 
Iringa 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR HEALTH IN TANZANIA – DETERMINANTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
87 
19.0 percent of men on Tanzania mainland do not use any type of mass media at least once per 
week (NBS, 2011). 
The privatization and liberalization of the media sector in the nineties led to a tremendous 
increase in the number of newspapers, FM and community radio stations and television 
broadcasters. In the past several years, media stakeholders have lobbied and pushed to enact 
media laws to improve people’s access to media. One of these laws was the Right of 
Information Act (RTI), which was discussed after Tanzania joined the Open Government 
Partnership Initiative (OGP). The objective of the multilateral OGP is to promote an increase in 
transparency, to contribute to the empowerment of citizens, to fight corruption, and to 
reinforce good governance. However, until today, the RTI and similar laws have not passed 
parliament due to a lack of consensus among its members (Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), 
2013). 
The education and training of journalists is necessary for a high-quality media landscape. 
Despite several initiatives of Western donor organisations, this has been a neglected area in 
East Africa during the past decades. Currently, there is a trend to formalize and merge 
corresponding courses at universities and colleges, as seen recently in Tanzania and Ethiopia 
(Skjerdal and Ngugui, 2007). An initial success in this field was the approval of a competency-
based journalism curriculum prepared by the MCT after a 2-years formulation period in January 
2012 (MCT, 2013). Major challenges of these programmes include a lack of qualified staff 
(relying on expatriate teaching), out-of-date equipment, little research, and modest recognition 
of the journalism profession. Moreover, journalists in the Horn of Africa have to fight against 
government corruption and various forms of state action against the media. In this respect, one 
cannot speak of freedom of the media in Tanzania. Independent and critical reporting is often 
seen as raising a voice against the governing party (Skjerdal and Ngugui, 2007). A total of 45 
violations of media freedom had been recorded by the MCT in 2012. These include 
kidnappings, denial of access to information, threats, interference by the state, and the 
harassment, assault, and murder of journalists (MCT, 2013). Nevertheless, the journalists' work 
has led to the today’s situation where many Tanzanians have access to various types of mass 
media, as elaborated in the following sections. 
Today, radio is the most common type of mass media used in Tanzania. The first radio station 
on air was ‘Radio Tanzania’ in 1993. According to the Tanzania Communications Regulatory 
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Authority (TCRA), the number of licensed radio stations increased steadily from 14, in the year 
2000, to 47, in 2006, and again to 86, by the end of 2012. Out of the total number of radio 
stations, five are national, 20 operate regionally, 58 are district-radio stations, and three 
operate at the community level. Almost half of all stations are commercial broadcasts, while 
the other half is more non-commercially oriented (MCT, 2013). To review the usage and 
dissemination of information provided by these radio stations, the latest DHS asked its 
respondents how often they listen to radio within a period of one week. In 2010, 57.1 percent 
of women and 76.3 percent of men stated that they follow radio programs at least once a week 
(NBS, 2011). Despite the rise in the number of operating radio stations, this is a small decrease 
compared to the year 2005, where 61.6 percent of women and 79.6 percent of men listened to 
radio on a weekly basis (NBS, 2005). The reason for this might be a switch to other types of 
mass media, for example, television or Internet. For both, men and women, the exposure to 
radio is higher in urban than in rural areas. 
Television is the second most frequently used mass media in Tanzania, at least in urban areas. A 
major challenge in this sector is to fulfill a quota imposed by TCRA, stating that 60 percent of 
the programme must be filled with local productions (MCT, 2013). The logic behind the 
introduction of this quota was to lower the program share of, for example, soap operas 
produced by foreign companies, and to increase the information on local news and politics. The 
average number of Tanzanian people watching television at least once a week has grown from 
20.4 percent in 2005 to 30.9 percent in 2010. However, there are large differences between 
rural and urban areas. Due to limited access to electrical power and low income, only 18.05 
percent of the rural population watches television at least once a week in comparison to 66.25 
percent in urban areas (NBS, 2005, 2011). The third most widespread type of mass media is the 
newspaper. According to Reuster-Jahn (2008), every newspaper bought in Tanzania is read by 
four to six persons. Newspaper penetration varies substantially among the 21 regions, reaching 
from 58% of people reading a newspaper at least once a week in Dar es Salaam to only 8% in 
Shinyanga (see map 6). This variation will be further explored in the econometric analysis. For 
the whole of Tanzania mainland, the percentage of people reading a newspaper at least once a 
week declined from 28.5 percent in 2005 to 24.2 percent in 2010 (NBS, 2005, 2011). For all 
types of mass media, the majority is produced and published in Kiswahili language, only a few 
English newspapers and television channels are available. Internet access as a new form of 
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mass media is almost exclusively available in urban centres and only affordable for the upper 
class of the population. 
Map 6: Regional Exposure to Newspapers, 20101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Percentage of women and men age 15-49 reading a newspaper at least once a week 
Source: NBS 2011 (mapped by the author) 
5.3 Literature Review 
Despite various clear-cut reasons to assume that political competition and access to mass 
media affect the responsiveness of governments to a large extent, research on this issue has 
been limited. Empirical investigations can be grouped into studies focusing on political 
determinants, on government responsiveness, mass media effects, and literature examining 
the joint effect of political and mass media variables on political attention. 
Within the literature on pure political determinants, Soroka and Wlezien (2005) found that 
policy makers in Great Britain are responsive to public preferences, especially in the health 
sector. Based on time-series data on budgetary policy and public opinion, the authors 
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concluded that an increase in public expectations on health services led to a statistically 
significant rise of health spending. Subsequent studies have emphasized the importance of 
the electoral process to hold governments accountable and responsive. An analysis of 
twentieth-century political patterns of nine American cities showed that the allocation of 
government benefits changes substantially when dominant regimes are in power (Trounstine, 
2006). During these times, resources were shifted to benefits for core coalition members and 
governing elites at the expense of a 6.4% decline of spending on public goods such as health 
and welfare. However, findings on the impact of political and electoral competition on 
government responsiveness show an unclear picture. For the case of Mexico, Cleary (2007) 
showed that there is no effect of electoral competition on the performance of municipal 
governments. According to the author, municipal performance might rather be improved 
through non-electoral participation. On the other hand, studies of government 
responsiveness in Britain, Denmark, and the United States showed that political attention is 
indeed higher when under pressure (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2007). A very recent literature 
review on participatory government reforms in developing countries suggests that more 
research is needed to judge whether increased community participation can increase the 
provision of public services (Speer, 2012). 
Very few studies on the sole impact of mass media on government responsiveness have 
emerged. In general, there is a clear consensus that democratic institutions, combined with a 
free and independent press, result in a government that is more responsive in providing 
public goods to its citizens  (Besley et al., 2002). More specifically, a study carried out by 
Strömberg (2002) tested the impact of access to television on government attention. Using 
cross-sectional data on intergovernmental transfers in the United States after the expansion 
of television in 1962, the results indicate that access to television significantly increased the 
ability of the population to attract government funds, especially for African-Americans. 
Strömberg (2004) further analyzed whether access to radio can discipline the government to 
increase the amount of relief funds spent in a certain county, based on cross-section data of 
2500 U.S. counties. Indeed, the author found that for every percentage point increase in the 
share of households with access to radio, politicians raised per capita relief spending by 0.6 
percent. Strömberg showed that this total effect can be divided in a direct effect of access to 
radio on spending of 0.54 percent and an indirect effect of access to radio on spending, 
through increased voter turnout, of 0.07 percent. 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR HEALTH IN TANZANIA – DETERMINANTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
91 
Besley and Burgess (2001) published one of the first empirical investigations taking into 
account both political and mass media factors. The authors used annual data on 16 Indian 
states to examine the responsiveness of state governments to food shortages via public food 
distribution between 1958 and 1992. According to the results, newspaper circulation, literacy, 
and electoral turnout are significant positive determinants of a government’s responsiveness 
to food shortages. Surprisingly, poorer states are not less responsive than richer states. 
Further work of Besley and Burgess (2002) explored again the influence of newspaper 
circulation on calamity relief expenditure in India, but now disaggregating newspapers into 
nineteen different languages. Based on the same panel data mentioned above, the results 
indicate that regional newspapers in local languages are larger drivers of government 
responsiveness than English or Hindi presses. In addition, the authors found that newspaper 
circulation is higher when non-governmental societies and associations own the media. 
Almost all of the above-mentioned studies use regression analysis as a method to explore 
government responsiveness. Moreover, most of the previous studies, with the exception of 
Besley and Burgess (2001 and 2002) and Speer (2012), focus on the political economy of 
developed countries and, in particular, the United States. Since institutional arrangements 
and electoral systems are at an earlier stage in the developing world, mechanisms of 
government attention might differ. As a contribution to close this research gap, the following 
analysis aims at answering the question whether similar effects of political factors and mass 
media on government responsiveness also exist in a very low-income country. Furthermore, 
the study is unique in focusing exclusively on political economy effects within the health 
sector. 
5.4 Theoretical Framework 
5.4.1 Conceptual Framework and Theory of Government Responsiveness 
Various political and societal institutions such as official allocation rules determine the 
distribution of local resources for health improvement. The development of institutions is 
based on multiple factors, including history, societal choices and chance. However, institutional 
arrangements differ, and, thus, lead to varying distributions of resources. The choice of 
institutions, in turn, depends on political power, since groups with the highest amount of 
political power will secure their preferred type of institution. Whenever political power exceeds 
political institutions due to, for example, tremendous economic resources of a certain group, 
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the allocation of resources for health improvement is likely to change in favor of these people 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Moreover, using the 
words of North (1990, p.3), institutions “[…] structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social, or economic.” This analysis examines whether institutional arrangements such 
as the electoral process influence the incentives of politicians to provide public services. 
Mechanisms and institutions determining local expenditure on health care in Tanzania include 
the official resource allocation formula, political factors, the impact of mass media, and 
additional factors. A corresponding theoretical framework is presented in figure 15. In general, 
health-related finances from government and non-government sources are allocated from the 
national to the district level according to an official allocation formula. To recognize the people 
as the major recipients of health and social welfare services, 70% of funds are allocated in 
proportion to the district population. An additional 10% of the total funds are distributed to 
cover the special needs of places with a disproportionally high share of poor people. The 
formula also takes into account increased expenditure needs for health care provision in 
remote areas (10%). Here, ambulances have to travel long distances to reach patients and the 
operational costs for drug distribution, immunization, and supervision are exceptionally high. 
The final 10% of resources are allocated to the districts according to their disease burden. Due 
to the difficulty of measuring the disease burden of a district, the 'under-five' mortality rate has 
been used as a proxy variable (MoHSW, 2007). 
However, it remains questionable whether these factors are the only determinants of local 
resources for health improvement. Firstly, democratic theory suggests that governments are 
responsive through the electoral process (Downs 1957). Consequently, the amount of district 
health spending is also based on various political factors, as shown in figure 16. One of the key 
factors of interest is the competition among political parties. If losing power is a threat, in the 
upcoming elections, incumbents have the incentive to increase their overall effort and, in 
particular, to be more responsive to their citizens in terms of providing public goods, such as 
health services (Mani and Mukand, 2007; Besley and Burges, 2002). Increasing power 
concentration frequently leads to a situation, where the needs of the local population are less 
represented and social services are weak. However, political competition can only be seen as a 
driver of government responsiveness as long as re-election possibilities exist for the current 
political head. Otherwise, the incentives of politicians to serve their citizens are less obvious.  A 
further common precondition for greater political competition is the participation of the 
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population in the election process. Thus, the government might allocate more per capita funds 
to districts with great electoral turnout (Strömberg, 2004). Theory also suggests a link between 
the gender of the political head and the provision of certain public services. Female-headed 
districts are more likely to create a political atmosphere that is sensitive to “women’s issues” 
(Atkeson and Carrillo, 2007). Since many health services, such as prenatal care and child health, 
fall into this group, a positive correlation might exist between district health spending and the 
representation of women in leading political positions.  Furthermore, scholars have shown that 
the level of government responsiveness in terms of health services depends on the type of 
political party in power (Soroka and Wlezien, 2005). Parties with socially oriented values might 
be more interested in the redistribution of income and the provision of public goods than their 
liberal counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Theoretical Framework of the Allocation of Resources for Health Improvement in Tanzania 
Source: author  
Beyond political factors, mass media affects the level of district resources for health 
improvement due to their role of transmitting politically relevant information to the 
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electorate and monitoring of politicians’ efforts to provide public services  (Besley Burges and 
Prat, 2002; Strömberg, 2004). To analyze this relationship in a theoretical manner, the 
principal-agent theory can be applied to electoral processes. Here, the citizens of a district act 
as principals paying taxes and user fees to finance the health system. Moreover, they have to 
comply with various health regulations. The agents are the representatives in parliament who 
have been elected by the districts’ population and now decide on the allocation of resources 
for health improvement. Due to a variety of interests and lobbying groups, the agents do not 
exactly know which actions are expected by their constituencies. On the other hand, 
principals have to deal with limited information on current and future policies introduced by 
the corresponding candidate. The refusal of re-election is the only mechanism available to 
sanction the actions of the politicians in power. 
Four potential problems arise. Firstly, a moral hazard might occur when district 
representatives in power bribe or accept a bribe in the process of allocating resources for 
health improvement to lower government levels. Secondly, the problem of adverse selection 
could arise due to the fact the voters do not know whether the candidate actually has the 
motivation and competence to improve the provision of public services in a certain district. 
Thirdly, voters might be rationally ignorant about district health policies, since the costs of 
being informed on certain policies for single voters far exceed the expected benefits. Fourthly 
and similarly to the previous point, citizens could have the perspective that a single vote 
would not make any difference in the election results, the so-called free-riding problem 
(Besley, Burges and Prat, 2002). Mass media can help to solve, at least, the first two problems. 
Having access to radio, newspapers, or television weakens the issue of asymmetric 
information by providing news on current health initiatives and election programs of potential 
candidates, at low costs.  However, the functionality of this mechanism strongly depends on 
media freedom and ownership. Otherwise, sensitive information on the allocation of 
resources to finance health services, for example, might not be public. As a result, politicians 
might pay more attention to districts where many people have access to mass media. Access 
to radio, newspapers, or television affects financing health services either directly or indirectly 
via political factors, such as increased voter turnout (Strömberg, 2004). Other factors, which 
are not the subject of this analysis, might influence the allocation of resources for health 
improvement from higher to lower government levels. This includes, for example, corruption, 
protests, or direct contact with government officials. 
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5.4.2 Modelling Government Responsiveness 
A statistical model is applied to analyze the impact of political factors and mass media on 
government responsiveness. As suggested in the literature, public health expenditure is used 
as a proxy for policy behaviour (e.g. Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2007). Equations (1) to (5) 
specify basic regression models to test the theoretically expected direct effect of political 
factors and mass media on health spending. Equation (6) estimates the indirect effect of mass 
media on responsiveness via voter turnout. There is no reason to expect any non-linearities.  
 The formal structure of equation (1) for districts i and year t is the following: 
(1) log Eit+1 =  + 1Tit + 2Cit + 3 Rit + 4 Nit + 5 Vit +  
On the left hand side of equation (1), log Eit+1 , captures the logarithm of deflated public per 
capita spending on health in the post-election year, since the literature recommends using at 
least a 1-year time lag for the public preference predictor (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2007; 
Soroka and Wlezien, 2005). The lag is used to account for the fact that it usually takes at least 
one year from budget planning to its execution. Log Eit+1 aggregates development spending on 
health, such as the construction of hospitals and dispensaries, as well as recurrent spending 
on, for example, salaries of health staff and drug costs. One of the key explanatory variables 
on the right hand side of equation (1) is voter turnout Tit. It represents the total of valid and 
spoilt votes divided by the number of registered voters during the previous election. Districts 
with unopposed candidates were excluded from the sample. To account for the assumed 
correlation of political party competition and health spending, the variable Cit has been 
included as an additional covariate. It captures the percentage of votes for the winning party 
less the percentage won by the second-place party. This indicator is also known as the ‘Margin 
of Victory’ (Cleary, 2007; Trounstine, 2006). The lower the value of Cit, the more political party 
competition is present in a certain constituency. Again, districts with no opposition parties 
participating in the election were excluded from the sample. 
The nexus of mass media and health spending is reflected by two independent variables in 
equation (1). Firstly, Rit measures the percentage of women and men aged 15-49 listening to 
the radio, at least once a week. Similarly to this, the second media variable, Nit , takes into 
account the percentage of women and men, aged 15-49, reading a newspaper at least once a 
week. Access to television and the use of Internet has not been included in equation (1) due 
to low coverage levels in rural areas.  The indirect effect of mass media on health spending via 
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electoral turnout will be analysed in equation (6). 
A set of ten control variables known as predictors of government responsiveness is captured 
in Vit. Firstly, the lagged logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on health is included 
in order to maintain the assumption that budget figures strongly depend on their value in the 
previous year. In many cases, earlier budgeted amounts are proportionally adjusted to 
increases of the total health budget only. Before taking into account the official flow of 
resources from central to district level, it must be controlled on the four factors of the official 
resource allocation formula, namely: population size, poverty level, the length of the district 
medical vehicle route, and 'under-five' mortality (see section 2.3). However, since per capita 
values are used for all spending variables, there is no need to add the population size as a 
control variable here. The logarithm of deflated per capita GDP serves as a proxy for the 
poverty level in a certain district. Due to the lack of data on the exact length of the district 
medical vehicle route, the degree of urbanization has been used as a proxy. It is defined as the 
percentage of the population living in urban areas. The 'under-five' mortality rate has been 
included as a control for funds which have been allocated as a consequence of a 
disproportionately high burden of disease. It measures the number of children who die before 
the age of five, per thousand live births per year. 
Beyond variables accounting for the resource allocation formula, several additional controls 
are included. A gender dummy serves to distinguish whether a certain district is headed by a 
male or female representative, as theoretically discussed in section 5.4.1. A second dummy 
variable measures the impact of the type of party in power on health spending. In particular, 
it reflects whether the current party in power in a district is the CCM or an opposition party. 
The unemployment variable indicates the number of women and men aged 15-49, employed 
in the 12 months preceding the survey, divided by the total population in that age span. The 
logic behind the inclusion of this variable is that a lack of employment opportunities may 
affect political activism, which, in turn, might influence the responsiveness of the government. 
Scholars have shown that higher educational attainment is likely to be positively correlated 
with interest in policy making (see for example Delli Carpini, 1996). Thus, the literacy rate has 
been included as an additional control variable in equation (1), measuring the number of 
literate women and men aged 15-49 divided by the total population in that age span. 
Furthermore, a population density variable reflects the logarithm of the number of people per 
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square kilometer, since it is easier to provide public health services to densely populated 
districts compared to dispersed ones.  Access to health infrastructure is a final control variable 
for the existing stock of health infrastructure, indicating the percentage of women and men, 
aged 15-49, who reported serious problems in accessing health care due to the distance to 
the next health facility. 
To test the robustness of the model, equation (2) analyzes the impact of political economy 
issues and mass media on the change of public per capita health spending, in the first year 
after elections. Here, the same independent variables are used as in equation (1): 
(2) log Eit+1 =  + 1Tit + 2Cit + 3 Rit + 4 Nit + 5 Vit +  
A further specification includes an interaction term of the 'under-five' mortality Mit as a 
measure of need for health interventions and political party competition. The idea of equation 
(3) is to test whether governments are more responsive to electoral pressure in less healthy 
districts. The dependent variable and other covariates are the same as in equation (1). 
(3) log Eit+1 =  + 1Tit + 2 Rit + 3 Nit + 4 Cit x Mit + 5 Vit +  
To investigate how these correlations evolve over time and more or less close to elections, 
equation (4) and (5) specify an alternate model analyzing the impact of political economy 
issues and mass media on the absolute value and change of public per capita health spending 
in the second year after elections, respectively. Again, the same covariates are used as in 
equation (1). 
(4) log Eit+2 =  + 1Tit + 2Cit + 3 Rit + 4 Nit + 5 Vit +  
(5) log Eit+2 =  + 1Tit + 2Cit + 3 Rit + 4 Nit + 5 Vit +  
In a second step, equation (6) models the indirect effect of mass media on government 
responsiveness via voter turnout. In comparison to equation (1), the lagged logarithm of 
deflated public per capita spending on health and access to health infrastructure are excluded 
from the set of control variables. 
(6) Tit =  + 2Cit + 3 Rit + 4 Nit + 5 Vit +  
For all models, the variables that are not shared are in logs to simplify the interpretation of 
results. Consequently, all coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, showing the 
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percentage response of different dependent variables to a percentage change of a covariate. 
With these models it is possible to perform a robust test of whether political factors and mass 
media play a role in being responsive to the health needs of poor populations in Tanzania. 
5.5 Quantitative Analysis: Model Estimation and Results 
5.5.1 Data 
All equations are estimated based on district-level data on Tanzania mainland. Excluding the 
semi-autonomous state Zanzibar, Tanzania has a total of 134 districts. Due to the lack of 
systematic secondary data at the district level, a dataset was generated by aggregating survey 
and budget data for the years 2005-2010, covering the last two elections on Tanzania 
mainland, in 2005 and 2010. As mentioned in section 5.4.2, some districts had to be excluded 
due to missing opposition parties or errors in data collection. As a result, a total number of 94 
to 110 observations have been used in the cross-sectional analysis (section 5.5) and 220 
observations in the estimation of a panel data set in section 5.6. 
Data on public health spending comes from regional budget books for the year 2005 and from 
the Local Government Information database for the years 2006 to 2010 (LOGIN Tanzania, see 
URT, 2012 II). The MoFEA and PMO-RALG jointly provide this database for public use. The 
figures include recurrent and development health spending of the government and, partly, 
donor funds allocated to the regions. For comparison, all data on government expenditures 
were deflated to the common base year 2010 using the GDP deflator retrieved from the 
World Bank’s development indicators (World Bank, 2013). Population data used for 
computing per capita amounts was generated from the projections of the population and 
housing census 2002 (NBS, 2006 II). According to LOGIN Tanzania, population variables are 
inflated uniformly across all regions by 2.9% per annum. Since 2005, the NEC of Tanzania 
publishes electoral results for council, parliamentary, and presidential elections at the 
regional, district, and constituency level online (NEC, 2013). These data sets include the 
names of the corresponding candidates, party affiliation, and the percentage of votes 
received. This information has been used to build the variables on voter turnout, political 
party competition, gender of political head, and type of party in power. In particular, the 
results of parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2010 are included. Data on access to mass 
media and the control variables of 'under-five' mortality rate, employment, literacy and 
access to health infrastructure were retrieved from DHS (NBS, 2005/2011). The NBS conducts 
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these nationally representative surveys every few years, since the beginning of the nineties, 
using the same methodological approach. In the latest of a series of eight surveys, 10,300 
households were interviewed from 475 sample points in Tanzania. In addition to data on the 
health status of the population, extensive information on health related issues is collected in 
these surveys, such as family planning and nutrition. 
The above-mentioned projections of the Population and Housing Census 2002 also served as a 
data source to determine the district values for the degree of urbanisation and population 
density. It is the fourth population census for the whole of Tanzania and is carried out every 
10 years by NBS and several development partners. The latest edition provides reliable 
estimates on population levels, population growth, life expectancy at birth, and fertility rates 
up to the year 2025. However, all projections are based on certain assumptions concerning 
mortality, fertility, migration, and HIV/AIDS. Information about per capita GDP was obtained 
from national accounts and deflated like public health spending (URT, 2011 I). The data 
sources used are the most reliable and comprehensive ones currently available for Tanzania 
and have frequently been used for analyses published in peer-reviewed journals. Table 10 
shows an overview of all variables. 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Min Max Unit of Measurement 
Exp. (1st year) 4494 3423 635 32933 Tanzanian Shillings 
Exp. Change (1st year) 1301 3129 -4661 30108 Tanzanian Shillings 
Exp. (2nd year) 5372 2806 958 23353 Tanzanian Shillings 
Exp. Change (2nd year) 2179 1970 -5692 12314 Tanzanian Shillings 
Voter Turnout 61.1 16.0 25.1 108.7 Fractions 
Political Party Competition 42.2 25.4 0.3 91.6 Fractions 
Access to Radio 67.8 8.4 49.3 84.7 Fractions 
Access to Newspapers 24.1 10.6 7.9 59.7 Fractions 
Under-five Mortality Rate 0.111 0.264 0.058 0.153 Number of Children/1000 
Gender of Political Head 0.054 0.227 0 1 0 = male / 1 = female 
Political Party 0.149 0.357 0 1 0 = CCM / 1 = other 
Degree of Urbanisation 21.8 13.5 7.8 96.0 Fractions 
Employment 81.7 8.3 51.8 96.8 Fractions 
GDP 0.665 0.213 0.357 1.736 Million Tanzanian Shillings 
Literacy 74.3 8.2 55.2 93.0 Fractions 
Population Density 330 877 2 6057 People per km2 
Access to Infrastructure 30.7 13.7 7.3 55.9 Fractions 
Source: author’s calculations 
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5.5.2 Model Estimation 
The following section presents the estimation method used for equations (1) to (5) and the 
empirical results. Assuming all right-hand side variables being uncorrelated with the error 
term, the coefficients can be consistently estimated by OLS. However, there were various 
reasons to expect the problem of multicollinearity among the media variables, since they 
measure a similar variable. For example, access to electricity allows people to listen to radio 
and to watch television. Consequently, these two media variables might be correlated. A 
widely accepted indicator to detect problems of multicollinearity is the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF). As a rule of thumb, the reciprocal of this factor, 1/VIF, should remain above 0.1. 
Otherwise, the estimation merits further investigation. Using all three media variables 
including access to television, access to radio, and access to newspapers in the regressions (1) 
to (5), the VIF-values for access to television falls below the 0.1. Thus, in addition to other 
reasons mentioned in section 5.4.2, the variable measuring access to television has been 
excluded from the model specifications. No further problems of multicollinearity, among 
other independent variables, arose.  
Model specification errors constitute a second potential cause for concern. These errors are the 
result of including one or more additional variables not relevant to the model specification or 
excluding one or more relevant variables. In the case of a model specification error, the error 
term might be inflated. A potential reason for biased results might be the fact that some 
variables of the theoretical framework (see section 5.4.1) are excluded from the empirical 
model due to data limitations, such as corruption, decentralization, protest, or transparency. To 
detect whether or not a model specification error does exist, two tests have been performed. 
Firstly, the linktest has been carried out, assuming that in the case of proper specification, no 
additional covariates should be significant except by chance. After adding random variables to 
equations (1) to (5), through the linktest, the results showed that none of the coefficients of 
these additional variables has been significant at the five percent level. Ovtest, a second test to 
detect model specification errors, confirmed these results. In contrast to linktest, ovtest creates 
additional variables based on the predictors and refits the model with these new covariates. 
Again, none of these variables had explanatory power. In conclusion, it can be stated that 
model specification errors do not constitute any potential cause for concern and that all 
coefficients can be consistently estimated using OLS. 
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5.5.3 Results 
Results based on the parliamentary elections in 2005 are presented in table 11. In the first 
column, the corresponding variables from the theoretical model are shown. The expected 
relationship between the variables of the theoretical model and the estimated coefficients is 
indicated in the second column. Exact definitions of all variables used are presented in 
Appendix 10. In general, the empirical analysis suggests that politicians are responsive to 
political factors. The impact of mass media on the provision of public health services is less 
clear. 
Using per capita health expenditure in the first year after the election as a dependent 
variable, the estimates of equation (1) imply that a one-percentage point smaller difference 
between the winning party and the second-place party leads to a 0.151 percentage points 
increase in public health spending. In other words, the theoretical assumption that there is a 
positive correlation between political party competition and government responsiveness is 
confirmed by the model estimations in the first column of table 11. The result is significant at 
the five-percent level. However, it turns out that there is no significant effect of mass media 
on health spending in this model specification. Certain control variables are significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable in the expected way. Firstly, the lagged logarithm of 
per capita health expenditure has a positive effect on health spending, with a highly 
significant coefficient of 0.645. This confirms the assumption that budget figures strongly 
depend on their value in the previous year. Secondly, a higher degree of urbanisation is 
significantly associated with higher health spending, contradicting the official allocation 
formula indicating that more resources would be allocated to rural districts with longer 
medical vehicle routes. The positive effect of urbanisation on health spending further 
increases when urbanisation is used as an interaction variable with political party competition 
(see Appendix 11). 
The second model was specified to test the robustness of these results when using the 
logarithm of per capita changes in health expenditure instead of absolute amounts as a 
dependent variable. Here, the positive effect of political party competition on government 
responsiveness is even stronger. A one-percentage point increase in competition leads to a 
0.667 percentage points increase in public health spending. This result is significant at the one 
percent level. In contrast to the first model specification, the estimation of equation (2) 
confirms our expectation that mass media is positively related to health spending. For every 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR HEALTH IN TANZANIA – DETERMINANTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
102 
one-percentage point increase of people having access to radio, per capita health expenditure 
increases by 2.233 percentage points. The insignificance of newspaper access might be 
explained by its much lower circulation compared to radio (see section 5.2.2). Again, the 
degree of urbanisation is positively related to public health spending. A further significant 
control variable is access to health infrastructure, indicating that more resources have been 
allocated to areas where people have serious problems in accessing health care.  
To further evaluate whether these results are still valid for districts with varying disease 
burdens, the third specification includes an interaction term of 'under-five' mortality and 
political party competition17. Indeed, a one-percentage point increase of the interaction 
variable leads to a 1.023 percentage point increase in public health spending, significant at the 
five percent level. This result suggests that governments are more responsive to electoral 
pressure in less healthy districts. In other words, high demand for health services might force 
political activism and, in turn, increases the pressure on politicians to provide public services. 
The lagged logarithm of per capita health expenditure has again a positive effect on health 
spending, with almost the same coefficient as in equation (1). Moreover, literacy is a 
significant control variable in this model specification stating that higher educational 
attainment in a district is related to improved government responsiveness. 
To test the robustness of these results over time, model (4) and (5) examine the same 
specifications as used in (1) and (2) for the second year after the election. As shown in table 
11, the impact of political competition on health spending decreases over time. This is in line 
with the expectation that, on the one hand side, the provision of public services directly 
affecting voters has its peak during election times to appease the electorate. On the other 
hand, the attention of the population to politics, and, in turn, the need for governments to be 
responsive decreases in post-election years. Using the logarithm of per capita health 
expenditure as a dependent variable in specification (4), a one-percentage point increase of 
political party competition leads to a 0.107 percentage point increase in public health 
spending, significant at the five percent level. As in previous years and simulations, 
government responsiveness is related to the lagged logarithm of health expenditure and to 
literacy. In parallel to the second model, equation (5) regresses the logarithm of health 
expenditure change on the same covariates as used before. Again, the estimations show a 
clearly smaller effect of political party competition on health spending in the second year 
                                                        
17 Interaction Variable = (1-Political Party Competition) x Under-five Mortality 
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after the election. A one-percentage point increase of political party competition leads to a 
0.177 percentage point increase in public health spending, significant at the ten percent level 
only. Looking at the control variables, a significantly positive determinant is the lagged 
logarithm of per capita health spending. 
Table 11: Government Responsiveness in the Health Sector of Tanzania 
   Dependent Variables 
   1st Year After the Election 2nd Year After the Election 
  Independent Variables (1) log 
Health 
Expenditure 
(per capita) 
(2) log 
Health 
Expenditure 
Change (per 
capita)  
(3) log Health 
Expenditure 
(per capita) 
Interaction 
Variables 
(4) log 
Health 
Expenditure 
(per capita) 
(5) log 
Health 
Expenditure 
Change (per 
capita)  
  Objective Variables      
Tit + Voter Turnout -0.096  
(0.29) 
-0.464  
(0.91) 
-0.052  
(0.29) 
0.177  
(0.19) 
0.525  
(0.43) 
Cit - Political Party 
Competition 
-0.151  
(0.06)** 
-0.667 
(0.24)*** 
 -0.107  
(0.05)** 
-0.177  
(0.10)* 
Rit + Access to Radio 0.355  
(0.32) 
2.233 
(1.30)* 
0.327  
(0.32) 
-0.416  
(0.32) 
-1.064  
(0.80) 
Nit + Access to Newspapers 0.009  
(0.23) 
-0.170  
(0.88) 
0.114  
(0.20) 
0.204  
(0.19) 
0.620  
(0.42) 
        
  Interaction Variable      
 + Political Party 
Competition x Under-
five Mortality 
  1.023  
(0.49)** 
  
        
Vit  Controls      
 + Lagged log Health 
Expenditure (per capita) 
0.645 
(0.11)*** 
-0.171  
(0.26) 
0.648  
(0.11)*** 
0.649  
(0.11)*** 
0.431  
(0.20)** 
Mit + Under-five Mortality -2.146  
(2.00) 
-5.913  
(5.59) 
 1.811  
(0.96)* 
3.326  
(2.05) 
 +/- Gender of Political Head 
(dummy) 
-0.007  
(0.04) 
-0.072  
(0.12) 
-0.013  
(0.04) 
-0.012  
(0.04) 
-0.018  
(0.09) 
 +/- Political Party (dummy) -0.060  
(0.04) 
-0.169  
(0.11) 
-0.047  
(0.04) 
0.061  
(0.05) 
0.145  
(0.11) 
 - Degree of Urbanisation 0.369  
(0.21)* 
1.308  
(0.65)** 
0.239  
(0.22) 
0.022  
(0.19) 
-0.103  
(0.37) 
 + Employment 0.616  
(0.37) 
2.435 
(1.36)* 
0.216  
(0.37) 
-0.281  
(0.32) 
-0.837  
(0.75) 
 + log GDP (per capita) -0.341  
(0.30) 
-1.230 
(1.17) 
-0.331  
(0.31) 
0.032  
(0.19) 
0.358  
(0.48) 
 + Literacy 0.331  
(0.22) 
1.201 
(0.77) 
0.388  
(0.22)* 
0.442 
(0.24)* 
0.365  
(0.37) 
 + log Population Density -0.033  
(0.04) 
-0.069  
(0.10) 
-0.030  
(0.04) 
0.007  
(0.02) 
0.036  
(0.05) 
 + Access to Health 
Infrastructure 
0.101  
(0.16) 
1.647 
(0.79)** 
0.180  
(0.15) 
-0.100  
(0.17) 
-0.083  
(0.31) 
        
  Valid N 110 94 110 110 106 
  R-squared 0.4768 0.2539 0.4606 0.5866 0.2496 
        
Note: The table reports standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted with the conventional ***p 
< 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
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5.6 The Impact of Mass Media on Voter Turnout 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, access to mass media affects health spending, 
either directly or indirectly, via political factors. This section is devoted to the analysis of the 
indirect effect via voter turnout. In general, radio and newspaper penetration increases 
people’s knowledge of politics and election cycles, and, in turn, the likelihood that people 
vote. Subsequently, it has been widely shown in the literature that increased voter turnout is 
related to higher public spending (Strömberg, 2004 etc.).  
In contrast to previous simulations in section 5.5, the estimation of equation (6) is based on a 
panel data set including information on the last two parliamentary elections of 2005 and 
2010. The same data sources and variables are used as in equation (1) to (5). However, the 
lagged logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on health and access to health 
infrastructure is excluded from the set of control variables. Generalized least-squares (GLS) 
random-effects have been used as an estimation method for the panel data regression. This 
assumes that we have a random sample from a large population and it can consequently be 
supposed that the time-constant unobserved effect (as for example, the colonial history of a 
district) is not correlated to all the covariates of equation (6) (see Wooldridge, 2009).      
With a few exceptions, the results 
of the panel data regression shown 
in table 12 are consistent with the 
theoretical expectations. A one-
percentage point increase of 
access to newspapers leads to a 
0.336 percentage point increase in 
voter turnout, significant at the 
one percent level. Most of the 
control variables included show 
large and significant coefficients 
with the expected signs. 
 Table 12: The Impact of Mass Media on Voter Turnout 
A B Independent Variables (5) Dependent 
Variable: Voter 
Turnout 
  Objective Variables  
Cit + Political Party Competition 0.026 (0.03) 
Rit + Access to Radio -0.064 (0.11) 
Nit + Access to Newspapers 0.336 (0.10)*** 
    
Vit  Controls  
 + Under-five Mortality 4.940 (0.35)*** 
 +/- Gender of Political Head 
(dummy) 
0.030 (0.03) 
 +/- Political Party (dummy) 0.042 (0.02)* 
 +/- Degree of Urbanisation -0.239 (0.09)** 
 - Employment -0.623 (0.11)*** 
 - log GDP (per capita) -0.234 (0.10)** 
 + Literacy 0.092 (0.14) 
 + log Population Density -0.030 (0.02)* 
    
  Valid N 220 
  R-squared 0.8302 
    
Note: The table reports standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance is noted with the conventional ***p < 
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
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5.7 Conclusions  
5.7.1 Major Findings and Recommendations 
The allocation of resources for health improvement from central to lower government levels is 
not solely a process of applying certain rules and guidelines regulating the distribution 
mechanisms. It is a more complex system where the incentives of politicians, electoral 
processes, and other external factors play a major role. Based on a dataset combining 
socioeconomic, electoral, and public-financial indicators for all districts of Tanzania mainland, 
this analysis suggests that politicians are responsive to electoral competition. Using per capita 
health expenditure, in the first year after the election, as a dependent variable, the estimates of 
equation (1) imply that a one-percentage point difference between the winning party and the 
second-place party leads to a 0.151 percentage point increase in public health spending, 
significant at the five percent level. The robustness of this result is confirmed in repeated 
simulations using the same dependent variable for the second year after the election and using 
the change of per capita health expenditure in both the first and the second year after the 
election. These findings contribute to clarify the picture on the effect of electoral competition 
on government responsiveness, at least for the health sector. The results are in line with those 
of Trounstine (2006) or Hobolt and Klemmensen (2007), showing that, for Britain, Denmark, 
and the United States, political attention to the provision of public services is indeed higher 
when under pressure.  
The direct effect of mass media on district level health spending is less clear. Only the second 
model specification confirms our expectation that mass media is positively related to health 
spending. For every one-percentage point increase of people having access to radio, per capita 
health expenditure increases by 2.233 percentage points. The estimated effect is even larger 
than the one found by Strömberg (2004) for public spending in the United States. Here, the 
author found that for every percentage point increase in the share of households with access to 
radio, politicians raised per capita relief spending by 0.6 percent. However, looking at all other 
model specifications of table 11, no significant impact on government responsiveness of both 
access to radio and newspapers can be validated. In contrast, the indirect effect of mass media 
on health spending, via voter turnout, is more obvious. A one-percentage point increase of 
access to newspapers leads to a 0.336 percentage point increase in voter turnout, significant at 
the one percent level. Thus, the theoretical assumption that mass media affects the level of 
district resources for health improvement, due to their role of transmitting politically relevant 
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information, cannot be finally confirmed. 
Governments provide a multiplicity of public health services. Knowing that health spending 
increases during election times, the question arises as to which interventions these additional 
resources are allocated. Scholars found that the visibility of public goods and services plays a 
major role (Mani and Mukand, 2007). Government representatives have a tendency to give 
more weight to those interventions that are more visible to the electorate. This tendency 
increases with the level of democracy, or, as measured in this analysis, political competition. On 
the one hand, the consequence for the health sector would be an increased allocation of funds 
to hospital buildings, dispensaries, and health centres, for example. On the other hand, the 
equipment for these buildings, drugs, and appropriate staffing would be neglected cost centres. 
Unfortunately, datasets for Tanzania do not allow to test whether additional resources for 
health improvement were allocated to more or less visible goods. 
A second issue relates to the question of how the increased health spending is financed, during 
times of electoral pressure. Increases in certain district health budgets are either at the 
expense of other sectors, other districts, or due to an increase of the total government budget. 
Looking at time-series data on government expenditure on major sectors for Tanzania, during 
the last decade, none of these sectors can be identified as a source of funds for the increased 
health budget. Further analysis is needed to clarify whether additional funds have been 
reallocated from other districts or are based on total budget increases. 
This analysis serves to improve the understanding of allocative processes in the health sector of 
a developing country. Several conclusions can be derived from the analysis. Firstly, an official 
resource allocation formula is only one determinant of district level health spending. Additional 
key factors are the incentives of politicians to provide public services – mainly driven by 
political competition. Secondly, as a consequence of the first point, an effectively functioning 
democracy and the access to mass media are unavoidable to ensure a certain level of public 
services for poor populations. Otherwise, there is less opportunity to sanction the actions of 
incumbents that do not reflect the preferences of the people. These results are in line with 
recent calls to strengthen good governance in poor health resource settings. Although this 
empirical analysis is narrowly focused on the allocation of resources for health improvement in 
a single developing country, the theoretical framework and estimation methods could be used 
to draw a broader picture of the determinants of government responsiveness in any country. 
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5.7.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This analysis has several limitations. Firstly, public health expenditure has been used as a 
proxy for government responsiveness. However, increased spending does not necessarily 
mean that more public health services are created and that, in turn, the government is more 
responsive to the needs of its citizens. One possible reason for this might be an inadequacy of 
local capacity to implement budgeted health measures. Moreover, some of the funds might 
be allocated to cost centres such as administration or buildings without influencing the total 
amount of health services consumed. Alternatively, the actual usage of health services or the 
burden of disease could have been used as a dependent variable, but data for these 
indicators, on district level, is limited in the case of Tanzania. Secondly, this analysis focuses 
on the government's responsiveness through the provision of health services. However, policy 
makers might also have an incentive to satisfy the electorate through the provision of other 
public services such as education, access to safe water sources, or energy. Thus, political 
competition might also be related to the increased provision of these services. 
The impact of political competition and mass media on the responsiveness of policy makers is 
just beginning to be understood. Further research is needed to understand the mechanics 
behind the allocation of scarce resources from central to lower government levels. As 
mentioned above, the relationship between political competition and the provision of services 
in other major sectors should be a first subject for further analysis. These results could then be 
compared to those of the health sector. Secondly, it would also be valuable to see how access 
to the Internet, as an additional information dissemination tool, influences political competition 
compared to other forms of mass media. Unfortunately, it was not possible to include this type 
of mass media in the present study due to data limitations. Thirdly, it would be important to 
understand to what kind of health interventions additional resources are allocated in times of 
elections, and, in particular, whether these are the more visible ones. All these questions need 
to be answered at lower and upper government levels, at different stages of decentralization 
and in diverse institutional settings. These and other issues are left for future elaboration. 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
Closing the gap between actual and optimal resource allocation for health is a complex matter. 
Various sectors, government levels, institutions, and interventions have the potential to use 
current resources for health improvement in such a way, that a larger amount of Disability-
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) can be averted and, in other words, the health status of a larger 
population is improved. To use this potential, decision makers, at all levels, have to be aware of 
the health effects and costs of the interventions they plan to implement. This dissertation 
focused on three selected areas where decisions on health resource allocation are made. 
Firstly, an empirical investigation has been carried out to answer the research question on the 
marginal health returns on cross-sectoral government expenditure (Q1). The results of the 
estimated SEM show a significantly positive impact of nutrition, access to safe water sources, 
sanitation, and education on the reduction of disease prevalence. When comparing these 
variables, the highest returns on DALYs are obtained by improving nutrition and water, 
followed by sanitation and education. However, short- and long-term public spending on health 
turned out not to have a significant positive impact on health. Further evaluation of the “causes 
of the causes” showed that mothers’ education and a decreasing number of 'under-five' 
diseases significantly reduce the prevalence of malnutrition among children under the age of 
five. In the case of access to safe water sources, which is a further determinant of the disease 
burden, public spending on water and an increasing degree of urbanization are significant 
determinants. Moreover, growing income is highly correlated with improvements in education. 
With respect to the qualitative structured interviews, networking-skills, knowledge-sharing-
skills, and partnership-creation-skills are all very important to establish and maintain cross-
sectoral cooperation. Additional skills required are further soft-skills such as joint-planning-, 
negotiation-, consultancy-, and organizational skills, and hard-skills such as a technical 
professional background. The most important factor influencing collaborative efforts is the 
relative budget allocated to a certain sector. Slightly less important in terms of starting 
collaborations are the payoffs of each stakeholder, and interpersonal attraction. Preconditions 
to work intersectorally include a well-balanced number of stakeholders, mutual trust, a 
consensus on common problems and, especially for government actors, sufficient incentives for 
IHA. A major challenge of working cross-sectorally for public health is the predominant sectoral 
orientation of funding, budget, planning, monitoring, and accountability, especially for 
government stakeholders. Considering these qualitative results and the fact that up until today 
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only a few cross-sectoral initiatives have been identified, hypothesis one (H1) cannot be 
verified. It remains unclear whether IHA already leads to significant synergies in allocating 
resources for health improvement in the case of Tanzania. 
Secondly, moving from cross-sectoral thoughts to the health sector itself, the objective of the 
fourth chapter was to test the hypothesis that interventions to combat malaria are prioritized 
in such a way that the marginal dollar goes to where it has the highest effect on averting DALYs. 
Estimates based on a population model for Tanzania mainland show that preventive 
interventions such as Insecticide-Treated Nets (ITNs) and Intermittent Presumptive Treatment 
with Sulphadoxine-Pyrimethamine in Pregnancy (IPTP) would be the first choice when setting 
priorities, with costs of US$ 41 per DALY averted for both of the interventions. With increasing 
budgets, the additional amount of funds available should be invested in case management with 
Artemisinin based Combination Treatment (ACT, US$ 53 per DALY averted). The shift from the 
two preventive measures (ITNs and IPTP) to the inclusion of ACTs results in an incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio of 85.3. As a fourth priority, Indoor Residual Spraying (IRS) at 95% coverage 
should be included with costs of US$ 73 per DALY averted and an incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio of 191.1.  
Graphical analysis shows diminishing marginal returns on malaria investments with increasing 
budgets. The most cost-effective strategy is implemented when covering ITNs, IPTP and case 
management with ACT at a level of 95%. The budget needed to finance this combination of 
interventions is almost identical to the funds available in the year 2010 (US$ 140 million, see 
section 4.2.4). However, the current budget does not prioritize certain interventions in such a 
way that the marginal dollar goes to where it has the highest effect on averting DALYs. The 
results of the budget analysis show that a budget share of 41.7% would be sufficient to provide 
ITNs to all Tanzanian people exposed to the risk of malaria (current allocation: 47%). To reach a 
more optimal budget allocation, funds from the overfunded ITN program and the less cost-
effective IRS should be shifted to make ACTs available and affordable to the poor population. 
The current allocation of funds to ACTs is 29% compared to 43.3% optimally. Thus, hypothesis 
two (H2) has to be invalidated. As a result of the qualitative analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis 
was rated as one of the most important criteria for health priority setting.  
Thirdly, the impact of the political economy has to be considered when analyzing the allocation 
of resources for health improvement. To account for that, the objective of chapter five was to 
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positively assess how political party competition and the access to mass media directly and 
indirectly affect the distribution of district resources for health improvement. Based on a 
dataset combining socioeconomic, electoral, and public-financial indicators for all districts of 
Tanzania mainland, this analysis suggests that politicians are responsive to electoral 
competition. Using per capita health expenditure in the first year after the election as a 
dependent variable, the estimates imply that a one-percentage point smaller difference 
between the winning party and the second-place party leads to a 0.151 percentage point 
increase in public health spending, significant at the five percent level. The robustness of this 
result is confirmed in repeated simulations using the same dependent variable for the second 
year after the election and using the change of per capita health expenditure in both the first 
and the second year, after the election. The direct effect of mass media on district level health 
spending is less clear. Only the second model specification confirms our expectation that mass 
media is positively related to health spending. For every one-percentage point increase of 
people having access to radio, per capita health expenditure increases by 2.233 percentage 
points. Based on these results, hypothesis three (H3) can be partially verified. Political factors 
directly affect the distribution of district resources for health improvement in Tanzania. 
In this dissertation, three selected areas of health resource allocation have been reviewed. To 
narrow the gap between the actual and a more efficient allocation of resources for health 
improvement, however, various other aspects of resource allocation must be considered. 
Firstly, in an optimal way, all interventions to combat other major diseases in Tanzania must be 
prioritized as it has been done, in this analysis, for malaria interventions. Secondly, the right 
mix of curative and preventive medicine has to be found for major diseases in this country. 
Based on a linear programming model for Tanzania, Fleßa (1999) called for a reallocation of 
resources for health improvement from curative to preventive services in order to increase the 
overall efficiency of the health care system. Thirdly, decision-makers have to be aware of the 
health effects and costs of interventions implemented at different levels of health facilities. This 
is necessary to decide on the budget share allocated to primary, secondary, and tertiary health 
facilities. Fourthly, this study has shown that political mechanisms and institutions play a major 
role in health resource allocation. Besides political party competition and other institutional 
variables included in the model, further political aspects need to be explored. One of these 
aspects would be to better understand what determines the allocation of resources to health 
and non-health sectors. These and other issues are left for future work. 
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This dissertation addressed the problem of resource allocation from a societal perspective 
using interdisciplinary research approaches. Based on the results of the three analyses, the 
health status of an entire population can be strengthened by allocating resources for health 
improvement in a more efficient manner. In particular, the following three policy 
recommendations can be given:  
 Thinking cross-sectorally, the highest health returns are obtained by improving 
nutrition and access to safe water sources, followed by sanitation and education 
 
 Moving from cross-sectoral thoughts to the health sector itself, the current malaria 
budget does not prioritize certain interventions in such a way that the marginal dollar 
goes to where it has the highest effect on averting DALYs. Preventive interventions 
such as ITNs and IPTP would be the first choice when setting priorities, followed by 
case management with ACTs and, finally, IRS 
 
 The reality of political economy needs attention in health finance and planning. The 
official allocation formula is not the only determinant of financial resources available 
at lower government levels. Political party competition and, in some cases, mass 
media, are positively related to health spending 
These empirical analyses focused on the mechanisms behind the allocation of resources for 
health improvement in a single developing country. However, the theoretical frameworks, 
estimation methods, and structures of the qualitative parts could be used to draw a broader 
picture of the determinants of resource allocation in any country. For this, certain variables and 
model structures would have to be adapted to other settings and the availability of data. At the 
same time, a process of learning how resources can be allocated in a more efficient manner has 
to be continued at different government levels as well as on the donor side.  
The implementation of the given policy recommendations is less straightforward. A complex 
system of various political factors and incentives lead to political choices and priorities that 
might not be the ones with the highest health benefit for the population. However, we must 
not forget that even today’s developed countries have spent decades creating a basis for a 
more efficient public health sector and remain far from reaching optimality. 
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Appendix 1: Map of Regional per Capita Agriculture Investment at Current 
Prices, 2010 (in Tanzanian Shillings) 
 
 
 
Data source: Login Tanzania Database 2011 (mapped by the author) 
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Appendix 2: Map of Regional per Capita Water Investment at Current Prices, 
2010 (in Tanzanian Shillings) 
 
 
 
Data source: Login Tanzania Database 2011 (mapped by the author) 
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Appendix 3: Map of Regional per Capita Education Investment at Current Prices, 
2010 (in Tanzanian Shillings) 
 
 
 
Data source: Login Tanzania Database 2011 (mapped by the author) 
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Appendix 4: Definitions of Variables (Chapter 3) 
Variable Definition 
Exogenous variable 
THINV Logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on health in the 
short- and long term (total spending of the current and the last five 
budget years)* 
SANI Latrines per 100 pupils 
INFRA Percentage of women and men age 15-49 who reported serious 
problems in accessing health care due to the distance to the next 
health facility 
URB Percentage of people living in urban areas 
TAINV Logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on agriculture 
(current and previous budget year)* 
BREASTF Percentage who started breastfeeding within 1 hour of birth, among 
the last children born in the five years preceding the survey 
IODINE Percentage of households with adequate iodine content of salt (15+ 
ppm) 
MEDU Percentage of women age 15-49 who completed grade 6 at the 
secondary level 
VACC Percentage of children age 12-23 months with a vaccination card 
TWINV Logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on water in the 
short- and long term (total spending of the current and the last five 
budget years)* 
TEINV Logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on education in the 
short- and long term (total spending of the current and the last five 
budget years)* 
LABOUR Percentage of women and men employed in the 12 months preceding 
the survey 
LAND Per capita farmland in ha (including the area under temporary 
mono/mixed crops, permanent mono/mixed crops and the area 
under pasture) 
RAIN Yearly rainfall in mm 
Endogenous variables 
DISPREV Health-Index: prevalence of the following diseases, weighted by 
DALYs according to WHO, 2009: 
Malaria: Percentage of children under age 5 with fever in the two 
weeks preceding the survey 
Diarrhoea: Percentage of children under age 5 who had diarrhoea in 
the two weeks preceding the survey 
Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI): Among children under age 5, the 
percentage who had symptoms of acute respiratory infection (ARI) in 
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the two weeks preceding the survey 
NUTR Percentage of children under age 5 classified as malnourished 
according to weight-for-age (below -2 standard deviation units (SD) 
from the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards adopted in 
2006) 
SWATER Percentage of households with access to safe water sources 
EDU Number of primary school pupils divided by the number of primary 
school teachers (Pupils-Teacher-Ratio, PTR).  
GDP Deflated per capita GDP, in million Tanzanian Shillings* 
 
* base year: 2010 
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Appendix 5: Estimation Variations (2SLS) (Chapter 3) 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1) DISPREV (2) NUTR (3) SWATER (4) EDU (5) GDP 
THINV 0.085 (0.08)     
NUTR 0.216 (0.24)     
SWATER -0.123  (0.08)     
SANI -0.038 (0.02)**     
INFRA 0.094 (0.08)     
GDP 0.010 (0.13) 0.095 (0.08) 0.010 (0.23) -17.523 (11.74)  
EDU -0.004 (0.00)**    -0.014 (0.00)** 
URB -0.118 (0.60) -0.358 (0.40) 2.086 (1.28) 31.286 (59.29) 2.685 (0.66)** 
      
TAINV  -0.026 (0.02)    
BREASTF  0.047 (0.04)    
IODINE  -0.023 (0.05)    
MEDU  -0.588 (0.17)**    
VACC  0.012 (0.09)    
DISPREV  0.369 (0.18)**  -22.60 (15.84)  
      
TWINV   0.247 (0.11)**   
      
LTEINV    -2.805 (8.50)  
      
LABOUR     0.255 (0.21) 
LAND     0.081 (0.03)** 
RAIN     0.000 (0.00) 
      
R-Squared 0.7416 0.9003 0.6966 0.8643 0.9248 
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 
      
Note: One/two asterisk indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 10/5 percent level, based on the 
statistics reported in respective parentheses. The coefficients of regional dummies are not reported. 
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Appendix 6: Interview Structure (Chapter 3) 
Structured Expert Interviews 
Challenges and Opportunities of Intersectoral Health Action (IHA) 
Most of the common diseases in Tanzania have multifaceted causes, led by malnutrition and 
poor water supply. Thus, cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary action is needed to strengthen the 
health status of the population. According to the Government of Tanzania, the “recognition of 
cross-sectoral contribution to outcomes and inter-sectoral linkages and synergies“ are one of 
the major prerequisites for the implementation of MKUKUTA II.  
 
Example: The transport sector includes questions regarding the reduction of pedestrian and 
vehicle accidents in their proposal for a new freeway (Egan et al., 2003) 
 
I: External factors / Context 
a) Please state the major objectives of your organisation/ministry: 
 
 
 
 
b) Please elaborate on examples of IHA in your organization/ministry: 
 
 
 
 
c) The table below shows some possible cooperation sectors for IHA. Specify how much 
you work with these sectors (column H) and how high your benefits are from this 
particular collaboration (column I). Your own sector can be left blank. If one or more 
partners are missing, you can add yourself.  
(1 = not intensive, low yield / 4 = very intensive, high yield) 
 
Partner-sectors for IHA H: Intensity I: Yield 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
c1) Health Sector         
c2) Education Sector (e.g. HIV/AIDS 
prevention) 
        
c3) Agriculture/Nutrition Sector (e.g. balanced 
diets) 
        
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c4) Water/Sanitation/Hygiene Sector 
(e.g. waterborne diseases) 
        
c5) Infrastructure Sector (e.g. medical vehicle 
route) 
        
c6) Employment Sector (e.g. generating 
income for health expenditure) 
        
c7)          
c8)          
 
d) Who are the main funders of the stated interventions? 
 
 
 
 
e) Are you starting to cooperate with health-related sectors that you have not previously 
maintained collaborative contacts with? 
 No   Yes, namely: __________________________________________ 
 
f) Which organizations/ministries are currently the main drivers for IHA? 
 
 
 
 
g) Which organizations/ministries are you missing at this time as drivers for IHA? 
 No   I miss: __________________________________________ 
 
h) In your case, does IHA include the private sector and faith based organizations? 
 
 
 
 
 
II: Change Management  / Project Management 
a) Please assess the following skills required for effective health promotion alliances  
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(1 = not important / 4 = very important) 
 1 2 3 4 
a1) Networking-skills     
a2) Knowledge-sharing-skills     
a3) Partnership-creation-skills     
a4) Partnership-support-skills     
a5) Other (please specify): 
____________________________ 
    
 
III: Support Based on Intersectoral Collaboration: Perceptions, Intentions, and Actions 
a) Which of the following parameters influence collaborative efforts with health- 
related sectors?  
(1 = not influencing / 4 = very influencing) 
 1 2 3 4 
a1) Initial distribution of resources among the 
participants 
    
a2) Payoffs of the coalition     
a3) Inclinations to join with other sectors 
(interpersonal attraction) 
    
a4) Other (please specify): 
____________________________ 
    
 
b) Please indicate major preconditions for successful cross-sectoral collaboration: 
(1 = not relevant / 4 = very relevant) 
 1 2 3 4 
b1) A balanced number of stakeholders in 
each sector (including relative skills) 
    
b2) Recognition of different incentives     
b3) Recognition of different cultures     
b4) Consensus on common problems     
b5) Consensus on mutual benefits     
b6) Functional ways of communication     
b7) Tools for analyzing common problems     
b8) Sufficient capacities     
b9) Sufficient incentives     
b10) Dissemination of intersectoral research 
findings 
    
b11) Other (please specify): 
___________________________ 
    
 
c) What are the major challenges of IHA? 
(1 = minor challenge / 4 = major challenge) 
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 1 2 3 4 
c1) Predominant sectoral orientation of 
funding, budget, planning, monitoring, and 
accountability 
    
c2) None of the sectors make efforts to take 
responsibility for cross-sectoral results 
    
c3) Large differences in paradigms, 
worldviews, and mindsets across sectors 
    
c4) Competition of sectoral results     
c5) Lack of education in multi-sectoral work     
c6) High level of staff turnover     
c7) Other (please specify): 
____________________________ 
    
 
d) Do you have further suggestions to improve IHA in your Organization/Ministry? Please 
elaborate: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV: Budget Allocation 
This graph shows the current allocation of public expenditures to major sectors for the financial 
year 2009/2010 (Source: Ministry of Finance). 
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Do you think the proportions should be changed? If so, relatively more / less on what 
sector? 
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Appendix 7: List of Interviewees (Chapter 3) 
No. Name Position Organisation 
1 Jamal Msami Researcher Research on Poverty 
Alleviation (REPOA) 
2 Dr. Baltazar Ngoli Former Regional Medical 
Officer Coast Region 
Government of 
Tanzania – Pwani 
Region 
3 Prof. Samuel Wangwe Director Research on Poverty 
Alleviation (REPOA) 
4 Dr. Axel Dörken GIZ Country Director GIZ 
5 Dr. Obelin Kisanga Former Regional Medical 
Officer Tanga 
Government of 
Tanzania – Tanga 
Region 
6 (not known) Regional Medical Officer 
Mtwara 
Government of 
Tanzania – Mtwara 
Region 
7 Noel Kahise  Second Master Umoja Secondary 
School, Mtwara  
8 Maximillian Mapunda  World Health 
Organization (WHO) 
9 Daniel Albrecht  MEDA 
10 Marion Lieser  CSSC 
11 Janet Macha  IFAKARA 
12 John Msuya Associate Professor in 
Nutrition and Development 
Economics 
Sokuine University of 
Agriculture (SUA) 
13 Tiba Former District Health 
Accountant 
Government of 
Tanzania 
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Appendix 8: Interview Structure (Chapter 4) 
 
Structured Expert Interviews: Health Priority Setting Process 
 
Priority setting in health care is defined simply as the process of determining how health care 
resources should be allocated among competing interventions or people. This process is 
necessary in a developing country like Tanzania, given the scarce financial resources and a 
tremendous burden of disease.  
 
1. Please elaborate on the health priority setting process in your institution/department: 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Please rate the importance of the following criteria for health priority setting: 
     (1 = not important criteria / 4 = very important criteria) 
2.1 Disease-related criteria 
 1 2 3 4 
a) Severity of a condition     
b) Cost-effectiveness of intervention     
c) Quality of evidence on effectiveness     
 
2.2 Patient-related criteria 
 1 2 3 4 
a) Urgency of need for care     
b) Responsible for causing own illness     
c) Age     
 if rated 3 or 4:       favoring young people 
 favoring old people 
    
d) Social status     
 if rated 3 or 4:       favoring wealthy people 
 favoring poor people 
    
e) Gender     
 if rated 3 or 4:       favoring female 
 favoring male 
    
f) Place of residence     
 if rated 3 or 4:       favoring rural areas 
 favoring urban areas 
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2.3 Society-related criteria 
 1 2 3 4 
a) Equity of health care access     
b) Community’s views     
c) Political views     
 
3. Do you think investing in non-health sectors should be given priority? (e.g. improving access 
to save water sources) Please elaborate. 
 
 
 
 
4. Who should be the main actors in health priority setting? 
     (1 = not important actor / 4 = very important actor) 
 1 2 3 4 
a) Health professionals     
b) Donors     
c) International level (e.g. WHO)     
d) Central government level     
e) Local Government level     
f) General public     
g) Patients     
h) NGOs     
i) Health insurance companies     
 Other (please specify): ________________     
5. What are the major challenges of the health priority setting process? 
     (1 = minor challenge / 4 = major challenge) 
 1 2 3 4 
a) Availability of health data/indicators     
b) Quality of health data/indicators     
c) Not aware of the impact of certain health 
investments 
    
d) No personnel capacity for priority setting     
e) No incentives to carry out an appropriate 
priority setting process 
    
f) Earmarked funding (Government)     
g) Earmarked funding (Donors)     
h) Political constraints (dominant interest groups, 
multiple government levels) 
    
i) Discrepancy in values     
 Other (please specify): 
____________________________ 
    
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6. This graph shows the current allocation of public health expenditures to major disease areas 
in Tanzania. Do you think the proportions should be changed? If so, relatively more / less on 
which disease? 
Source: National Health Accounts, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Do you have further suggestions to improve the health priority setting process? 
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Appendix 9: List of Interviewees (Chapter 4) 
No. Name Position Organisation 
1 Daniel Albrecht Manager, Projects & 
Business Development 
Tanzania National Voucher 
Scheme 
MEDA Economic 
Development 
Associates, Tanzania  
2 Max Mapunda Health Service Delivery World Health 
Organization (WHO), 
Tanzania Office 
3 Dr. Tausi Kida Director of Programmes – 
ESRF/REPOA/ISS Capacity 
Building 
Economic and Social 
Research Foundation 
(ESRF) 
4 Meinolf Kuper Head of Health Financing Tanzanian-German 
Programme to 
Support Health 
(TGPSH) 
5 Modest Rwakahemula Doctor in Charge St. Joseph Kagondo 
Hospital 
6 Justus Magongo Councillor Muleba District United Republic of 
Tanzania 
7 Dr. Leontine District Medical Officer, 
Muleba District 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
8 (not known) Health Administrator, 
Muleba District 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
9 (not known) Health Administrator, 
Muleba District 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
10 Dr. Joseph District Health Secretary, 
Bukoba Rural District 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
11 Dr. Raphael Kiula District Medical Officer, 
Bukoba Municipal 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
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Appendix 10: Definitions of Variables (Chapter 5) 
 
Variable name Definition 
Health Expenditure 
(first year after the election) 
Logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on health in 2006 (budgeted 
amounts)* 
Health Expenditure Change 
(first year after the election) 
Logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on health in 2006 - logarithm of 
deflated public per capita spending on health in 2005 (budgeted amounts)* 
Health Expenditure 
(second year after the 
election) 
Logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on health in 2007 (budgeted 
amounts)* 
Health Expenditure Change 
(second year after the 
election) 
Logarithm of deflated public per capita spending on health in 2007 - logarithm of 
deflated public per capita spending on health in 2005 (budgeted amounts)* 
Voter Turnout Number of valid votes divided by the number of registered voters 
Political Party Competition = margin of victory: percentage of votes for the winning party less the percentage 
won by the second-place party (see Cleary 2007) 
Access to Radio Percentage of women and men aged 15-49 listening to radio at least once a week 
Access to Newspapers Percentage of women and men aged 15-49 reading a newspaper at least once a 
week 
Under-five Mortality The probability of dying between birth and the fifth birthday, per 1,000 live births 
Gender of Political Head Dummy variable: male / female 
Political Party Dummy variable: leading party CCM / other party 
Degree of Urbanisation Percentage of the population living in urban areas 
Employment Number of women and men aged 15-49 employed in the 12 months preceding 
the survey divided by the total population in that age span 
GDP Logarithm of deflated per capita GDP, in million Tanzanian Shillings* 
Literacy Number of women and men aged 15-49 literate divided by the total population in 
that age span 
Population Density Logarithm of the number of people per square kilometer 
Access to Health 
Infrastructure 
Percentage of women and men age 15-49 who reported serious problems in 
accessing health care due to the distance to the next health facility 
 
* base year: 2010  
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Appendix 11: Interacting Political Party Competition and Urbanization 
   Dependent Variable (1st Year After the Election) 
  Independent Variables log Health Expenditure (per capita) 
  Objective Variables  
Tit + Voter Turnout -0.076 (0.40) 
Rit + Access to Radio 0.118 (0.42) 
Nit + Access to Newspapers 0.088 (0.21) 
    
  Interaction Variable  
 + Political Party Competition x Degree of 
Urbanisation 
0.412 (0.17)** 
    
Vit  Controls  
 + Lagged log Health Expenditure (per capita) 0.692 (0.11)*** 
 + Under-five Mortality 0.550 (1.62) 
 +/- Gender of Political Head (dummy) -0.010 (0.04) 
 +/- Political Party (dummy) -0.043 (0.04) 
 + Employment -0.362 (0.52) 
 + log GDP (per capita) -0.420 (0.23) 
 + Literacy 0.381 (0.19) 
 + log Population Density -0.030 (0.04) 
 + Access to Health Infrastructure 0.108 (0.14) 
    
  Valid N 110 
  R-squared 0.4805 
    
Note: The table reports standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted with the conventional ***p 
< 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
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Appendix 12: Data (selected variables) 
Complete data sets for all variables used can be downloaded from: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/uzby8qsk35gyriw/AAAlHavg5rDeUL5N2KyZ3Qira 
For the exact definition of variables see Appendix 4 and 10. 
REGION YEAR TEINV THINV TWINV TAINV GDP RAIN EDU URB 
Arusha 2004 52720 11211 1748 1357 0,688 478,7 48 0,313 
Arusha 2005 57619 12811 1953 952 0,745 530,3 48 0,313 
Arusha 2009 84688 23749 5095 5596 0,899 793,4 42 0,313 
Arusha 2010 98958 26952 5794 6646 0,972 793,4 42 0,313 
Manyara 2004 45668 10503 2224 1486 0,602 478,7 61 0,127 
Manyara 2005 50907 12600 2630 1503 0,684 530,3 61 0,130 
Manyara 2009 86597 24150 5530 6287 0,801 793,4 52 0,142 
Manyara 2010 93082 26156 6591 5939 0,822 793,4 49 0,144 
Pwani 2004 50919 18097 3792 2518 0,479 883,4 45 0,219 
Pwani 2005 55132 21233 4681 2241 0,465 691,0 45 0,223 
Pwani 2009 94139 36729 8912 6180 0,506 820,4 42 0,240 
Pwani 2010 103660 38550 9278 6220 0,547 860,6 41 0,244 
Dodoma 2004 41582 10160 2148 1378 0,374 687,6 49 0,142 
Dodoma 2005 45081 11598 2636 1319 0,376 329,7 49 0,150 
Dodoma 2009 72822 19063 5095 3878 0,443 394,6 56 0,182 
Dodoma 2010 79701 21560 5507 4800 0,482 394,6 53 0,190 
Iringa 2004 52239 10799 1846 1370 0,733 682,5 48 0,182 
Iringa 2005 56548 12458 2198 1296 0,771 481,1 48 0,187 
Iringa 2009 90396 26170 5431 5013 0,867 417,9 45 0,208 
Iringa 2010 102179 28246 5940 4657 0,908 417,9 45 0,213 
Kigoma 2004 32676 8098 1552 685 0,407 867,7 72 0,174 
Kigoma 2005 35598 9122 1722 597 0,407 742,2 72 0,183 
Kigoma 2009 56009 13680 2257 1532 0,441 865,6 59 0,220 
Kigoma 2010 58346 14794 2501 2369 0,431 865,6 59 0,229 
Kilimanjaro 2004 74641 16934 3192 2201 0,699 0,0 42 0,217 
Kilimanjaro 2005 79915 18735 3709 2259 0,752 0,0 42 0,221 
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Kilimanjaro 2009 129332 35046 7203 6624 0,830 512,6 36 0,238 
Kilimanjaro 2010 141009 38043 7693 6509 0,831 512,6 34 0,242 
Lindi 2004 47744 16034 3997 1255 0,545 1171,2 52 0,182 
Lindi 2005 51450 18095 4806 1155 0,530 511,5 52 0,193 
Lindi 2009 79773 28895 7978 7248 0,580 841,4 55 0,237 
Lindi 2010 87736 31206 9003 6879 0,628 841,4 55 0,247 
Mara 2004 52698 9461 2699 1302 0,624 729,6 59 0,200 
Mara 2005 55758 10860 3380 1817 0,624 815,7 59 0,206 
Mara 2009 93478 21100 7282 4979 0,680 1006,2 61 0,230 
Mara 2010 101396 23678 7873 5262 0,683 1006,2 58 0,235 
Mbeya 2004 49798 9455 1066 1477 0,668 678,3 56 0,207 
Mbeya 2005 54259 12047 1237 1407 0,729 678,3 56 0,209 
Mbeya 2009 83902 22340 2621 2453 0,880 678,3 55 0,215 
Mbeya 2010 89537 23806 3135 3462 0,917 678,3 51 0,217 
Morogoro 2004 44522 9443 1345 1383 0,639 921,5 51 0,278 
Morogoro 2005 47919 11015 1835 1223 0,652 444,8 51 0,283 
Morogoro 2009 83500 21526 3388 4476 0,690 751,0 48 0,300 
Morogoro 2010 92961 23585 3636 3625 0,714 751,0 46 0,304 
Mtwara 2004 47607 11099 2103 1032 0,486 1485,3 49 0,212 
Mtwara 2005 52580 12532 2599 1029 0,471 754,1 49 0,217 
Mtwara 2009 76874 19622 4783 3452 0,522 1230,8 52 0,235 
Mtwara 2010 83045 21052 5544 4465 0,656 1230,8 51 0,239 
Mwanza 2004 34583 7714 995 502 0,593 1094,6 69 0,208 
Mwanza 2005 37556 9013 1133 623 0,609 1060,1 69 0,209 
Mwanza 2009 70186 19742 2446 2586 0,778 1144,7 61 0,215 
Mwanza 2010 77139 21555 2640 2443 0,803 1144,7 57 0,216 
Ruvuma 2004 56548 12982 2095 1298 0,704 1097,4 40 0,157 
Ruvuma 2005 61078 14427 2397 1245 0,775 716,1 40 0,159 
Ruvuma 2009 94091 23263 4307 9210 0,872 955,6 48 0,169 
Ruvuma 2010 103147 25298 4638 7622 0,851 955,6 48 0,171 
Shinyanga 2004 29458 6414 1086 905 0,447 601,5 74 0,096 
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Shinyanga 2005 33453 7663 1204 778 0,431 601,5 74 0,098 
Shinyanga 2009 70833 19423 5753 3225 0,528 601,5 71 0,105 
Shinyanga 2010 76682 21364 6099 2947 0,557 601,5 62 0,107 
Singida 2004 42257 12240 2475 1428 0,391 460,1 54 0,150 
Singida 2005 45315 13745 2687 1318 0,357 460,1 54 0,156 
Singida 2009 80952 22564 6795 3360 0,402 460,1 58 0,181 
Singida 2010 90606 25607 7447 4249 0,484 460,1 53 0,187 
Tabora 2004 37144 8820 1594 861 0,471 1200,6 54 0,149 
Tabora 2005 40356 10000 1995 859 0,531 683,0 54 0,160 
Tabora 2009 66288 17974 3776 2557 0,586 850,4 67 0,201 
Tabora 2010 69118 19523 4252 2160 0,578 850,4 64 0,211 
Tanga 2004 48862 13169 1948 1483 0,664 1196,8 40 0,185 
Tanga 2005 52944 14753 2421 1449 0,747 821,0 40 0,186 
Tanga 2009 86610 25992 5500 6595 0,716 1155,9 53 0,188 
Tanga 2010 96095 29192 6263 6259 0,730 1155,9 50 0,189 
Kagera 2004 36178 6179 1202 310 0,434 1934,9 59 0,074 
Kagera 2005 45035 7672 1583 398 0,420 1953,6 59 0,078 
Kagera 2009 80458 16363 3917 3198 0,485 1989,6 60 0,094 
Kagera 2010 86921 18607 4337 3498 0,495 1989,6 58 0,097 
Dar 2004 32682 9118 1027 567 1,241 1094,8 47 0,944 
Dar 2005 35335 9499 1226 540 1,277 900,6 47 0,947 
Dar 2009 62353 19972 1206 565 1,714 964,2 44 0,957 
Dar 2010 74490 24241 1180 476 1,736 964,2 37 0,960 
Rukwa 2004 30540 10113 1772 897 0,621 805,6 63 0,181 
Rukwa 2005 38222 12557 2249 722 0,638 805,6 63 0,183 
Rukwa 2009 74224 22307 4170 4987 0,754 805,6 65 0,193 
Rukwa 2010 79656 22967 4277 7091 0,765 805,6 63 0,195 
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DISTRICT YEAR 
POLITICAL 
PARTY 
COMPETITION 
VOTER 
TURNOUT 
POPULATION 
DENSITY 
Arusha Urban Council 2010 0,192 0,429 3614,3 
Arusha Urban Council 2005 0,066 0,587 4169,6 
Arusha Arumeru 2010 0,279 0,459 188,2 
Arusha Arumeru 2005 0,442 0,737 217,1 
Arusha Monduli 2010 0,838 0,492 13,8 
Arusha Monduli 2005 0,894 0,668 15,9 
Arusha Karatu 2010 0,215 0,682 57,1 
Arusha Karatu 2005 0,016 0,875 65,9 
Manyara Babati 2010 0,016 0,615 64,4 
Manyara Babati 2005 0,278 0,841 74,3 
Manyara Hanang 2010 0,215 0,501 63,1 
Manyara Hanang 2005 0,823 0,829 72,8 
Manyara Kiteto 2010 0,282 0,426 9,9 
Manyara Kiteto 2005 0,146 0,755 11,4 
Manyara Mbulu 2010 0,278 0,589 57,7 
Manyara Mbulu 2005 0,377 0,848 66,6 
Manyara Simanjiro 2005 0,550 0,678 9,1 
Pwani/Coast Region Kibaha Urban Council 2010 0,139 0,460 76,7 
Pwani/Coast Region Kibaha Urban Council 2005 0,262 0,690 88,5 
Pwani/Coast Region Bagamojo 2010 0,713 0,435 24,6 
Pwani/Coast Region Bagamojo 2005 0,692 0,753 28,4 
Pwani/Coast Region Kisarawe 2010 0,641 0,463 22,6 
Pwani/Coast Region Kisarawe 2005 0,341 0,774 26,1 
Pwani/Coast Region Mkuranga 2010 0,457 0,330 81,4 
Pwani/Coast Region Mkuranga 2005 0,292 0,745 93,9 
Pwani/Coast Region Mafia 2010 0,178 0,659 82,9 
Pwani/Coast Region Mafia 2005 0,177 0,832 95,6 
Pwani/Coast Region Rufiji 2010 0,207 0,693 16,0 
Pwani/Coast Region Rufiji 2005 0,141 0,808 18,5 
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Dodoma Dodoma Urban Council 2010 0,497 0,399 132,7 
Dodoma Dodoma Urban Council 2005 0,739 0,664 153,1 
Dodoma Dodoma District Council 2010 0,497 0,348 33,2 
Dodoma Dodoma District Council 2005 0,877 0,790 38,3 
Dodoma Kondoa 2010 0,459 0,582 34,3 
Dodoma Kondoa 2005 0,350 0,803 39,6 
Dodoma Kongwa 2005 0,870 0,812 75,2 
Dodoma Mpwapwa 2010 0,790 0,449 35,9 
Dodoma Mpwapwa 2005 0,786 0,798 41,4 
Iringa Urban Council 2010 0,061 0,612 702,6 
Iringa Urban Council 2005 0,496 0,653 810,6 
Iringa Disctrict Council 2010 0,877 0,541 13,0 
Iringa Disctrict Council 2005 0,594 0,761 15,0 
Iringa Ludewa 2005 0,914 0,766 28,0 
Iringa Makete 2010 0,702 0,585 35,2 
Iringa Makete 2005 0,916 0,790 40,7 
Iringa Mufindi 2005 0,786 0,791 55,8 
Iringa Njombe 2010 1,000 0,543 45,0 
Iringa Njombe 2005 0,660 0,750 51,9 
Iringa Kilolo 2010 0,848 0,484 31,8 
Iringa Kilolo 2005 0,828 0,801 36,7 
Kigoma Urban Council 2010 0,028 0,473 1193,3 
Kigoma Urban Council 2005 0,144 0,719 1376,7 
Kigoma District Council 2010 0,076 0,473 44,9 
Kigoma District Council 2005 0,173 0,734 51,8 
Kigoma Kasulu 2010 0,126 0,302 72,7 
Kigoma Kasulu 2005 0,243 0,766 83,9 
Kigoma Kibondo 2010 0,196 0,559 27,9 
Kigoma Kibondo 2005 0,646 0,794 32,1 
Kilimanjaro Moshi Urban Council 2010 0,259 0,470 5250,4 
Kilimanjaro Moshi Urban Council 2005 0,146 0,689 6057,1 
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Kilimanjaro Moshi District Council 2010 0,206 0,542 278,0 
Kilimanjaro Moshi District Council 2005 0,289 0,761 320,7 
Kilimanjaro Hai 2010 0,095 0,606 115,7 
Kilimanjaro Hai 2005 0,442 0,757 133,5 
Kilimanjaro Mwanga 2010 0,615 0,498 56,2 
Kilimanjaro Mwanga 2005 0,616 0,681 64,8 
Kilimanjaro Rombo 2010 0,032 0,552 175,6 
Kilimanjaro Rombo 2005 0,629 0,739 202,5 
Kilimanjaro Same 2010 0,467 0,510 39,8 
Kilimanjaro Same 2005 0,552 0,726 45,9 
Lindi Urban Council 2010 0,067 1,087 64,9 
Lindi Urban Council 2005 0,194 0,744 74,9 
Lindi District Council 2010 0,435 0,482 34,0 
Lindi District Council 2005 0,383 0,803 39,2 
Lindi Kilwa 2010 0,137 0,621 13,5 
Lindi Kilwa 2005 0,228 0,762 15,6 
Lindi Ruangwa 2010 0,492 0,492 49,0 
Lindi Ruangwa 2005 0,638 0,787 56,5 
Lindi Liwale 2010 0,205 0,696 2,1 
Lindi Liwale 2005 0,148 0,857 2,4 
Lindi Nachingwea 2010 0,432 0,493 28,4 
Lindi Nachingwea 2005 0,745 0,797 32,7 
Mara Musoma Urban Council 2010 0,215 0,531 4078,6 
Mara Musoma Urban Council 2005 0,125 0,693 4705,3 
Mara Musoma District Council 2005 0,125 0,693 101,2 
Mara Bunda 2010 0,353 0,604 98,5 
Mara Bunda 2005 0,090 0,776 113,7 
Mara Serengeti 2010 0,163 0,517 17,0 
Mara Serengeti 2005 0,208 0,747 19,7 
Mara Tarime 2010 0,010 0,486 133,7 
Mara Tarime 2005 0,447 0,701 154,3 
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Mbeya Urban Council 2010 0,299 0,471 1520,1 
Mbeya Urban Council 2005 0,559 0,641 1753,6 
Mbeya District Council 2010 0,225 0,505 14,1 
Mbeya District Council 2005 0,714 0,720 16,3 
Mbeya Ileje 2010 0,693 0,540 61,0 
Mbeya Ileje 2005 0,450 0,773 70,3 
Mbeya Kyela 2010 0,802 0,486 139,2 
Mbeya Kyela 2005 0,887 0,732 160,6 
Mbeya Mbarali 2010 0,352 0,434 13,0 
Mbeya Mbarali 2005 0,609 0,701 15,0 
Mbeya Mbozi 2010 0,110 0,477 56,2 
Mbeya Mbozi 2005 0,838 0,706 64,8 
Mbeya Rungwe 2005 0,443 0,748 169,3 
Morogoro Urban Council 2010 0,383 0,382 928,2 
Morogoro Urban Council 2005 0,371 0,663 1070,8 
Morogoro District Council 2010 0,600 0,429 38,0 
Morogoro District Council 2005 0,702 0,785 43,9 
Morogoro Kilombero 2010 0,055 0,414 22,8 
Morogoro Kilombero 2005 0,581 0,704 26,3 
Morogoro Kilosa 2010 0,659 0,403 36,3 
Morogoro Kilosa 2005 0,674 0,785 41,9 
Morogoro Ulanga 2010 0,540 0,579 8,3 
Morogoro Ulanga 2005 0,393 0,822 9,6 
Morogoro Mvomero 2010 0,387 0,451 23,4 
Morogoro Mvomero 2005 0,775 0,770 27,0 
Mtwara Urban Council 2010 0,217 0,525 598,6 
Mtwara Urban Council 2005 0,317 0,705 690,6 
Mtwara District Council 2010 0,380 0,532 60,1 
Mtwara District Council 2005 0,560 0,808 69,3 
Mtwara Masasi 2010 0,528 0,485 52,2 
Mtwara Masasi 2005 0,671 0,822 60,3 
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Mtwara Newala 2010 0,356 0,611 91,3 
Mtwara Newala 2005 0,625 0,919 105,3 
Mtwara Tandahimba 2010 0,015 0,582 114,0 
Mtwara Tandahimba 2005 0,471 0,841 131,5 
Mwanza Urban Council 2010 0,112 0,356 1182,6 
Mwanza Urban Council 2005 0,577 0,531 1364,3 
Mwanza Geita 2010 0,361 0,396 110,8 
Mwanza Geita 2005 0,329 0,691 127,8 
Mwanza Kwimba 2010 0,224 0,434 85,4 
Mwanza Kwimba 2005 0,433 0,768 98,6 
Mwanza Magu 2010 0,355 0,497 143,1 
Mwanza Magu 2005 0,469 0,730 165,1 
Mwanza Sengerema 2010 0,529 0,358 158,4 
Mwanza Sengerema 2005 0,306 0,670 182,8 
Mwanza Ukerewe 2010 0,161 0,434 431,5 
Mwanza Ukerewe 2005 0,104 0,690 497,8 
Mwanza Misumgwi 2010 0,727 0,400 139,3 
Mwanza Misumgwi 2005 0,690 0,757 160,7 
Ruvuma Songea Urban Council 2005 0,901 0,745 351,7 
Ruvuma Songea District Council 2005 0,901 0,745 4,9 
Ruvuma Songea District Council 2010 0,812 0,417 5,7 
Ruvuma Mbinga 2005 0,840 0,770 37,5 
Ruvuma Mbinga 2010 0,721 0,424 43,3 
Ruvuma Tunduru 2005 0,087 0,752 13,9 
Ruvuma Tunduru 2010 0,181 0,520 16,1 
Shinyanga Urban Council 2005 0,223 0,706 259,9 
Shinyanga Urban Council 2010 0,003 0,490 299,9 
Shinyanga District Council 2005 0,417 0,739 69,5 
Shinyanga District Council 2010 0,439 0,401 80,2 
Shinyanga Bariadi 2005 0,103 0,765 65,4 
Shinyanga Bariadi 2010 0,082 0,568 75,4 
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Shinyanga Bukombe 2005 0,337 0,669 38,6 
Shinyanga Bukombe 2010 0,270 0,251 44,5 
Shinyanga Kahama 2005 0,652 0,635 66,6 
Shinyanga Kahama 2010 0,308 0,354 76,8 
Shinyanga Maswa 2005 0,145 0,758 117,8 
Shinyanga Maswa 2010 0,080 0,512 135,9 
Shinyanga Meatu 2005 0,170 0,742 29,6 
Shinyanga Meatu 2010 0,145 0,479 34,2 
Shinyanga Kishapu 2005 0,732 0,766 58,5 
Shinyanga Kishapu 2010 0,491 0,387 67,4 
Singida Urban Council 2005 0,863 0,721 185,1 
Singida Urban Council 2010 0,678 0,418 213,5 
Singida District Council 2005 0,807 0,825 34,9 
Singida District Council 2010 0,375 0,531 40,2 
Singida Iramba 2005 0,583 0,788 49,2 
Singida Iramba 2010 0,678 0,423 56,8 
Singida Manyoni 2005 0,868 0,693 7,6 
Singida Manyoni 2010 0,433 0,355 8,7 
Tabora Urban Council 2005 0,409 0,629 9,9 
Tabora Urban Council 2010 0,485 0,406 11,4 
Tabora Igunga 2005 0,686 0,692 50,6 
Tabora Igunga 2010 0,497 0,301 58,3 
Tabora Nzega 2005 0,405 0,691 63,2 
Tabora Nzega 2010 0,469 0,297 72,9 
Tabora Sikonge 2005 0,459 0,627 6,7 
Tabora Sikonge 2010 0,337 0,266 7,7 
Tabora Urambo 2005 0,495 0,643 18,4 
Tabora Urambo 2010 0,372 0,342 21,2 
Tanga Urban Council 2005 0,306 0,643 542,0 
Tanga Urban Council 2010 0,221 0,475 625,3 
Tanga Handeni 2005 0,721 0,724 43,1 
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Tanga Handeni 2010 0,564 0,338 49,7 
Tanga Korogwe Urban Council 2005 0,713 0,691 73,4 
Tanga Korogwe Urban Council 2010 0,704 0,444 84,6 
Tanga Lushoto 2005 0,780 0,742 126,7 
Tanga Lushoto 2010 0,750 0,402 146,1 
Tanga Muheza 2005 0,563 0,758 61,2 
Tanga Muheza 2010 0,629 0,490 70,6 
Tanga Pangani 2005 0,193 0,797 45,6 
Tanga Pangani 2010 0,313 0,642 52,6 
Tanga Kilindi 2005 0,744 0,762 21,5 
Tanga Kilindi 2010 0,871 0,419 24,8 
Kagera Bukoba Urban Council 2005 0,004 0,777 1070,3 
Kagera Bukoba Urban Council 2010 0,142 0,559 1234,8 
Kagera Bukoba District Council 2005 0,637 0,741 53,6 
Kagera Bukoba District Council 2010 0,747 0,572 61,9 
Kagera Biharamulo 2005 0,512 0,745 42,9 
Kagera Biharamulo 2010 0,023 0,455 49,5 
Kagera Karagwe 2005 0,213 0,850 58,2 
Kagera Karagwe 2010 0,183 0,628 67,2 
Kagera Muleba 2005 0,466 0,751 38,0 
Kagera Muleba 2010 0,810 0,515 43,8 
Kagera Ngara 2005 0,496 0,821 80,0 
Kagera Ngara 2010 0,315 0,461 92,3 
Dar es Salaam Ilala Urban Council 2010 0,237 0,252 3201,4 
Dar es Salaam Ilala Urban Council 2005 0,461 0,616 3693,3 
Dar es Salaam Temeke Urban Council 2010 0,254 0,358 1248,0 
Dar es Salaam Temeke Urban Council 2005 0,290 0,616 1439,7 
Dar es Salaam Kinondoni Urban Council 2010 0,146 0,394 2161,4 
Dar es Salaam Kinondoni Urban Council 2005 0,386 0,605 2493,5 
Rukwa Sumbawanga Urban Council 2005 0,787 0,663 88,7 
Rukwa Sumbawanga Urban Council 2010 0,006 0,452 102,3 
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Rukwa Sumbawanga District Council 2005 0,362 0,719 30,7 
Rukwa Sumbawanga District Council 2010 0,628 0,367 35,4 
Rukwa Nkansi 2005 0,158 0,736 16,7 
Rukwa Nkansi 2010 0,102 0,403 19,3 
Rukwa Mpanda 2005 0,476 0,640 9,1 
 
